bond hearing in Georgia

2014See Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (testimony adduced at pre-trial commitment hearing could be considered in determining whether trial court erred in ruling on motion to suppress), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2014See Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (testimony adduced at pre-trial commitment hearing could be considered in determining whether trial court erred in ruling on motion to suppress), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2014Moreover, “in reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress we may consider all relevant evidence of record, wherever located,” Tyre v. State, 323 Ga. App. 37, 42 (4) (a) ( 747 SE2d 106 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), which in this case includes the transcript of an earlier bond hearing.

2014Moreover, “in reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress we may consider all relevant evidence of record, wherever located,” Tyre v. State, 323 Ga. App. 37, 42 (4) (a) ( 747 SE2d 106 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), which in this case includes the transcript of an earlier bond hearing.

2014See Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (testimony adduced at pre-trial commitment hearing could be considered in determining whether trial court erred in ruling on motion to suppress), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2014See Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 431-432 (II) ( 219 SE2d 768 ) (1975) (testimony adduced at pre-trial commitment hearing could be considered in determining whether trial court erred in ruling on motion to suppress), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as noted in State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 765 (1) ( 727 SE2d 670 ) (2012).

2018A request for a lawyer "must be clear and unambiguous; the mere mention of the word 'attorney' or 'lawyer' without more, does not automatically invoke the right to counsel." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dubose v. State , 294 Ga. 579 , 582 (2), 755 S.E.2d 174 (2014).

2018A request for a lawyer "must be clear and unambiguous; the mere mention of the word 'attorney' or 'lawyer' without more, does not automatically invoke the right to counsel." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dubose v. State , 294 Ga. 579 , 582 (2), 755 S.E.2d 174 (2014).

2008On the other hand, prior testimony from a defendant’s bond hearing has been held inadmissible at the trial of the case, because the court there concluded that “the issues involved in the two proceedings were not so sufficiently similar that it can be said that the previous opportunity for cross-examination of the witness . . . was adequate.” Craft, supra, 154 Ga. App. at 683 (1).

2008On the other hand, prior testimony from a defendant’s bond hearing has been held inadmissible at the trial of the case, because the court there concluded that “the issues involved in the two proceedings were not so sufficiently similar that it can be said that the previous opportunity for cross-examination of the witness . . . was adequate.” Craft, supra, 154 Ga. App. at 683 (1).

2024Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 426 (1) (emphasis supplied).

2024Simons Waterfront, 293 Ga. at 426 (1) (emphasis supplied).

2024See Middleton v. State, 316 Ga. 808, 810 n.3 (890 SE2d 713) (2023) (declining to consider an argument that was “never raised in proceedings below”).

2024See Middleton v. State, 316 Ga. 808, 810 n.3 (890 SE2d 713) (2023) (declining to consider an argument that was “never raised in proceedings below”).

2022See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020). 2 during an initial bond hearing unduly influenced her to waive her right to a jury trial, rendering the waiver involuntary.

2022See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 398-399 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020). 2 during an initial bond hearing unduly influenced her to waive her right to a jury trial, rendering the waiver involuntary.

2022She relies heavily upon Ealey v. State, 310 Ga. App. 893, 898 (714 SE2d 424) (2011), where the Court of Appeals held that the State failed to meet its burden to show that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was voluntary.

2022She relies heavily upon Ealey v. State, 310 Ga. App. 893, 898 (714 SE2d 424) (2011), where the Court of Appeals held that the State failed to meet its burden to show that a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was voluntary.

2020Accord Roberts v. Citizens Bank, 62 Ga. App. 584 ( 8 SE2d 900 ) (1940) (“[I]t must appear from the record that the bond required by [OCGA § 5-4-5] has been duly approved by the judicial officer before whom the case was tried in the first instance.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 3 OCGA § 5-4-5 (a) “refers to just one exception to the bond requirement[, which] is set forth in subsection (c), and applies only where the party seeking the writ files an affidavit of indigence.” Duty Free Air & Ship Supply, supra. If the party applying for the writ of certiorari makes and files with his petit

2020Accord Roberts v. Citizens Bank, 62 Ga. App. 584 ( 8 SE2d 900 ) (1940) (“[I]t must appear from the record that the bond required by [OCGA § 5-4-5] has been duly approved by the judicial officer before whom the case was tried in the first instance.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 3 OCGA § 5-4-5 (a) “refers to just one exception to the bond requirement[, which] is set forth in subsection (c), and applies only where the party seeking the writ files an affidavit of indigence.” Duty Free Air & Ship Supply, supra. If the party applying for the writ of certiorari makes and files with his petit

2020She informally advised 21 Babbitt v. State, 337 Ga. App. 553, 554 (1) (a) ( 789 SE2d 205 ) (2016).

2020She informally advised 21 Babbitt v. State, 337 Ga. App. 553, 554 (1) (a) ( 789 SE2d 205 ) (2016).

2020Accord Roberts v. Citizens Bank, 62 Ga. App. 584 ( 8 SE2d 900 ) (1940) (“[I]t must appear from the record that the bond required by [OCGA § 5-4-5] has been duly approved by the judicial officer before whom the case was tried in the first instance.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 3 OCGA § 5-4-5 (a) “refers to just one exception to the bond requirement[, which] is set forth in subsection (c), and applies only where the party seeking the writ files an affidavit of indigence.” Duty Free Air & Ship Supply, supra. If the party applying for the writ of certiorari makes and files with his petit

2016Compare Williams, supra at 146 (1) (vacating attorney fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) based on lack of notice because, prior to making fee award, no party had filed a motion seeking attorney fees from appellant, the court had not mentioned that it was considering an award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or an award on any basis against the appellant, and the hearing notice contained no reference either to OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or to the possibility that appellant could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct); Rowan v. Reuss, 246 Ga. App. 139, 140 (1) ( 539 SE2d 241 ) (2000) (award of attorney fees

2016Compare Williams, supra at 146 (1) (vacating attorney fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) based on lack of notice because, prior to making fee award, no party had filed a motion seeking attorney fees from appellant, the court had not mentioned that it was considering an award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or an award on any basis against the appellant, and the hearing notice contained no reference either to OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or to the possibility that appellant could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct); Rowan v. Reuss, 246 Ga. App. 139, 140 (1) ( 539 SE2d 241 ) (2000) (award of attorney fees

2016Compare Williams, supra at 146 (1) (vacating attorney fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) based on lack of notice because, prior to making fee award, no party had filed a motion seeking attorney fees from appellant, the court had not mentioned that it was considering an award under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or an award on any basis against the appellant, and the hearing notice contained no reference either to OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) or to the possibility that appellant could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct); Rowan v. Reuss, 246 Ga. App. 139, 140 (1) ( 539 SE2d 241 ) (2000) (award of attorney fees

2016Auth., 303 Ga. App. 724, 736-737 (3) ( 694 SE2d 680 ) (2010) (affirming fee award where, although trial court had not specifically stated that it was considering an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), appellant had received ample notice and an opportunity to challenge the award, because the trial court had told appellant that it intended to take up at a bond hearing on its own motion the issue of sanctions against him, including attorney fees).

2016Auth., 303 Ga. App. 724, 736-737 (3) ( 694 SE2d 680 ) (2010) (affirming fee award where, although trial court had not specifically stated that it was considering an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), appellant had received ample notice and an opportunity to challenge the award, because the trial court had told appellant that it intended to take up at a bond hearing on its own motion the issue of sanctions against him, including attorney fees).

2012See Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) ( 624 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (bond conditions including restricting accused’s contact with the victim and prosecution witnesses, banishment from certain counties, and requiring accused to undergo a mental and physical evaluation, were intended to further public safety and did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219, 220 (1) ( 491 SE2d 450 ) (1997) (trial court was authorized to forbid the accused, who was charged with battery, from contacting the victim as a condition of his pretrial release).

2012See Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) ( 624 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (bond conditions including restricting accused’s contact with the victim and prosecution witnesses, banishment from certain counties, and requiring accused to undergo a mental and physical evaluation, were intended to further public safety and did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219, 220 (1) ( 491 SE2d 450 ) (1997) (trial court was authorized to forbid the accused, who was charged with battery, from contacting the victim as a condition of his pretrial release).

2012Here, because a jury had not been impaneled and sworn in this case, “neither of the first two abuses identified in North Carolina v. Pearce concerning second prosecutions is present in this case.” Id. at 899 . 11 Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1) ( 425 SE2d 282 ) (1993). 12 OCGA § 17-6-1 (e). 13 Strickland, 300 Ga. App. at 900 . 14 The State alleges in its appellate brief that it proffered evidence at the bond hearing that Alden had two prior DUI convictions.

2012Here, because a jury had not been impaneled and sworn in this case, “neither of the first two abuses identified in North Carolina v. Pearce concerning second prosecutions is present in this case.” Id. at 899 . 11 Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1) ( 425 SE2d 282 ) (1993). 12 OCGA § 17-6-1 (e). 13 Strickland, 300 Ga. App. at 900 . 14 The State alleges in its appellate brief that it proffered evidence at the bond hearing that Alden had two prior DUI convictions.

2012See Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) ( 624 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (bond conditions including restricting accused’s contact with the victim and prosecution witnesses, banishment from certain counties, and requiring accused to undergo a mental and physical evaluation, were intended to further public safety and did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219, 220 (1) ( 491 SE2d 450 ) (1997) (trial court was authorized to forbid the accused, who was charged with battery, from contacting the victim as a condition of his pretrial release).

2012See Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) ( 624 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (bond conditions including restricting accused’s contact with the victim and prosecution witnesses, banishment from certain counties, and requiring accused to undergo a mental and physical evaluation, were intended to further public safety and did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219, 220 (1) ( 491 SE2d 450 ) (1997) (trial court was authorized to forbid the accused, who was charged with battery, from contacting the victim as a condition of his pretrial release).

2011In Davis, 244 Ga.App. at 716 (1), 536 S.E.2d 603 , the trial judge who conducted the bond hearing and issued the bond testified that it was his custom to go over the special conditions with defendants and that the bond was served on the defendant in that case.

2011In Davis, 244 Ga.App. at 716 (1), 536 S.E.2d 603 , the trial judge who conducted the bond hearing and issued the bond testified that it was his custom to go over the special conditions with defendants and that the bond was served on the defendant in that case.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.

2009See Burgess v. State, 276 Ga. 185, 186 ( 576 SE2d 863 ) (2003); Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 283 ( 486 SE2d 876 ) (1997). 16 Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 . 17 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (119 SC 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999). 18 Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 19 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 433 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985) (plurality opinion)). 20 Steve M.