class action waiver in Illinois

2015Bruemmer v. Compaq Computer Corp. involves application of the class action rule that holds prospective class claims as moot where the proposed class plaintiffs have been offered a tender of the full amount of damages prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. 329 Ill.

2015Bruemmer v. Compaq Computer Corp. involves application of the class action rule that holds prospective class claims as moot where the proposed class plaintiffs have been offered a tender of the full amount of damages prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. 329 Ill.

2022Plaintiff cites Kinkel, 223 Ill. 2d at 42 , where our supreme court found the contract’s class action waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable.

2009We do not find this degree of procedural unconscionability to be sufficient to render the class action waiver unenforceable, but it is a factor to be considered in combination with our findings on the question of substantive unconscionability.’’ Kinkel, 223 Ill. 2d at 27 , 857 N.E.2d at 266 .

2008The supreme court did not dispute the appellate court's assessment that the class action waiver was "hidden in a maze of fine print where it was unlikely to be noticed, much less read" (Kinkel, 357 Ill.

2008The supreme court did not dispute the appellate court’s assessment that the class action waiver was “hidden in a maze of fine print where it was unlikely to be noticed, much less read” (Kinkel, 357 Ill.

2014See 735 ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2008). " '(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; (3) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (4) the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' " Uesco Industries, Inc. v. Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 45 (quoting Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,

2014See 735 ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2008). “ ‘(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; (3) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (4) the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’ ” Uesco Industries, Inc. v. Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 45 (quoting Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,

2014See 735 ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2008). " '(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; (3) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (4) the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' " Uesco Industries, Inc. v. Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 45 (quoting Barbara's Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,

2014See 735 ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2008). “ ‘(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; (3) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (4) the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’ ” Uesco Industries, Inc. v. Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 45 (quoting Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,

2014It is enough that the factual allegations are sufficiently broad in scope to plead the possible existence of a class action claim under section 2-801." Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 453-54 (2004).

2014It is enough that the factual allegations are sufficiently broad in scope to plead the possible existence of a class action claim under section 2-801.” Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 453-54 (2004).

2008See Arriola, 323 Ill.App.3d at 151-52 , 256 Ill.Dec. 168 , 751 N.E.2d 221 ; accord Bruemmer, 329 Ill.App.3d at 764 , 263 Ill.Dec. 516 , 768 N.E.2d 276 .

2008See Arriola, 323 Ill.

2006See also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149-52 (applying California law as set out in Szetela to conclude that the legal remedies clause in defendant’s form contract was substantively unconscionable, not because it required arbitration of all disputes, but because the class action waiver therein lacked mutuality where carrier would not be likely to bring a class action against its customers; the legal remedies clause also sharply curtailed damages for intentional torts, imposed secrecy on arbitration that benefitted the carrier to the detriment of customers, and imposed costs on some customers that would

2006See also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149-52 (applying California law as set out in Szetela to conclude that the legal remedies clause in defendant=s form contract was substantively unconscionable, not because it required arbitration of all disputes, but because the class action waiver therein lacked mutuality where carrier would not be likely to bring a class action against its customers; the legal remedies clause also sharply curtailed damages for intentional torts, imposed secrecy on arbitration that benefitted the carrier to the detriment of customers, and imposed costs on some customers that would

2006See also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149-52 (applying California law as set out in Szetela to conclude that the legal remedies clause in defendant’s form contract was substantively unconscionable, not because it required arbitration of all disputes, but because the class action waiver therein lacked mutuality where carrier would not be likely to bring a class action against its customers; the legal remedies clause also sharply curtailed damages for intentional torts, imposed secrecy on arbitration that benefitted the carrier to the detriment of customers, and imposed costs on some customers that would

2006See also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149-52 (applying California law as set out in Szetela to conclude that the legal remedies clause in defendant=s form contract was substantively unconscionable, not because it required arbitration of all disputes, but because the class action waiver therein lacked mutuality where carrier would not be likely to bring a class action against its customers; the legal remedies clause also sharply curtailed damages for intentional torts, imposed secrecy on arbitration that benefitted the carrier to the detriment of customers, and imposed costs on some customers that would

2006Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690-91 (N.D.

2006Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690-91 (N.D.

2011Wheatley, 99 Ill.2d at 486 , 77 Ill.Dec. 115 , 459 N.E.2d 1364 .

2011Wheatley, 99 Ill.2d at 486 , 77 Ill.Dec. 115 , 459 N.E.2d 1364 .

2008Thus, for these reasons and since we have the authority to sustain the decision of a trial court on any ground which is called for by the record (see City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill.2d 480, 492 , 276 Ill.Dec. 887 , 795 N.E.2d 240 (2003)), we choose to proceed by examining the effect of tender to named plaintiffs rather than to the entire class. [3] As a final note, Cohen cursorily asserts in his brief that the trial court made an improper evidentiary finding that Compact posted its offer to honor the coupons on its Web site before the class action claim was filed.

2008Thus, for these reasons and since we have the authority to sustain the decision of a trial court on any ground which is called for by the record (see City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 492 (2003)), we choose to proceed by examining the effect of tender to named plaintiffs rather than to the entire class. 3 As a final note, Cohen cursorily asserts in his brief that the trial court made an improper evidentiary finding that Compact posted its offer to honor the coupons on its Web site before the class action claim was filed.

2025Likewise, “if a purported representative plaintiff for a class action cannot maintain his individual - 10 - claim against the defendant because of lack of standing or otherwise, then the class action claim cannot be maintained.” Griffith v. Wilmette Harbor Ass’n, 378 Ill.

2022In any case, we deem the issue of the validity of the class action waiver as not properly before us and therefore express no opinion regarding either its interpretation, validity or enforceability. - 15 - No. 1-21-1214 contract.” Melenia v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 135, 151 (2006).

2022In any case, we deem the issue of the validity of the class action waiver as not properly before us and therefore express no opinion regarding either its interpretation, validity or enforceability. - 15 - No. 1-21-1214 contract.” Melenia v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 135, 151 (2006).

2016See id. ¶ 17 II 5 ¶ 18 In count II of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the $500 charge contained in the impoundment ordinance violates the Illinois Constitution because it is an attempt by the City to raise revenue through its police powers. ¶ 19 The Illinois Constitution grants home rule units the right to “exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill.

2013Defendant has not cited any Illinois authority in support of its argument that we use a de novo standard of review. ¶ 42 In Illinois, “[t]he decision regarding class certification is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion or applied impermissible legal criteria.” Cruz v. Unilock Chicago, Inc., 383 Ill.

2013Cooper, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-01 ; see also In re DirecTV Early Cancellation Litigation, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1081 (C.D.