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13 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heacock v. Heacockgreen1 sentence2024Claim preclusion "is a ramification of the policy considerations that underlie the rule against splitting a cause of action and is 'based on the idea that the party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit.'" Massaro v. Walsh, 71 Mass. App. 562, 565 (2008), quoting Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeogreen1 sentence2020See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 , 315–316 (1982). 32 We consider first the claims of the incarcerated individuals. a. | 1 | 1 |
Foxboro Harness, Inc. v. State Racing Commissiongreen1 sentence2011Of course, the well-established typical rule is that “[a] party is not entitled to raise arguments on appeal that he could have raised, but did not raise, before the administrative agency.” Foxboro Harness, Inc. v. State Racing Commn., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 85 (1997), quoting from Albert v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Albert v. Municipal Court of the City of Bostongreen1 sentence2011Of course, the well-established typical rule is that “[a] party is not entitled to raise arguments on appeal that he could have raised, but did not raise, before the administrative agency.” Foxboro Harness, Inc. v. State Racing Commn., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 85 (1997), quoting from Albert v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 388 Mass. 491, 493 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Apparel Art International, Inc. v. Amertex Enterprises Ltd.green1 sentence2010Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1005)): “[u]nder a generally accepted exception to the res judicata doctrine, a litigant’s claims are not precluded if the court in an earlier action expressly reserves the litigant’s right to bring those claims in a later action”; Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of United States and Canada, 231 P. 2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1951). | 1 | 1 |
Perroncello v. Donahuegreen1 sentence2010The town could have objected on the grounds of claim splitting, but did not; it may not assert that defense now. 10 Furthermore, the trial transcript strongly suggests the Court’s concurrence with trust counsel’s position that, if the trust were to prevail as to title, the issue of recompense from the town “can be settled in a subsequent proceeding over damages for the taking from June 2001 to the present.” Graeter Aff., Ex. 2, at 17-18. 11 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §26(1)(b). 12 See also Perroncello v. Donahue, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 564, 570 (2005) (quoting Apparel Art Intl., Inc. v. Am | 1 | 1 |
Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn.green1 sentence2010Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 586 (1st Cir. 1005)): “[u]nder a generally accepted exception to the res judicata doctrine, a litigant’s claims are not precluded if the court in an earlier action expressly reserves the litigant’s right to bring those claims in a later action”; Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of United States and Canada, 231 P. 2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1951). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maskellgreen1 sentence1989Thus the defendant appears to have done less than is called for by Mass.R.Crim.P. 24(b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979), which requires that counsel specify both “the matter to which he objects” and “the grounds of his objection.” See Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 563-564 (1987); Commonwealth v. Maskell, 403 Mass. 111, 115 (1988). *25 The defendant gets around to stating his “grounds” in his brief on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Keevangreen1 sentence1989Thus the defendant appears to have done less than is called for by Mass.R.Crim.P. 24(b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979), which requires that counsel specify both “the matter to which he objects” and “the grounds of his objection.” See Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 563-564 (1987); Commonwealth v. Maskell, 403 Mass. 111, 115 (1988). *25 The defendant gets around to stating his “grounds” in his brief on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Spence v. Reedergreen1 sentence1983See generally, Spence v. Reeder, 382 Mass. 398, 413 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Selectmen of Avon v. Lindergreen1 sentence1975See Selectmen of Avon v. Linder, 352 Mass. 581, 582-583 (1967); Starr v. Board of Health of Clinton, 356 Mass. 426, 427 (1969). 13 Our Rule 12 (b), last sentence, provides (although the parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not) that “ [a] motion, answer, or reply presenting the defense numbered (6) shall include a short, concise statement of the grounds on which such defense is based.” This should not be allowed to degenerate into a formulary recital but should address itself to the real legal issues. 14 As this is the result, it is immaterial as a practical matter whether we regard t | 1 | 1 |
Starr v. Board of Health of Clintongreen1 sentence1975See Selectmen of Avon v. Linder, 352 Mass. 581, 582-583 (1967); Starr v. Board of Health of Clinton, 356 Mass. 426, 427 (1969). 13 Our Rule 12 (b), last sentence, provides (although the parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not) that “ [a] motion, answer, or reply presenting the defense numbered (6) shall include a short, concise statement of the grounds on which such defense is based.” This should not be allowed to degenerate into a formulary recital but should address itself to the real legal issues. 14 As this is the result, it is immaterial as a practical matter whether we regard t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Soares
green
2 sentences1994“While [the prosecutor] need not approximate the grounds required by a challenge for cause, [her] reason must pertain to the individual qualities of the prospective juror and not to that juror’s group association.” Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. at 491 . 1987While [the prosecutor] need not ap *402 proximate the grounds required by a challenge for cause, his reason must pertain to the individual qualities of the prospective juror and not to that juror’s group association.” Soares, supra at 491 . | 4 | 1987–1994 |
Katz v. Gerardi
green
1 sentence2024A dismissal on the grounds of claim splitting "generally occurs while 'the dismissed party is involved in another pending suit regarding the same subject matter against the same defendants.'" Jinks, supra, quoting Katz, supra at 1219 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence1991Soares, supra. Batson, supra. In this case, because the prosecution disproportionately excluded sixty-seven per cent of the prospective black jurors and only fourteen per cent of the available whites, the de *317 fendant established a prima facie rebuttal of the presumption. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Langlitz v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors
green
1 sentence1990Langlitz, supra at 377 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Congrove v. Holmes
green
1 sentence1977The plaintiff points out that an Ohio trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff in a case resembling the present (Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95 [C.P. 1973]), but the discovery process may have gone further there than here, and the result appears dubious in any event. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.