14 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1980–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLPgreen2 sentences2015“A class action is an exception to the rule ‘that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process’ ” (Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d 400, 409 [2009] [emphasis omitted], quoting Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40 [1940]). 2015"A class action is an exception to the rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process'" ( Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d 400, 409 [emphasis omitted], quoting Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40 ). | 2 | 2 |
Hansberry v. Leegreen2 sentences2015“A class action is an exception to the rule ‘that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process’ ” (Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d 400, 409 [2009] [emphasis omitted], quoting Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40 [1940]). 2015"A class action is an exception to the rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process'" ( Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d 400, 409 [emphasis omitted], quoting Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40 ). | 1 | 2 |
Weaver v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Corp ., 35 NY3d 492 , 511 [2020][Rivera, J., dissenting in part] rearg denied 36 NY3d 962 [2021] ["A class action allows a named plaintiff to commence a suit as a representative of the known and unknown members of a putative class."].) However, in the Court of Claims, in order to satisfy the pleading requirements set out in Section 11 (b), each member of the class must be named in a claim and the claim must satisfy all the jurisdictional requirements for each claimant. ( Weaver v State of New York , 82 AD3d 878, 879 [2d Dept 2011].) Here, the claim identifies five named claimants and "approxim | 1 | 1 |
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurantgreen1 sentence2024Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. , 570 U.S. 228, 236-38 (2013) ("The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting parties. | 1 | 1 |
Tsadilas v. Providian National Bankgreen1 sentence2024It no more eliminates those parties' right to pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938."); Horton v. Dow Jones & Co. , 804 F. App'x 81 , 84-85 (2d Cir. 2020) (upholding class-action waiver provision in arbitration agreement); Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'l Bank , 13 AD3d 190, 191 (1st Dep't 2004) ("The arbitration provision is enforceable even though it waives plaintiff's right to bring a class action. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shuttsgreen2 sentences2015Absent individuals are bound by the decree in the class action “ ‘so long as the named parties adequately represented the absent class and the prosecution of the litigation was within the common interest’ ” (Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d at 409 , quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797, 808 [1985]). 2015Absent individuals are bound by the decree in the class action " so long as the named parties adequately represented the absent class and the prosecution of the litigation was within the common interest'" ( Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 NY3d at 409 , quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797, 808 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hollmangreen1 sentence2007In analyzing this class action claim, the Court of Claims employed the four-prong De Bour test governing police encounters to determine whether an impermissible seizure had occurred, i.e., a level 3 (forcible stop and detention requiring reasonable suspicion) or level 4 (arrest based on probable cause), so as to support a constitutional tort based upon a violation of the Search and Seizure Clause 5 (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see also People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boragreen1 sentence2007Here, it was undisputed that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that any of the claimants (or anyone else) was involved in this crime; thus, the only issue was whether claimants proved that all members of the class at trial (or any individual claimants) had been seized, i.e., forcibly stopped and detained (level 3). 6 Notably, however, the level of the encounter—including whether a tortious seizure occurred—and whether circumstances existed to justify it are fact-specific inquiries ordinarily decided on a case-by-case basis rather than as to a diverse group whose disparate | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ocasiogreen1 sentence2007Here, it was undisputed that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that any of the claimants (or anyone else) was involved in this crime; thus, the only issue was whether claimants proved that all members of the class at trial (or any individual claimants) had been seized, i.e., forcibly stopped and detained (level 3). 6 Notably, however, the level of the encounter—including whether a tortious seizure occurred—and whether circumstances existed to justify it are fact-specific inquiries ordinarily decided on a case-by-case basis rather than as to a diverse group whose disparate | 1 | 1 |
People v. De Bourgreen2 sentences2007In analyzing this class action claim, the Court of Claims employed the four-prong De Bour test governing police encounters to determine whether an impermissible seizure had occurred, i.e., a level 3 (forcible stop and detention requiring reasonable suspicion) or level 4 (arrest based on probable cause), so as to support a constitutional tort based upon a violation of the Search and Seizure Clause 5 (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see also People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 [1992]). 2007Here, it was undisputed that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that any of the claimants (or anyone else) was involved in this crime; thus, the only issue was whether claimants proved that all members of the class at trial (or any individual claimants) had been seized, i.e., forcibly stopped and detained (level 3). 6 Notably, however, the level of the encounter—including whether a tortious seizure occurred—and whether circumstances existed to justify it are fact-specific inquiries ordinarily decided on a case-by-case basis rather than as to a diverse group whose disparate | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matros Automated Electrical Const. Corp. v. Libman
green
2 sentences2022Const. Corp. v Libman , 37 AD3d 313 [1st Dept 2007]). 2022Const. Corp. v Libman , 37 AD3d 313 [1st Dept 2007]). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Footnote 2: While a court must determine in the first instance whether a valid arbitration agreement was made, the parties may delegate questions relating to the "arbitrability" of a dispute (e.g., whether the particular dispute falls within the ambit of the arbitration agreement, or whether one party should be relieved from the agreement due to the wrongful conduct of another party), to the arbitrator ( see Henry Schein, Inc., 586 US at 69 ; see also Wu , 43 NY3d at 301-302, 308-309). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Globe Surgical Supply v. GEICO Insurance
green
1 sentence2023Co. , 59 AD3d at 138-139 ). d. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Passucci v. Absolut Center for Nursing & Rehabilitation at Allegany, LLC
green
1 sentence2023In Passucci v Absolut Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation at Allegany, LLC ( 2014 NY Slip Op 33459[U] [Sup Ct, Erie County], affd 125 AD3d 1313 ), the plaintiff commenced a putative class action claim alleging negligence and a violation of Public Health Law § 2801-d after the plaintiff's decedent passed away while a resident at the defendant's facility. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ashley Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, "the right to bring a collective action on behalf of others" is a "litigation mechanism," and therefore a mere procedural right ( Walthour , 745 F3d at 1337 ). 2017Moreover, “the right to bring a collective action on behalf of others” is a “litigation mechanism,” and therefore a mere procedural right (Walthour, 745 F3d at 1337 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Discover Bank v. Superior Court
red
1 sentence2013Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the majority (Justice Breyer authored the dissent), found that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s Discover Bank rule, which provided that a class-action waiver, contained in a mandatory arbitration agreement in a consumer contract, is unconscionable and unenforceable (Discover Bank v Superior Ct, 36 Cal 4th 148, 113 P3d 1100 [2005]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
green
1 sentence2013The majority’s rationale was “straightforward”: “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim . . . [t]he conflicting rule is displaced by the [Federal Arbitration Act]” (AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1740 , 1747 [2011]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Heights 75 Owners Corp. v. Thurman
neutral
1 sentence1992A class action for a claim of breach of contract is entirely cognizable (see, e.g., Heights 75 Owners Corp. v Thurman, 134 AD2d 484 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Torres v. New York State Department of Labor
green
1 sentence1980In Weight Watchers of Phila. v Weight Watchers Int. (supra, p 651), the court held that “For the purpose of preventing and correcting abuses, once an action is filed as a class action it should be so presumed even prior to a formal determination that it is a class action.” In Torres v New York State Dept, of Labor (supra), the court found that the action was appropriate as a class action under rule 23 (subds [a], [b], par [2]) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.