43 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. Carter-Reed Co.green2 sentences2024To achieve these objectives, "our courts have 'consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.'" Ibid. (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 518 ). 2020In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we "'must ascertain whether the trial court has followed' the class action standard set forth in Rule 4:32-1." Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017) (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 506 ). | 5 | 11 |
Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Centergreen2 sentences2018Our courts liberally construe Rule 4:32-1, the class action rule, in accordance with the Court's instruction that "a class action 'should lie unless it is clearly infeasible.'" Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 103 (quoting Riley, 61 N.J. at 225 ). 2017Our courts liberally construe Rule 4:32-1, the class action rule, in accordance with the Court's instruction that "a class action 'should lie unless it is clearly infeasible.'" Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 103 (quoting Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 225 (1972)). | 3 | 7 |
Debra Dugan v. TGI Friday’s, Inc. (077567) Ernest Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC (077567) (Burlington County and Statewide)green2 sentences2020In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we "'must ascertain whether the trial court has followed' the class action standard set forth in Rule 4:32-1." Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017) (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 506 ). 2020A-5545-18T3 12 Moreover, our courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the class action rule is required to be liberally construed in favor of permitting certification, Dugan, 231 N.J. at 46-47 ; Lee, 203 N.J. at 518 ; Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 103 , and that certification should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper. | 2 | 7 |
LUSKY v. Capasso Brothersgreen2 sentences2004Here, the judge did not expressly place on either party the burden of producing evidence, but invoked the principle of Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A. 2d 736 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 466 , 291 A. 2d 16 (1972), that "the class action rule should be liberally construed, and such an action should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper." In effect, the judge placed on defendants the burden of producing evidence that class treatment was inappropriate. 2004Here, the judge did not expressly place on either party the burden of producing evidence, but invoked the principle of Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A. 2d 736 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 466 , 291 A. 2d 16 (1972), that "the class action rule should be liberally construed, and such an action should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper." In effect, the judge placed on defendants the burden of producing evidence that class treatment was inappropriate. | 2 | 6 |
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delawaregreen2 sentences2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). 2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). | 2 | 4 |
Strawn v. Canusogreen2 sentences2006Not surprisingly, in light of the importance of its role generally, and specifically in recognition of its usefulness in connection with small-damages actions such as are often the case in consumer suits, this Court has instructed that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." Ibid.; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) (stating that "a class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims"); Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 228 , 294 A. 2d 7 (stating that "a court should be slow to hold 2006Not surprisingly, in light of the importance of its role generally, and specifically in recognition of its usefulness in connection with small-damages actions such as are often the case in consumer suits, this Court has instructed that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." Ibid.; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) (stating that "a class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims"); Riley, supra, 61 N.J. at 228 , 294 A. 2d 7 (stating that "a court should be slow to hold | 2 | 2 |
Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.green2 sentences2019The Court concluded that the individually named plaintiff could not proceed with the class action claim for injunctive relief because he , not the individual class members, was not able to "demonstrate that his claim of personal ascertainable loss posed a genuine issue of material fact that required submission to a jury ...." Id. at 240 , 801 A.2d 281 (emphasis added). 2019The Court concluded that the individually named plaintiff could not proceed with the class action claim for injunctive relief because he , not the individual class members, was not able to "demonstrate that his claim of personal ascertainable loss posed a genuine issue of material fact that required submission to a jury ...." Id. at 240 , 801 A.2d 281 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc.green2 sentences2025Indeed, whether a class action waiver provision is enforceable "is a question of law, and we need not defer to the interpretative analysis of the trial . . . courts unless we find it persuasive." Ibid. 2024Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019). 15 Whether a class action waiver provision is enforceable “is a question of law, and we need not defer to the interpretative analysis of the trial or appellate courts unless we find it persuasive.” See ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelingreen2 sentences1975Super. 369, 373 (App. Div. 1972), certif. den. 60 N.J. 466 (1972); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F. 2d 555, 563 (2 Cir.1968). 1972See Comment to R. 4:32; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, supra . | 1 | 2 |
Alissa Moon v. Breathless Incgreen1 sentence2024Relying upon Moon v. Breathless Inc., 868 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 2017), they argue an enforceable arbitration agreement must (1) "identify the substantive areas it purports to cover," (2) "reference the types of claims waived," and (3) "explain the difference between arbitration and litigation using clear and unambiguous language to inform the parties of their legal rights and their intent to surrender those rights." Plaintiffs argue the arbitration clause in the Agreements here fails all three prongs, as it does not explain which areas and claims are covered, nor does it clearly explain the r | 1 | 1 |
Lizzie Davis v. Oasis Legal Finance Operating Company, LLCgreen2 sentences2024Operating Co., 936 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2019). 2024The Eleventh Circuit pointedly distinguished cases like the one before it, in which a class action waiver would violate “Georgia’s public policy as expressed in the text and purpose of” applicable statutes, from those in which the court had previously held that “certain class action waivers were not unconscionable.” Davis, 936 F.3d at 1183 . | 1 | 1 |
Tahisha Roach v. Bm Motoring, Llc(077125)green2 sentences2022Therefore, although the court referred to the class certification requirements under Rules 4:32-1(a) and (b), it was unnecessary to complete the analysis since each potential class member, including plaintiff, executed a MVRO with an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver provision. 1 228 N.J. 163, 177 (2017). 2022Therefore, although the court referred to the class certification requirements under Rules 4:32-1(a) and (b), it was unnecessary to complete the analysis since each potential class member, including plaintiff, executed a MVRO with an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver provision. 1 228 N.J. 163, 177 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholdersgreen1 sentence2021The District Court granted Florence's class certification and motion for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim; however, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision on the unlawful search claim in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co.green1 sentence2020While it is true a court "must 'accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint' and consider the remaining pleadings, [as well as] discovery (including interrogatory answers, relevant documents, and depositions)," this other evidence – if pertinent – must be viewed "in a light favorable to plaintiff." Lee, 203 N.J. at 505 (quoting Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192 N.J. 372, 376 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen2 sentences2011In particular, we uphold the court’s specific ruling that the class action waiver provisions in the contract documents should not be invalidated on public policy grounds, a conclusion that is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). 2011In particular, we uphold the court’s specific ruling that the class action waiver provisions in the contract documents should not be invalidated on public policy grounds, a conclusion that is in keeping with the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 694319green | 1 | 1 |
| Groover v. Michelin North America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Slaven v. BP America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2024To achieve these objectives, "our courts have 'consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.'" Ibid. (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 518 ). 2020A-5545-18T3 12 Moreover, our courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the class action rule is required to be liberally construed in favor of permitting certification, Dugan, 231 N.J. at 46-47 ; Lee, 203 N.J. at 518 ; Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 103 , and that certification should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper. | 10 | 2010–2024 |
In the Matter of Kuusela
green
2 sentences2019In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we " 'must ascertain whether the trial court has followed' the class action standard set forth in Rule 4:32-1." Ibid. (quoting *979 Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC , 203 N.J. 496 , 506, 4 A.3d 561 (2010) ). 2018New Jersey courts have "consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed." Dugan , 231 N.J. at 46 , 171 A.3d 620 (quoting Lee , 203 N.J. at 518 , 4 A.3d 561 ). | 4 | 2015–2019 |
Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018As our Supreme Court said in Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 191 N.J. 88 , 104, 922 A.2d 710 (2007) : When making certification determinations, "the best policy" is to interpret the class-action rule "so as to promote the purposes underlying the rule." 5 James W. 2017In light of those objectives, our courts have “consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.” Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 518 , 4 A.3d 561 (2010) (quoting Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 103 , 922 A.2d 710 ). | 4 | 2010–2018 |
Delgozzo v. Kenny
green
2 sentences2007“New Jersey courts, as well as federal courts construing the federal class action rule after which our rule is modelled [sic], have consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.” Delgozzo, supra, 266 N.J.Super. at 179 , 628 A.2d 1080 (collecting eases); see also Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. 2007“New Jersey courts, as well as federal courts construing the federal class action rule after which our rule is modelled [sic], have consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.” Delgozzo, supra, 266 N.J.Super. at 179 , 628 A.2d 1080 (collecting eases); see also Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. | 4 | 2002–2007 |
In Re the Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action
green
2 sentences2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac 2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac | 4 | 1993–2006 |
Saldana v. City of Camden
green
2 sentences2015LR 4:32 — 1(b)(3).] In short, “the movant must demonstrate both the predominance of the common issues and the ‘superiority’ of a cause of action over other available trial techniques.” Saldana v. City of Camden, 252 N.J.Super. 188, 196 , 599 A.2d 582 (App.Div.1991). “ ‘New Jersey courts ... have consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.’ ” Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 518 , 4 A.3d 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 103 , 922 A.2d 710 ). 2015LR 4:32 — 1(b)(3).] In short, “the movant must demonstrate both the predominance of the common issues and the ‘superiority’ of a cause of action over other available trial techniques.” Saldana v. City of Camden, 252 N.J.Super. 188, 196 , 599 A.2d 582 (App.Div.1991). “ ‘New Jersey courts ... have consistently held that the class action rule should be liberally construed.’ ” Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 518 , 4 A.3d 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 103 , 922 A.2d 710 ). | 3 | 1993–2015 |
Lusky v. CAPASSO BROTHERS
neutral
2 sentences2004Here, the judge did not expressly place on either party the burden of producing evidence, but invoked the principle of Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A. 2d 736 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 466 , 291 A. 2d 16 (1972), that "the class action rule should be liberally construed, and such an action should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper." In effect, the judge placed on defendants the burden of producing evidence that class treatment was inappropriate. 1995For all of those claimants who rely on the seller’s duty to disclose, it would be a hollow system of justice that awarded recovery to some homeowners while denying recovery to others similarly situated. *68 In assessing whether class certification is the superior method for adjudication, we are also “mindful that the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud.” Id. at 435 , 461 A.2d 736 (citing Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 228 , 294 A.2d 7 (1972); Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A.2d 736 (App.Div.), c | 3 | 1975–2004 |
State v. White
neutral
2 sentences2004Here, the judge did not expressly place on either party the burden of producing evidence, but invoked the principle of Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A. 2d 736 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 466 , 291 A. 2d 16 (1972), that "the class action rule should be liberally construed, and such an action should be permitted unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper." In effect, the judge placed on defendants the burden of producing evidence that class treatment was inappropriate. 1995For all of those claimants who rely on the seller’s duty to disclose, it would be a hollow system of justice that awarded recovery to some homeowners while denying recovery to others similarly situated. *68 In assessing whether class certification is the superior method for adjudication, we are also “mindful that the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud.” Id. at 435 , 461 A.2d 736 (citing Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 228 , 294 A.2d 7 (1972); Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J.Super. 369, 373 , 287 A.2d 736 (App.Div.), c | 2 | 1995–2004 |
Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Scott Kayser D/B/A Quality Express Scott Kayser
green
1 sentence2024As an initial matter, we conclude the court's reliance on Roadway Package, 257 F.3d at 288-89 , was misplaced. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge
green
2 sentences2017Furthermore, we held in Rockel, supra, 368 N.J. 2017Furthermore, we held in Rockel, supra, 368 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
C.A. v. Bentolila
neutral
1 sentence2017Super. 404 (App. Div. 2011), appeal dism'd, 213 N.J. 47 (2013), we held that a class action waiver 10 A-1051-13T1 in a transaction to purchase a new car was not per se invalid, id. at 441, but that the arbitration provisions of the several contract documents in that case were inconsistent and therefore not enforceable. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware v. Muhammad
green
2 sentences2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). 2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Computervision Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). 2011If such a chilling effect were proven, the trial court perceived that the class action waiver might be invalidated on public policy grounds, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had found in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 20-22 , 912 A.2d 88 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338 , 127 S.Ct. 2032 , 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (2007). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Muhammad v. County Bank
green
2 sentences2006Muhammad, supra, 379 N.J.Super. at 244-48 , 877 A. 2d 340 . 2006Muhammad, supra, 379 N.J.Super. at 244-48 , 877 A. 2d 340 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences2006Prima Paint, supra, 388 U.S. 395 , 87 S.Ct. 1801 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1270 , and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed. 2d 1038 (2006), hold that because arbitration agreements are, as a matter of federal arbitration law, severable from the remainder of a contract, a challenge to a contract as a whole is for an arbitrator to decide. 2006Prima Paint, supra, 388 U.S. 395 , 87 S.Ct. 1801 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1270 , and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed. 2d 1038 (2006), hold that because arbitration agreements are, as a matter of federal arbitration law, severable from the remainder of a contract, a challenge to a contract as a whole is for an arbitrator to decide. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gras v. Associates First Capital Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Trotter v. Perdue Farms, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Ellis v. Elgin Riverboat Resort green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay red | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tober v. Charneta, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Olive v. Graceland Sales Corp. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.