Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
36 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reed v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Haines v. State, 851 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial "court records must establish the defendant's clear intent to waive a portion of his" accrued jail time in order to deny a facially sufficient motion for additional jail credit on the grounds of a waiver) Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's summary denial of the facially sufficient claims discussed herein and remand for either attachment of record portions refuting the appellant's claims or an evidentiary hearing. 2005See Haines v. State, 851 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial “court records must establish the defendant’s clear intent to waive a portion of his” accrued jail time in order to deny a facially sufficient motion for additional jail credit on the grounds of a waiver). | 3 | 3 |
Welch v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“Compliance with each step is not discretionary, and the proper remedy when the trial court fails to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to reverse and remand for a new trial.” King v. State, 106 So.3d 966, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So.3d 452, 461 (Fla.2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 212 (Fla.2008) (reversing because the trial court focused on the grounds for the defense’s objection instead of requesting the state’s reason for the strike); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing 2011This failure constitutes reversible error.” Id. at 212. | 2 | 2 |
Haines v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Haines v. State, 851 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial "court records must establish the defendant's clear intent to waive a portion of his" accrued jail time in order to deny a facially sufficient motion for additional jail credit on the grounds of a waiver) Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's summary denial of the facially sufficient claims discussed herein and remand for either attachment of record portions refuting the appellant's claims or an evidentiary hearing. 2005See Haines v. State, 851 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial “court records must establish the defendant’s clear intent to waive a portion of his” accrued jail time in order to deny a facially sufficient motion for additional jail credit on the grounds of a waiver). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hugginsgreen1 sentence2026Considering the limited value of the additional impeachment evidence, the substantial grounds on which defense counsel actually impeached Filancia, and the strength of the State’s proof, the evidence at issue would not have “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Sweet, 293 So. 3d at 451 (quoting State v. Huggins, 788 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Sabine v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“Compliance with each step is not discretionary, and the proper remedy when the trial court fails to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to reverse and remand for a new trial.” King v. State, 106 So.3d 966, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So.3d 452, 461 (Fla.2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 212 (Fla.2008) (reversing because the trial court focused on the grounds for the defense’s objection instead of requesting the state’s reason for the strike); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“Compliance with each step is not discretionary, and the proper remedy when the trial court fails to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to reverse and remand for a new trial.” King v. State, 106 So.3d 966, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So.3d 452, 461 (Fla.2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 212 (Fla.2008) (reversing because the trial court focused on the grounds for the defense’s objection instead of requesting the state’s reason for the strike); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing | 1 | 1 |
King v. Stategreen1 sentence2015“Compliance with each step is not discretionary, and the proper remedy when the trial court fails to abide by its duty under the Melbourne procedure is to reverse and remand for a new trial.” King v. State, 106 So.3d 966, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Hayes v. State, 94 So.3d 452, 461 (Fla.2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206, 212 (Fla.2008) (reversing because the trial court focused on the grounds for the defense’s objection instead of requesting the state’s reason for the strike); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing | 1 | 1 |
Nieves v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Nieves v. State, 22 So.3d 691, 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Melbourne v. Stategreen1 sentence2014In Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court set forth a three-step procedure for challenging a peremptory challenge on the grounds that the challenge was made on a discriminatory basis. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Mitchell v. State, 681 So.2d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hines v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc.green1 sentence2012See State v. Schoening, 00-0903, p. 3 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 762, 764 , quoting Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238, p. 8 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 864-65 (“This court has stated that, while there is no single required procedure or type of proceeding for attacking a statute’s constitutionality, ‘the long-standing jurisprudential rule of law is ... the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized.’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schoeninggreen1 sentence2012See State v. Schoening, 00-0903, p. 3 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 762, 764 , quoting Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238, p. 8 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 859, 864-65 (“This court has stated that, while there is no single required procedure or type of proceeding for attacking a statute’s constitutionality, ‘the long-standing jurisprudential rule of law is ... the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized.’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Bell v. State, 851 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 820 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Cifuentes v. State, 717 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Walker v. State, 853 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Currington v. State, 711 So.2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Haynes v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See Warren v. State, 499 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), Jones v. State, 479 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and Haynes v. State, 571 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See Warren v. State, 499 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), Jones v. State, 479 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and Haynes v. State, 571 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See Warren v. State, 499 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), Jones v. State, 479 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and Haynes v. State, 571 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Goldstein v. Richtergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Staten v. Couchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Geter v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zuliskey v. Prudential Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Harrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Slappy
green
2 sentences1990The prosecutor's failure to question the juror about the grounds for the challenge rendered the explanation "suspect." Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22 . 1990Because the objection was not frivolous the burden shifted to the state to present a "clear and reasonably specific racially neutral explanation." Id. | 2 | 1989–1990 |
State v. DiGuilio
green
1 sentence2013State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rodriguez v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS
neutral
1 sentence2009See Bell v. State, 851 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 820 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Cifuentes v. State, 717 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cifuentes v. State
green
1 sentence2009See Bell v. State, 851 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 820 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Cifuentes v. State, 717 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Currington v. State
green
1 sentence2003See Walker v. State, 853 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Currington v. State, 711 So.2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1998NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] On the night of the robbery, Hoggins reported to the police that his bike had been stolen. [3] Hoggins did not make an objection to this rebuttal closing argument. [4] Article I, section 9 provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself. [5] Additionally, the State argues that Hoggins failed to specifically object on the grounds of a violatio 1998NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] On the night of the robbery, Hoggins reported to the police that his bike had been stolen. [3] Hoggins did not make an objection to this rebuttal closing argument. [4] Article I, section 9 provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself. [5] Additionally, the State argues that Hoggins failed to specifically object on the grounds of a violatio | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gavins v. State
green
1 sentence1997Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rodriguez v. Coto
green
1 sentence1990Casana v. State, 546 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Underwood v. State, 455 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Gadson v. State, 368 So.2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Coxon v. State, 365 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Coxon v. State
green
1 sentence1990Casana v. State, 546 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Underwood v. State, 455 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Gadson v. State, 368 So.2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Coxon v. State, 365 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Underwood v. State
green
1 sentence1990Casana v. State, 546 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Underwood v. State, 455 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Gadson v. State, 368 So.2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Coxon v. State, 365 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gadson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1990Casana v. State, 546 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Underwood v. State, 455 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Gadson v. State, 368 So.2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Coxon v. State, 365 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence1989I would affirm the judgment below on the grounds that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails to meet the requirements of Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla.1981), in that the motion fails to indicate how the alleged improper investigation jeopardized the defense. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lee v. Florida High School Activities Association, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Coates v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Kirkland v. Robbins green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Bell v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Slaughter v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Velsor v. Allstate Insurance Company green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Botte v. Pomeroy green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lawton v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Nix v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Eller v. Crowell green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Spevack v. Klein green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Barcus v. Wood neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Peeples v. State green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Spaulding v. Ellsworth neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Jordan v. Sayre green | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.