grounds defense in North Dakota

1962In Bolton v. Donavan, 9 N.D. 575 , 84 N.W. 357 , this court said: “The term ‘merits,’ as used by the profession, when applied to actions, usually denotes the subject or ground *225 of an action as stated in the complaint, or the grounds of the defense as stated in the answer; and a trial of the merits of an action generally means the elicitation of evidence in support of the averments of fact set out in the pleadings.

1962In Bolton v. Donavan, 9 N.D. 575 , 84 N.W. 357 , this court said: “The term ‘merits,’ as used by the profession, when applied to actions, usually denotes the subject or ground *225 of an action as stated in the complaint, or the grounds of the defense as stated in the answer; and a trial of the merits of an action generally means the elicitation of evidence in support of the averments of fact set out in the pleadings.

2000Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Owens v. State , 1998 ND 106, ¶ 50 , 578 N.W.2d 542 , stating it is well settled issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). [¶5] On April 6, 1999, Berlin, acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.

2000Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Owens v. State, 1998 ND 106, ¶ 50 , 578 N.W.2d 542 , stating it is well settled issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). [¶ 5] On April 6, 1999, Berlin, acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of violation of N.D.R.CrimJP. 11.

2000Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Owens v. State , 1998 ND 106, ¶ 50 , 578 N.W.2d 542 , stating it is well settled issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). [¶5] On April 6, 1999, Berlin, acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.

2000Id. at ¶ 10 (citing Owens v. State , 1998 ND 106, ¶ 50 , 578 N.W.2d 542 , stating it is well settled issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). [¶5] On April 6, 1999, Berlin, acting pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.

1981The State relies on State v. Walla, 57 N.D. 726 , 224 N.W. 211 (1929), as support for this proposition.

1981The State relies on State v. Walla, 57 N.D. 726 , 224 N.W. 211 (1929), as support for this proposition.

1980There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.” ’ 403 P.2d at 39 — 40.” Furthermore, Section 28-14-66, N.D.C.C., sets forth the grounds of a challenge for cause to a juror and provides the following relevant grounds: “28-14-06.

1962But the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning, and have held that the phrase ‘involves the merits’ must be so interpreted as to embrace orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action or subject-matter in controversy.” In National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Weisler, 131 Minn. 365 , 155 N.W. 396 , the court considered the ap-pealability of an order of substitution made pursuant to Section 7685, Minnesota General

1962But the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning, and have held that the phrase ‘involves the merits’ must be so interpreted as to embrace orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action or subject-matter in controversy.” In National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Weisler, 131 Minn. 365 , 155 N.W. 396 , the court considered the ap-pealability of an order of substitution made pursuant to Section 7685, Minnesota General

1955But the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning and have held that the phrase `involves the merits' must be so interpreted as to embrace orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action or subject-matter in controversy." See also Schutt v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 71 N.D. 640 , 3 N.W.2d 417 ; Swiggum v. Valley Inv.

1955But the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning and have held that the phrase `involves the merits' must be so interpreted as to embrace orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action or subject-matter in controversy." See also Schutt v. Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 71 N.D. 640 , 3 N.W.2d 417 ; Swiggum v. Valley Inv.

1947But the courts, in construing statutes governing appeals from interlocutory orders, have frequently enlarged this meaning, and have held that the phrase, “involves the merits,” must be so interpreted as to embrace orders which pass upon the substantial legal rights of the suitor, whether such rights do or do not relate directly to the cause of action, or subject-matter in controversy.’ The Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice (2 Enc PI & Pr 75) says: ‘Where statutes allow an appeal from interlocutory orders “affecting a. substantial right” or “involving the merits,” an order in the nature of

1894Paragraph 9, in effect, set out a breach of the warranty with respect to both the evaporative and fuel saving qualities of the boiler in question. ■ It was a breach of the warranty and the resultant damages that constituted the grounds of the defense, and hence they should not have been stricken out of the answer. ( 61 N. W.

1890Mechem, in his treatise on Agency, (section 714,) in stating the grounds of the doctrine, uses the following language: “The reason is that, while the agent was authorized to act or speak at the time and within the scope of his authority, he is not authorized at a subsequent time to narrate what he had done, or how he did it.” The following cases sustain and illustrate the strict rule: Randall v. Telegraph Co. 54 Wis. 140 , 11 N. W.

1890Mechem, in his treatise on Agency, (section 714,) in stating the grounds of the doctrine, uses the following language: “The reason is that, while the agent was authorized to act or speak at the time and within the scope of his authority, he is not authorized at a subsequent time to narrate what he had done, or how he did it.” The following cases sustain and illustrate the strict rule: Randall v. Telegraph Co. 54 Wis. 140 , 11 N. W.