grounds challenge in Ohio

2004Such challenges are deemed waived because "[t]he prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits." (Citations omitted.) Id. {¶ 13} In his motion to suppress filed at the trial court, Appellant argued that "the officers did not have a warrant or justification to enter [his] home[.]" Appellant cited legal precedent for the proposition of law that evidence obtained without a warrant and outside of the confines of one of the e

2004Such challenges are deemed waived because "[t]he prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits." (Citations omitted.) Id. {¶ 13} In his motion to suppress filed at the trial court, Appellant argued that "the officers did not have a warrant or justification to enter [his] home[.]" Appellant cited legal precedent for the proposition of law that evidence obtained without a warrant and outside of the confines of one of the e

1996State v. Johnson (1974), 16 Ore.App. 560, 567-570, 519 P.2d 1053 , 1057.

1996State v. Johnson (1974), 16 Ore.

2026This contention inverts the applicable legal standards. {¶ 32} The forfeiture doctrine, as articulated in Wintermeyer, 2019-Ohio-5156 , requires a party challenging a search or seizure to state the grounds for that challenge with particularity so that both the opposing party and the trial court are on notice of the issues to be resolved.

2022“Limiting suppression hearings to issues that are actually contested promotes judicial economy by ensuring that parties do not put on unnecessary evidence and that trial courts do not consider extraneous issues.” State v. Wintermeyer, 158 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2019-Ohio-5156, ¶ 23 . “[W]hen a defendant makes stipulations or narrows the issues to be decided at a suppression hearing, the prosecution need not ‘prove the validity of every aspect of the search.’” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Peagler at 500 .

2017No. 96APC01-90, 1996 WL 492979 (Aug. 27, 1996), citing Crim.R. 33(E). {¶ 36} In order to warrant the granting of a motion for new trial in a criminal case based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that the new evidence "(1) discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the f

2017No. 96APC01-90, 1996 WL 492979 (Aug. 27, 1996), citing Crim.R. 33(E). {¶ 36} In order to warrant the granting of a motion for new trial in a criminal case based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that the new evidence "(1) discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the f

2007Services , Franklin App. No. 04AP-1196, 2005-Ohio-3384 . {¶ 24} "In Berus , the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that an appellant's similar failure to satisfy the grounds requirement of R.C. 119.12 created a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal.

2006Services, Franklin App. No. 04AP-1196, 2005-Ohio-3384 . {¶ 15} In Berus, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that an appellant's similar failure to satisfy the grounds requirement of R.C. 119.12 created a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal.

2007The Berus court relied on Zier v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (1949), 151 Ohio St. 123 , 84 N.E.2d 746 . {¶ 25} "In Zier , the section of the General Code authorizing an appeal to the common pleas court required the appellant's notice of appeal to `set forth the errors' in the order appealed from.

2007The Berus court relied on Zier v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (1949), 151 Ohio St. 123 , 84 N.E.2d 746 . {¶ 25} "In Zier , the section of the General Code authorizing an appeal to the common pleas court required the appellant's notice of appeal to `set forth the errors' in the order appealed from.

2026Id.

2023The revocation hearing is an informal proceeding “ ‘structured to assure that the finding of a * * * violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the [defendant’s] behavior.’ ” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.E.2d 484 (1972). {¶8} Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s acceptance of Mr. Stewart’s no contest plea.

2023The revocation hearing is an informal proceeding “ ‘structured to assure that the finding of a * * * violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the [defendant’s] behavior.’ ” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.E.2d 484 (1972). {¶8} Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s acceptance of Mr. Stewart’s no contest plea.

2018Second Assignment of Error {¶ 14} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing their claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that this claim was moot. *220 Legal Standard {¶ 15} Mootness is a "doctrine of standing in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Siferd v. Siferd , 2017-Ohio-8624 , 100 N.E.3d 915 , ¶ 12, quoting U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d

2018Second Assignment of Error {¶ 14} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing their claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that this claim was moot. *220 Legal Standard {¶ 15} Mootness is a "doctrine of standing in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Siferd v. Siferd , 2017-Ohio-8624 , 100 N.E.3d 915 , ¶ 12, quoting U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d

2018Second Assignment of Error {¶ 14} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing their claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that this claim was moot. *220 Legal Standard {¶ 15} Mootness is a "doctrine of standing in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Siferd v. Siferd , 2017-Ohio-8624 , 100 N.E.3d 915 , ¶ 12, quoting U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d

2018Second Assignment of Error {¶ 14} In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing their claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that this claim was moot. *220 Legal Standard {¶ 15} Mootness is a "doctrine of standing in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Siferd v. Siferd , 2017-Ohio-8624 , 100 N.E.3d 915 , ¶ 12, quoting U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d

2018Even if, for the purpose of our review, this Court were to assume that Ms. Brown's charged offenses are allied offenses of similar import to minor drug possession, and further assume that a hypothetical charge for minor drug possession would have been dismissed on the grounds of immunity based on the circumstances underlying this matter, for the reasons that follow we determine that Ms. Brown's argument still lacks merit. {¶ 14} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides that "[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or in

2018Even if, for the purpose of our review, this Court were to assume that Ms. Brown's charged offenses are allied offenses of similar import to minor drug possession, and further assume that a hypothetical charge for minor drug possession would have been dismissed on the grounds of immunity based on the circumstances underlying this matter, for the reasons that follow we determine that Ms. Brown's argument still lacks merit. {¶ 14} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides that "[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or in

2018Even if, for the purpose of our review, this Court were to assume that Ms. Brown's charged offenses are allied offenses of similar import to minor drug possession, and further assume that a hypothetical charge for minor drug possession would have been dismissed on the grounds of immunity based on the circumstances underlying this matter, for the reasons that follow we determine that Ms. Brown's argument still lacks merit. {¶ 14} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides that "[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or in

2018Even if, for the purpose of our review, this Court were to assume that Ms. Brown's charged offenses are allied offenses of similar import to minor drug possession, and further assume that a hypothetical charge for minor drug possession would have been dismissed on the grounds of immunity based on the circumstances underlying this matter, for the reasons that follow we determine that Ms. Brown's argument still lacks merit. {¶ 14} R.C. 2941.25(A) provides that "[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or in

2018Ms. Brown has failed to demonstrate how, had she been charged with minor drug possession, a pre-conviction dismissal of that particular charge on the grounds of immunity would have required dismissal of any allied offenses. {¶ 15} "To ensure compliance with both R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 'a trial court is required to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing.' " State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245 , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 27.

2018Ms. Brown has failed to demonstrate how, had she been charged with minor drug possession, a pre-conviction dismissal of that particular charge on the grounds of immunity would have required dismissal of any allied offenses. {¶ 15} "To ensure compliance with both R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 'a trial court is required to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing.' " State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245 , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 27.

2018Ms. Brown has failed to demonstrate how, had she been charged with minor drug possession, a pre-conviction dismissal of that particular charge on the grounds of immunity would have required dismissal of any allied offenses. {¶ 15} "To ensure compliance with both R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 'a trial court is required to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing.' " State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245 , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 27.

2018Ms. Brown has failed to demonstrate how, had she been charged with minor drug possession, a pre-conviction dismissal of that particular charge on the grounds of immunity would have required dismissal of any allied offenses. {¶ 15} "To ensure compliance with both R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 'a trial court is required to merge allied offenses of similar import at sentencing.' " State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245 , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Underwood , 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 27.

2018Montgomery No. 25860, 2014-Ohio-1274, ¶ 10 , quoting Dayton v. Dabney, 99 Ohio App.3d 32, 37 , 649 N.E.2d 1271 (2d Dist.1994), citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).

2017No. 2016 CA 00113, 2017-Ohio-262, ¶ 23 , citing City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988) (“The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.”) {¶53} A motion for a court order “shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought.

2016No. 08AP-371, 2008-Ohio-6518, ¶ 8 . {¶ 77} A trial court may grant a new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(6) "[w]hen new evidence material to the defense is discovered, which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial." The language of Crim.R. 33 makes it clear that a trial court should not grant a new trial " 'unless it affirmatively appears from the record that a defendant was prejudiced by one of the grounds stated in the rule, or was thereby prevented from having a fair trial.' " Salinas at ¶ 41, quoting Columbus v. Carroll, 10th Dist.

2014In its entry, the court analyzed the relevant factors as described in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether Pittman’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

2011The U.S. Supreme Court found the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above a speculative level. {¶15} The U.S. Supreme Court enlarged on the Twombly standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), 129 S. Ct. 1937 , 173 L.

2011The U.S. Supreme Court found the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above a speculative level. {¶15} The U.S. Supreme Court enlarged on the Twombly standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), 129 S. Ct. 1937 , 173 L.

2011See, e.g., State v. Cullins, Montgomery App. No. 21881, 2007-Ohio-5978 , 2007 WL 3309638 , at ¶ 10; State v. Carter, Montgomery App. No. 21999, 2008-Ohio-2588 , 2008 WL 2222717 , at ¶ 20. {¶ 14} “The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the grounds of the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.