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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sotogreen2 sentences2002Since we conclude that Mr. Outlaw’s waiver was ineffective because it was based on inaccurate information, we need not resolve the issue as to whether the proper standard to be applied in the District to examine the validity of the waiver is simply one of "voluntariness,” or something more, such as: (1) a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing” standard, see Hagans, Holmes, supra; or (2) a combination of "voluntariness” with the assessment of whether the defendant had at least "some rudimentary understanding of the rights being relinquished,” see Buchanan v. City of Kenosha, 90 F.Supp.2d 1008, 10 2002Since we conclude that Mr. Outlaw’s waiver was ineffective because it was based on inaccurate information, we need not resolve the issue as to whether the proper standard to be applied in the District to examine the validity of the waiver is simply one of "voluntariness,” or something more, such as: (1) a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing” standard, see Hagans, Holmes, supra; or (2) a combination of "voluntariness” with the assessment of whether the defendant had at least "some rudimentary understanding of the rights being relinquished,” see Buchanan v. City of Kenosha, 90 F.Supp.2d 1008, 10 | 1 | 1 |
Buchanan v. City of Kenoshagreen1 sentence2002Since we conclude that Mr. Outlaw’s waiver was ineffective because it was based on inaccurate information, we need not resolve the issue as to whether the proper standard to be applied in the District to examine the validity of the waiver is simply one of "voluntariness,” or something more, such as: (1) a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing” standard, see Hagans, Holmes, supra; or (2) a combination of "voluntariness” with the assessment of whether the defendant had at least "some rudimentary understanding of the rights being relinquished,” see Buchanan v. City of Kenosha, 90 F.Supp.2d 1008, 10 | 1 | 1 |
Bond v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993There is no occasion in the instant case to question the validity of Bond's analysis per se, but only the application of that analysis to pre -waiver, unreasonable delay of over six hours, a circumstance not presented by the facts in Bond, supra, 614 A.2d at 901, and a circumstance not addressed in light of § 3501(c) in Byrd . 1993There is no occasion in the instant case to question the validity of Bond's analysis per se, but only the application of that analysis to pre -waiver, unreasonable delay of over six hours, a circumstance not presented by the facts in Bond, supra, 614 A.2d at 901, and a circumstance not addressed in light of § 3501(c) in Byrd . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pedro Alvarez-Sanchezgreen2 sentences1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea 1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Darrell Halbert, (Two Cases)green2 sentences1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea 1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea | 1 | 1 |
Poe v. Noblegreen1 sentence1993The subsequent writing thus became the offer to contract, specifying that the father could accept it by returning the consent and waiver form signed, which he did two days later. - The assurances in the April 20 letter were made by Hopkins in her capacity “as an employee of the personal representative,” Poe v. Noble, 525 A.2d 190, 193 (D.C.1987) (under District of Columbia probate law, “counsel for the estate [is] viewed as an employee of the personal representative”), a fact Akins, Sr. — represented by counsel — is presumed to have known. 7 The situation, as we see it, is no different than if | 1 | 1 |
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Elm Grovegreen1 sentence1985See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Elm Grove, 472 F.Supp. 1183, 1184 (E.D.Wis.1979); Margolies v. Encounter, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 475, 479 , 368 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 , 398 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Margolies v. Encounter, Inc.green2 sentences1985See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Elm Grove, 472 F.Supp. 1183, 1184 (E.D.Wis.1979); Margolies v. Encounter, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 475, 479 , 368 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 , 398 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (1977). 1985See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Elm Grove, 472 F.Supp. 1183, 1184 (E.D.Wis.1979); Margolies v. Encounter, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 475, 479 , 368 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 , 398 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hagans v. United States
green
2 sentences2002In contrast with the waiver form signed by Mr. Outlaw, the one signed by the appellant in Hagans, supra, specifically mentioned the right to “an extradition hearing before being returned to the District of Columbia to face charges there being filed against me.” 408 A.2d at 966 . 2002In contrast with the waiver form signed by Mr. Outlaw, the one signed by the appellant in Hagans, supra, specifically mentioned the right to “an extradition hearing before being returned to the District of Columbia to face charges there being filed against me.” 408 A.2d at 966 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Byrd v. United States
green
2 sentences1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea 1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Harlen Manuel
green
2 sentences1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea 1993See Alvarez-Sanchez, supra, 975 F.2d at 1403 *995 ("[d]iscretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours") (quoting Halbert, supra, 436 F.2d at 1234 ); see also id. at 1400-01 ("in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession"); id. at 1401 ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable prea | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Young v. Ridley
green
2 sentences1983Even if it were binding on this court, Young v. Ridley, 309 F.Supp. 1308 (D.D.C.1970), relied on by appellant, does not interdict undertakings in cases where inability to meet the bond requirement is alleged. 1983In Young, 309 F.Supp. at 1313 n. 12, the district court stated, in language unnecessary to its holding, that availability of the plea of title “shall not depend upon a litigant’s economic posture” (citing Thompson). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
W. B. Moses & Sons v. Hayes
neutral
1 sentence1981In holding that the bond requirement was not jurisdictional, the court in Hayes, supra, relied on the fact that a statutory remedy was available to those interested persons unsatisfied with the surety provided. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.