bond requirement in Arizona

2017See Ariz. Const. art. 3, § 1 (“Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 586 (1977) (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70 (App. 1980) (finding a bond requirement in negligence actions against the state unconstitutional as “a mone

2017See Ariz. Const, art. 3, § 1 (“Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[pjower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz, 576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70 , 618 P.2d 238, 240 (App. 1980) (finding a bond requirement in negligence actions agains

2017Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 195-96 , 848 P.2d 273, 280-81 (1993) (setting forth requirements for finding severability). ¶ 35 In his concurrence, Justice Gould declares the bond provision “unenforceable because it is incomplete and unintelligible.” Infra ¶85 (Gould, J., concurring in part and in the result).

2017Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 195-96 , 848 P.2d 273, 280-81 (1993) (setting forth requirements for finding severability). ¶ 35 In his concurrence, Justice Gould declares the bond provision “unenforceable because it is incomplete and unintelligible.” Infra ¶85 (Gould, J., concurring in part and in the result).

2017See Ariz. Const, art. 3, § 1 (“Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[pjower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz, 576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70 , 618 P.2d 238, 240 (App. 1980) (finding a bond requirement in negligence actions agains

2017See Ariz. Const, art. 3, § 1 (“Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[pjower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz, 576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70 , 618 P.2d 238, 240 (App. 1980) (finding a bond requirement in negligence actions agains

1997Id. at 100, 579 P.2d at 604 .

1984See Insurance Company of North America v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 119 Ariz. 97 , 579 P.2d 601 (App.1978).

2020Before declaring a statute invalid as incomplete or unintelligible, however, we must “us[e] every authorized means to ascertain and give the [statute] an intelligible meaning.” Coggins v. Ely, 23 Ariz. 155, 161 (1921); see also City of Tucson, 242 Ariz. at 610–11 ¶¶ 97–102 (Gould, J., concurring) (discussing the “unintelligibility doctrine”). ¶36 The bond requirement in § 41-194.01(B)(2) is so incomplete that we cannot enforce it.

2020Before declaring a statute invalid as incomplete or unintelligible, however, we must “us[e] every authorized means to ascertain and give the [statute] an intelligible meaning.” Coggins v. Ely, 23 Ariz. 155, 161 (1921); see also City of Tucson, 242 Ariz. at 610–11 ¶¶ 97–102 (Gould, J., concurring) (discussing the “unintelligibility doctrine”). ¶36 The bond requirement in § 41-194.01(B)(2) is so incomplete that we cannot enforce it.

2020See CAVCO Indus., 129 Ariz. at 434 n.3 (acknowledging “the simple common law rule that courts will not apply unintelligible laws”).

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a

2019See State v. Rodriguez, 227 Ariz. 58 , 61 n.4, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (declining to address arguments not raised in petition for review).

2017Simpson v. Owens (Simpson I), which explicates the quoted proposition by stating “[t]he parties must have the right to examine/cross-examine the witnesses and to review in advance those witnesses’ prior statements that are written[,]” does not address victims as witnesses in a bond release hearing. 207 Ariz. 261, 275-76, ¶ 44 , 85 P.3d 478, 492-93 (App. 2004). ¶ 9 In Arizona, victims of crimes have the right to be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release determination, such as Sisco’s Simpson II hearing, pursuant to the Arizona Constitution’s Article II, § 2.1 (A) (4) of the Vic

2017Simpson v. Owens (Simpson I), which explicates the quoted proposition by stating “[t]he parties must have the right to examine/cross-examine the witnesses and to review in advance those witnesses’ prior statements that are written[,]” does not address victims as witnesses in a bond release hearing. 207 Ariz. 261, 275-76, ¶ 44 , 85 P.3d 478, 492-93 (App. 2004). ¶ 9 In Arizona, victims of crimes have the right to be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release determination, such as Sisco’s Simpson II hearing, pursuant to the Arizona Constitution’s Article II, § 2.1 (A) (4) of the Vic

2016See Morales, 527 U.S. at 76-77 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J,, dissenting). ¶ 49 As for the majority’s characterization of the role of the trial judge in a no bond hearing as “ornamental” and having to “turn a blind eye to the individual facts” of a case, I strongly disagree.

2016See Morales, 527 U.S. at 76-77 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J,, dissenting). ¶ 49 As for the majority’s characterization of the role of the trial judge in a no bond hearing as “ornamental” and having to “turn a blind eye to the individual facts” of a case, I strongly disagree.

2014Thomas and King, Inc. v. City of Phx., 208 Ariz. 203, 207, ¶ 11 , 92 P.3d 429, 433 (App.2004); see City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 109, ¶ 9 , 32 P.3d 31, 34 (App.2001) (“When an ordinance regulates an area that is also regulated by state statute, the ordinance may parallel the statute or even reach beyond the parameters of the statute so long as the ordinance does not conflict with the statute.”). ¶ 23 Bellemont interprets the language in A.R.S. § 11-821(C) as stating that once a bond has been posted, the final plat approved, and the original developer defaults, the obligat

2014Thomas and King, Inc. v. City of Phx., 208 Ariz. 203, 207, ¶ 11 , 92 P.3d 429, 433 (App.2004); see City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 109, ¶ 9 , 32 P.3d 31, 34 (App.2001) (“When an ordinance regulates an area that is also regulated by state statute, the ordinance may parallel the statute or even reach beyond the parameters of the statute so long as the ordinance does not conflict with the statute.”). ¶ 23 Bellemont interprets the language in A.R.S. § 11-821(C) as stating that once a bond has been posted, the final plat approved, and the original developer defaults, the obligat

2014Thomas and King, Inc. v. City of Phx., 208 Ariz. 203, 207, ¶ 11 , 92 P.3d 429, 433 (App.2004); see City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 109, ¶ 9 , 32 P.3d 31, 34 (App.2001) (“When an ordinance regulates an area that is also regulated by state statute, the ordinance may parallel the statute or even reach beyond the parameters of the statute so long as the ordinance does not conflict with the statute.”). ¶ 23 Bellemont interprets the language in A.R.S. § 11-821(C) as stating that once a bond has been posted, the final plat approved, and the original developer defaults, the obligat

2014Thomas and King, Inc. v. City of Phx., 208 Ariz. 203, 207, ¶ 11 , 92 P.3d 429, 433 (App.2004); see City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 109, ¶ 9 , 32 P.3d 31, 34 (App.2001) (“When an ordinance regulates an area that is also regulated by state statute, the ordinance may parallel the statute or even reach beyond the parameters of the statute so long as the ordinance does not conflict with the statute.”). ¶ 23 Bellemont interprets the language in A.R.S. § 11-821(C) as stating that once a bond has been posted, the final plat approved, and the original developer defaults, the obligat

2010Under Rule 7.6(c)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court must issue a bench warrant and set a bond hearing if “it appears to the court that the released person has violated a condition of an appearance bond.” The court may order all or part of an appearance bond forfeited “[i]f at the hearing, the violation is not explained or excused.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 7.6(c)(2). ¶ 10 With respect to bond forfeiture, “the trial court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to forfeit all, part, or none of the appearance bond pursuant to Rule 7.6(c)(2) and whether any part of the

2010Under Rule 7.6(c)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court must issue a bench warrant and set a bond hearing if “it appears to the court that the released person has violated a condition of an appearance bond.” The court may order all or part of an appearance bond forfeited “[i]f at the hearing, the violation is not explained or excused.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 7.6(c)(2). ¶ 10 With respect to bond forfeiture, “the trial court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to forfeit all, part, or none of the appearance bond pursuant to Rule 7.6(c)(2) and whether any part of the

1990See Hinton, 65 Ariz. at 116 , 174 P.2d at 754 .

1990See Hinton, 65 Ariz. at 116 , 174 P.2d at 754 .