bond requirement in Texas

2025ES3 also contends Texas law requires evidence of lost-profits, not lost- 50 Id. 51 756 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, no writ). 52 672 S.W.3d 22 , 26 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J., dissenting). 2d.

2025ES3 also contends Texas law requires evidence of lost-profits, not lost- 50 Id. 51 756 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, no writ). 52 672 S.W.3d 22 , 26 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J., dissenting). 2d.

2021See, e.g., Ex parte Wood, 952 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding a combined $450,000 bond on capital murder and aggravated robbery charges was too high under the bond factors).

2021See, e.g., Ex parte Wood, 952 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding a combined $450,000 bond on capital murder and aggravated robbery charges was too high under the bond factors); Ex parte McDonald, 852 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.).

2019See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. 1964) (“The State has a valid statutory right to a supersedeas without filing a bond upon perfecting its appeal by giving proper notice.”); see also In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).

1999When an entity exempt from the bond requirement files appeal, that "appeal, when perfected, automatically supersedes the district court's judgment, and that suspension remains in effect until all appellate rights are exhausted." In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999).

2015Cf. Limon v. State, 947 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex.App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (bar owners had' standing to challenge a bond requirement for obtaining, a liquor license after a state commission -denied their applications for failing to post the bond).

2015Cf. Limon v. State, 947 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (bar owners had standing to challenge a bond requirement for obtaining a liquor license after a state commission denied their applications for failing to post the bond).

2010For purposes of the bond requirement, however, “a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2010For purposes of the bond requirement, however, “a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” CA Partners v. Spears , 274 S.W.3d 51, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co. , 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2010For purposes of the bond requirement, however, “a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2010For purposes of the bond requirement, however, “a debt collector does not include the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” CA Partners v. Spears , 274 S.W.3d 51, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co. , 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)).

2007See Dorenfield , 73 S.W.2d at 86 (not including the depositing of a bond from a list of facts considered in determining whether someone is an officer of the state).

2007See Dorenfield, 73 S.W.2d at 86 (not including the depositing of a bond from a list of facts considered in determining whether someone is an officer of the state).

2002He cites Ex parte Homan , 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted , 962 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Crim.

2002He cites Ex parte Homan, 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 962 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2002He cites Ex parte Homan , 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted , 962 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Crim.

2002He cites Ex parte Homan, 963 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 962 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

2025Id.

1988Ex parte Lesher, 651 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.1983).

2015Appellant said that his attorney visited him during the detention, and ″said everything was o.k. and not to worry and that I was going to get deferred probation, and explained to me that it could eventually 1 Although the case law refers to the procedure by which an alien is expelled from the United States as ″deportation,″ see, e.g., Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(″the written admonishment was sufficient to give Applicant notice that a plea of guilty could have resulted in deportation.″), such [*2] proceedings commenced after April 1, 1997, are properly referr

2014“Deportability” is a legal state rendering an “alien[] in and admitted to the United States . . . subject to removal[.]” Id.

2026See, e.g., LaHood, 401 S.W.3d at 51–52 (counsel’s failure to further investigate was unreasonable when counsel acknowledged her client “told her he was bipolar and was prescribed Zoloft, Risperadol, and Zyprexa”); Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 499 , 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) 10 (“Appellant’s affidavit, coupled with his mother’s testimony at the bond hearing regarding his mental health history, show that mitigating evidence was available and his attorney knew about it but failed to present it at trial.” (emphasis added)); Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 154 (Tex. App.—

2026See, e.g., LaHood, 401 S.W.3d at 51–52 (counsel’s failure to further investigate was unreasonable when counsel acknowledged her client “told her he was bipolar and was prescribed Zoloft, Risperadol, and Zyprexa”); Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 499 , 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) 10 (“Appellant’s affidavit, coupled with his mother’s testimony at the bond hearing regarding his mental health history, show that mitigating evidence was available and his attorney knew about it but failed to present it at trial.” (emphasis added)); Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 154 (Tex. App.—

2026See, e.g., LaHood, 401 S.W.3d at 51–52 (counsel’s failure to further investigate was unreasonable when counsel acknowledged her client “told her he was bipolar and was prescribed Zoloft, Risperadol, and Zyprexa”); Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 499 , 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) 10 (“Appellant’s affidavit, coupled with his mother’s testimony at the bond hearing regarding his mental health history, show that mitigating evidence was available and his attorney knew about it but failed to present it at trial.” (emphasis added)); Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 154 (Tex. App.—

2024See id. at 174 (“[W]e consider the information the appellant claims this witness would have provided to determine if the appellant was prejudiced as a result of the delay.”).

2024See Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 896 ; Greene, 446 S.W.3d at 764 n.4. 12 “notification” and a “claim” would have muddied—much less actively misled Appellant regarding—the statute of limitations.

2024See, e.g., Porretto v. Stalder, 834 F.2d 461, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Simmons where defendant’s bail testimony was admitted at trial, noting he was 2 represented and called by own counsel at bail hearing, and failed to show he was “compelled . . . to waive his right against self-incrimination in order to pursue his right to bail”).

2021See, e.g., Ex parte Wood, 952 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding a combined $450,000 bond on capital murder and aggravated robbery charges was too high under the bond factors); Ex parte McDonald, 852 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.).

2021See Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex. Crim.

2019See State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tex. 2017); City of San Antonio v. Headwaters Coal., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 543, 551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (applying these principles to interpret a bond requirement).

2019See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. 1964) (“The State has a valid statutory right to a supersedeas without filing a bond upon perfecting its appeal by giving proper notice.”); see also In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).

2019See State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tex. 2017); City of San Antonio v. Headwaters Coal., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 543, 551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (applying these principles to interpret a bond requirement).