class action waiver in Georgia

2023Then, on December 6, 2021, the trial court denied Cagle’s motion for class certification, ruling that he “failed to provide any evidence or proof towards the numerosity requirement,” and so it “need not consider the other elements of class certification.” This appeal follows.1 A class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is “conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.”2 And the party seeking to represent a class “bears t

2023Then, on December 6, 2021, the trial court denied Cagle’s motion for class certification, ruling that he “failed to provide any evidence or proof towards the numerosity requirement,” and so it “need not consider the other elements of class certification.” This appeal follows.1 A class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is “conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.”2 And the party seeking to represent a class “bears t

2019Nevertheless, SunTrust maintains that the class-action waiver is severable based on the general severability clause appearing at the beginning of the Rules and Regulations, which provides that "[a] determination that any part of this agreement is invalid or unenforceable will not affect the remainder of this agreement." However, "[t]he concept of severability refers to striking a distinct part [of a contract and allowing the remainder to stand], not to excising certain language contained in a single provision." AMB Property, L.P. v. MTS, Inc. , 250 Ga. App. 513 , 515, 551 S.E.2d 102 (2001) (fo

2019Nevertheless, SunTrust maintains that the class-action waiver is severable based on the general severability clause appearing at the beginning of the Rules and Regulations, which provides that "[a] determination that any part of this agreement is invalid or unenforceable will not affect the remainder of this agreement." However, "[t]he concept of severability refers to striking a distinct part [of a contract and allowing the remainder to stand], not to excising certain language contained in a single provision." AMB Property, L.P. v. MTS, Inc. , 250 Ga. App. 513 , 515, 551 S.E.2d 102 (2001) (fo

2019Wilson v. Clark Atlanta University, Inc. , 339 Ga. App. 814 , 834 (2) (c), 794 S.E.2d 422 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) ("[W]ords [in a contract], like people, are judged by the company they keep.").

2019Wilson v. Clark Atlanta University, Inc. , 339 Ga. App. 814 , 834 (2) (c), 794 S.E.2d 422 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted) ("[W]ords [in a contract], like people, are judged by the company they keep.").

2023Ctr., Inc., 309 Ga. 188, 192 (II) (1) (a) ( 845 SE2d 555 ) (2020) (explaining that “[b]ecause class actions represent an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, such actions are permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.” (punctuation omitted)).

2023Ctr., Inc., 309 Ga. 188, 192 (II) (1) (a) ( 845 SE2d 555 ) (2020) (explaining that “[b]ecause class actions represent an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, such actions are permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.” (punctuation omitted)).

2023Then, on December 6, 2021, the trial court denied Cagle’s motion for class certification, ruling that he “failed to provide any evidence or proof towards the numerosity requirement,” and so it “need not consider the other elements of class certification.” This appeal follows.1 A class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is “conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.”2 And the party seeking to represent a class “bears t

2023Then, on December 6, 2021, the trial court denied Cagle’s motion for class certification, ruling that he “failed to provide any evidence or proof towards the numerosity requirement,” and so it “need not consider the other elements of class certification.” This appeal follows.1 A class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is “conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only, and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23.”2 And the party seeking to represent a class “bears t

2020Compare SunTrust Bank v. Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. 794 , 799-800 (1) ( 824 SE2d 717 ) (2019) (class-action waiver was not severable from unenforceable jury trial waiver when the class-action waiver was listed in the same contractual provision as the jury trial waiver and therefore did not constitute its own “distinct part” of the contract).

2019For the 7 Although the trial court did not find this issue dispositive, “[u]nder the right for any reason doctrine, [we] will affirm a judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason is different than the reason upon which the trial court relied.” Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 346 Ga. App. 131, 137 (2) ( 816 SE2d 77 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 12 reasons that follow, no abuse of discretion appears in the trial court’s decision to certify the class.

2019For the 7 Although the trial court did not find this issue dispositive, “[u]nder the right for any reason doctrine, [we] will affirm a judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason is different than the reason upon which the trial court relied.” Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 346 Ga. App. 131, 137 (2) ( 816 SE2d 77 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 12 reasons that follow, no abuse of discretion appears in the trial court’s decision to certify the class.

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2019LEXIS 219819 , at * 3 (II) (The court ruled that, if the class-action waiver at issue was an exculpatory clause, “there [could] be no doubt that it would be unenforceable,” given that the clause was in a paragraph with other provisions, the paragraph had no separate heading, and the typeface of the clause was the same size as in the surrounding paragraphs.) (citation omitted). 21 See, e.g., Parkside Center, 250 Ga. App. at 611-612 (2) (provision was in a section under the general heading of “Miscellaneous”); see also T.S.

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2019See Milligan v. State, 307 Ga. App. 1, 6 ( 703 SE2d 1 ) (2010) (denying motion for reconsideration because it relied on a newly-raised argument); see also Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 110 (2) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (issue abandoned where appellant 2 In its initial brief before us, SunTrust noted in a footnote that “the contract states any invalid language is severable.” Similarly, in its reply brief, SunTrust asserted, without any supporting argument, that “the sentence waiving a jury trial and the sentencing waiving class procedures are distinct, independent promises.” SunTru

2014“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, _ U. S. _. _ (II) ( 133 SCt 1426 , 185 LE2d 515) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23. 3 The party seeking to represent a class “bear[s] the burden of proving that class certification is appropriate.” Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 127 (3) ( 610 SE2d 529 ) (2005) (citation omitted).

2014“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only,” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, _ U. S. _. _ (II) ( 133 SCt 1426 , 185 LE2d 515) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and consistent with its exceptional nature, a class action is permitted only in the limited circumstances described in OCGA § 9-11-23. 3 The party seeking to represent a class “bear[s] the burden of proving that class certification is appropriate.” Carnett’s, Inc. v. Hammond, 279 Ga. 125, 127 (3) ( 610 SE2d 529 ) (2005) (citation omitted).

2014See also McGarry v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 267 Ga. App. 23, 25 (1) ( 599 SE2d 34 ) (2004).

2014See also McGarry v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 267 Ga. App. 23, 25 (1) ( 599 SE2d 34 ) (2004).