class action rule in Michigan

2000Plaintiff's emphasis on Durant v. Michigan, 456 Mich. 175 , 566 N.W.2d 272 (1997), is misplaced.

2000Plaintiff's emphasis on Durant v. Michigan, 456 Mich. 175 , 566 N.W.2d 272 (1997), is misplaced.

1971For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court." In a number of cases the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that class actions are an appropriate *319 procedural device where there are numerous members of the class and common questions of law or fact affect their rights and common relief is sought. [34] Recently in Bond v. Ann Arbor School District (1970), 383 Mich 693, 702 , the Court observed: "It is in th

1971For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.” In a number of cases the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that class actions are an appropriate procedural device where there are numerous members of the class and common questions of law or fact affect their rights and common relief is sought. 34 Recently in Bond v. Ann Arbor School District (1970), 383 Mich 693, 702 , the Court observed: “It is in the very

2025When the crux of the complaint is not the invalidity of the contract as a whole, but rather the arbitration provision itself, then the federal courts must decide whether the arbitration provision is invalid and unenforceable under 9 USC § 2 of the FAA. [Nagrampa v MailCoups, Inc, 469 F3d 1257, 1263-1264 (CA 9, 2006).] See also Puleo v Chase Bank USA, NA, 605 F3d 172, 182 (CA 3, 2010) (“Under the FAA and the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, then, the District Court could not have compelled class arbitration without first addressing whether the class action waiver was unconscionable.”); Vis v

2025When the crux of the complaint is not the invalidity of the contract as a whole, but rather the arbitration provision itself, then the federal courts must decide whether the arbitration provision is invalid and unenforceable under 9 USC § 2 of the FAA. [Nagrampa v MailCoups, Inc, 469 F3d 1257, 1263-1264 (CA 9, 2006).] See also Puleo v Chase Bank USA, NA, 605 F3d 172, 182 (CA 3, 2010) (“Under the FAA and the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, then, the District Court could not have compelled class arbitration without first addressing whether the class action waiver was unconscionable.”); Vis v

1980Meaningful consideration of the class action claim must begin with a hard look at the legal and associational standing of the potential class members and the unions, for the class action prerequisites set forth in Grigg v Michigan National Bank, 405 Mich 148 ; 274 NW2d 752 (1979), cannot be applied in a legal vacuum.

1980Meaningful consideration of the class action claim must begin with a hard look at the legal and associational standing of the potential class members and the unions, for the class action prerequisites set forth in Grigg v Michigan National Bank, 405 Mich 148 ; 274 NW2d 752 (1979), cannot be applied in a legal vacuum.

1979(Bajorek, supra, p 64 .) In stating that "the same rule of law would apply” to a class action, the Court did not incorporate the alternative basis for joinder, convenience in the administration of justice, into the class action rule as a precondition to the maintenance of any class action.

1979In Palmer Park Theater Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 343-344 ; 106 NW2d 845 (1961), the Court quoted from the portion of the Bajorek opinion which stated that "[i]t cannot be said with certainty that the same issues will be presented in all of the 25 cases". ( Bajorek, supra, p 64 .) In stating that "the same rule of law would apply" to a class action, the Court did not incorporate the alternative basis for joinder, convenience in the administration of justice, into the class action rule as a precondition to the maintenance of any class action.

1979In Palmer Park Theater Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 343-344 ; 106 NW2d 845 (1961), the Court quoted from the portion of the Bajorek opinion which stated that "[i]t cannot be said with certainty that the same issues will be presented in all of the 25 cases". ( Bajorek, supra, p 64 .) In stating that "the same rule of law would apply" to a class action, the Court did not incorporate the alternative basis for joinder, convenience in the administration of justice, into the class action rule as a precondition to the maintenance of any class action.

1979In Palmer Park Theater Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 343-344 ; 106 NW2d 845 (1961), the Court quoted from the portion of the Bajorek opinion which stated that "[i]t cannot be said with certainty that the same issues will be presented in all of the 25 cases". ( Bajorek, supra, p 64 .) In stating that "the same rule of law would apply" to a class action, the Court did not incorporate the alternative basis for joinder, convenience in the administration of justice, into the class action rule as a precondition to the maintenance of any class action.

1977To some extent this question may turn on whether a class action suit is inherently equitable in nature and, thus, not permissible before an administrative agency having no equitable powers, see, Pressley v Wayne County *176 Sheriff, 30 Mich App 300, 318-319 ; 186 NW2d 412 (1971), Paley v Coca Cola Co, 389 Mich 583, 589-592 ; 209 NW2d 232 (1973) (opinion for affirmance by Williams, J.), or whether class actions are merely procedural devices to expedite proceedings in certain cases, not requiring equitable jurisdiction.

1977To some extent this question may turn on whether a class action suit is inherently equitable in nature and, thus, not permissible before an administrative agency having no equitable powers, see, Pressley v Wayne County *176 Sheriff, 30 Mich App 300, 318-319 ; 186 NW2d 412 (1971), Paley v Coca Cola Co, 389 Mich 583, 589-592 ; 209 NW2d 232 (1973) (opinion for affirmance by Williams, J.), or whether class actions are merely procedural devices to expedite proceedings in certain cases, not requiring equitable jurisdiction.

1977To some extent this question may turn on whether a class action suit is inherently equitable in nature and, thus, not permissible before an administrative agency having no equitable powers, see, Pressley v Wayne County *176 Sheriff, 30 Mich App 300, 318-319 ; 186 NW2d 412 (1971), Paley v Coca Cola Co, 389 Mich 583, 589-592 ; 209 NW2d 232 (1973) (opinion for affirmance by Williams, J.), or whether class actions are merely procedural devices to expedite proceedings in certain cases, not requiring equitable jurisdiction.

1977To some extent this question may turn on whether a class action suit is inherently equitable in nature and, thus, not permissible before an administrative agency having no equitable powers, see, Pressley v Wayne County *176 Sheriff, 30 Mich App 300, 318-319 ; 186 NW2d 412 (1971), Paley v Coca Cola Co, 389 Mich 583, 589-592 ; 209 NW2d 232 (1973) (opinion for affirmance by Williams, J.), or whether class actions are merely procedural devices to expedite proceedings in certain cases, not requiring equitable jurisdiction.