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50 Virginia opinions name it 13 courts 1912–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alexander v. Kuykendallgreen2 sentences2014Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 14-15 , 63 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1951). 2014Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 14-15 , 63 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1951). | 12 | 13 |
CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc.green2 sentences2009Id., citing Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 129 , 96 S.E. 360, 365 (1918); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 14-15 , 63 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1951). 2002“If a defendant desires more definite information, or a more specific statement of the grounds of the claim, the defendant should request the court to order the plaintiff to file a Bill of Particulars.” Id. | 2 | 4 |
Nixon v. Rowlandgreen2 sentences2009A general appearance “is a waiver of process, equivalent to personal service of process and confers jurisdiction of the person on the court.” Nixon v. Roivland, 192 Va. 47, 50 , 63 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1951). 2009A general appearance “is a waiver of process, equivalent to personal service of process and confers jurisdiction of the person on the court.” Nixon v. Roivland, 192 Va. 47, 50 , 63 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1951). | 1 | 2 |
Hunter v. Burroughsgreen2 sentences2009Id., citing Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 129 , 96 S.E. 360, 365 (1918); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 14-15 , 63 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1951). 2009Id., citing Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 129 , 96 S.E. 360, 365 (1918); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 14-15 , 63 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1951). | 1 | 2 |
City Gas Co. v. Poudregreen2 sentences2006Ry. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477 , 506, 153 S.E. 865 , 873 (1930) (filing of a grounds of defense by defendant "limited in its defenses to the ground there stated"); see also City Gas Co. v. Poudre, 113 Va. 224 , 226, 74 S.E. 158 , 160 (1912) (purpose of requiring a grounds of defense is "to give the plaintiff reasonable notice of the particular defense upon which the defendant expects to rely, so that he may not be prejudiced by surprise"). 2006Ry. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477 , 506, 153 S.E. 865 , 873 (1930) (filing of a grounds of defense by defendant "limited in its defenses to the ground there stated"); see also City Gas Co. v. Poudre, 113 Va. 224 , 226, 74 S.E. 158 , 160 (1912) (purpose of requiring a grounds of defense is "to give the plaintiff reasonable notice of the particular defense upon which the defendant expects to rely, so that he may not be prejudiced by surprise"). | 1 | 2 |
Gilpin v. Joycegreen2 sentences2002A general appearance “is a waiver of process, equivalent to personal service of process and confers jurisdiction of the person on the court.” See Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 581 . 2002See id. at 582 . | 1 | 2 |
Berry v. Klingergreen1 sentence2025In terms of reliance on a pleading, a litigant’s pleading is binding on them “[u]nless amended.” Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 207 (1983) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Osburn v. Va. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Controlgreen1 sentence2022“Under this framework, in an appeal of a grievance proceeding, a reviewing court, whether it is a circuit or appellate court, may reverse or modify the decision only if it is ‘contradictory to law.’” Morris, 74 Va. App. at 538 (quoting Osburn v. Va. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 295 Va. 10, 17 (2018)). | 1 | 1 |
Morris & Co. v. Alvisgreen2 sentences2011Morris & Co. v. Alvis, 138 Va. 149, 158 , 121 S.E. 145, 148 (1924) (“To the declaration, as amended, the defendant pleaded not guilty and filed the following grounds of defense.”) An appeal from a final judgment of the Juvenile Court results in a trial de novo. 2011Morris & Co. v. Alvis, 138 Va. 149, 158 , 121 S.E. 145, 148 (1924) (“To the declaration, as amended, the defendant pleaded not guilty and filed the following grounds of defense.”) An appeal from a final judgment of the Juvenile Court results in a trial de novo. | 1 | 1 |
Harley v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010Harley v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 342, 350 , 488 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1997). 2010Harley v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 342, 350 , 488 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Oxenham v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007See Oxenham, 241 Va. at 289 , 402 S.E.2d at 5 . 2007See Oxenham, 241 Va. at 289 , 402 S.E.2d at 5 . | 1 | 1 |
CARSON BY MEREDITH v. LeBlancgreen2 sentences2003See Meredith v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135 , 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993) (at summary judgment stage, court must adopt those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the non-moving party); see also Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18 , 267 S.E.2d 96 (1980) (in deciding summary judgment motions courts must adopt those inferences most favorable to the party whose evidence it is sought to j¡iave struck, unless the inferences are strained, forced, or contrary to reason). 9 The defendant’s attorney has stated that no reply was filed because he did not believe that a “new matter” had been set forth in th 2003See Meredith v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135 , 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993) (at summary judgment stage, court must adopt those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the non-moving party); see also Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18 , 267 S.E.2d 96 (1980) (in deciding summary judgment motions courts must adopt those inferences most favorable to the party whose evidence it is sought to j¡iave struck, unless the inferences are strained, forced, or contrary to reason). 9 The defendant’s attorney has stated that no reply was filed because he did not believe that a “new matter” had been set forth in th | 1 | 1 |
Bloodworth v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2003See Meredith v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135 , 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993) (at summary judgment stage, court must adopt those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the non-moving party); see also Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18 , 267 S.E.2d 96 (1980) (in deciding summary judgment motions courts must adopt those inferences most favorable to the party whose evidence it is sought to j¡iave struck, unless the inferences are strained, forced, or contrary to reason). 9 The defendant’s attorney has stated that no reply was filed because he did not believe that a “new matter” had been set forth in th 2003See Meredith v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135 , 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993) (at summary judgment stage, court must adopt those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the non-moving party); see also Bloodworth v. Ellis, 221 Va. 18 , 267 S.E.2d 96 (1980) (in deciding summary judgment motions courts must adopt those inferences most favorable to the party whose evidence it is sought to j¡iave struck, unless the inferences are strained, forced, or contrary to reason). 9 The defendant’s attorney has stated that no reply was filed because he did not believe that a “new matter” had been set forth in th | 1 | 1 |
Rhodes v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2002See also Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979); Lee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108 (1979); and Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Chaves v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rock v. Arkansasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Economic Water Heating Corp. v. Dillon Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Charleston Port Terminalsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kelly Leigh Harris v. Washington & Lee University
green
2 sentences2025Thus, it is “fundamental . . . that ‘the party sought to be estopped must be seeking to adopt a position [of fact] 14 Since we agree with the appellants that the circuit court erred for the reasons stated in assignment of error two, we decline to opine on the alleged alternative grounds for error in assignment of error three as we resolve this case “on the best and narrowest grounds available.” Harris v. Wash. & Lee Univ., 82 Va. App. 175 , 205 n.15 (2024). - 18 - that is inconsistent with a stance taken in a prior litigation.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Bentley Funding, 269 2025The circuit court erred in finding the judicial estoppel doctrine barred consideration of the appellants’ UUDPA negligence per se claim.15 The appellants further assign error to the circuit court’s decision to apply the judicial estoppel doctrine to bar consideration of their UUDPA negligence per se claim on the grounds that 15 Since we agree with the appellants that the circuit court erred for the reasons stated in assignment of error two, we decline to opine on the alleged alternative grounds for error in assignment of error three as we resolve this case “on the best and narrowest grounds av | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Osborne
green
2 sentences2006Ry. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477 , 506, 153 S.E. 865 , 873 (1930) (filing of a grounds of defense by defendant "limited in its defenses to the ground there stated"); see also City Gas Co. v. Poudre, 113 Va. 224 , 226, 74 S.E. 158 , 160 (1912) (purpose of requiring a grounds of defense is "to give the plaintiff reasonable notice of the particular defense upon which the defendant expects to rely, so that he may not be prejudiced by surprise"). 2006Ry. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477 , 506, 153 S.E. 865 , 873 (1930) (filing of a grounds of defense by defendant "limited in its defenses to the ground there stated"); see also City Gas Co. v. Poudre, 113 Va. 224 , 226, 74 S.E. 158 , 160 (1912) (purpose of requiring a grounds of defense is "to give the plaintiff reasonable notice of the particular defense upon which the defendant expects to rely, so that he may not be prejudiced by surprise"). | 2 | 1937–2006 |
Copeland v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2000To the contrary, the written notice must specify both the time and date of the hearing, as well as “the grounds for the hearing.” Id. 1999The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that “[njeither die time nor the grounds for the hearing were specified.” 14 Va. App. at 756 . | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Bentley Funding v. Sk & R Group
green
1 sentence2025Thus, it is “fundamental . . . that ‘the party sought to be estopped must be seeking to adopt a position [of fact] 14 Since we agree with the appellants that the circuit court erred for the reasons stated in assignment of error two, we decline to opine on the alleged alternative grounds for error in assignment of error three as we resolve this case “on the best and narrowest grounds available.” Harris v. Wash. & Lee Univ., 82 Va. App. 175 , 205 n.15 (2024). - 18 - that is inconsistent with a stance taken in a prior litigation.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Bentley Funding, 269 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Antonio Passaro, Jr. v. Virginia Department of State Police
green
1 sentence2022ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review Chapter 30 of Title § 2.2 grants employees the right to judicial review of a grievance hearing decision on the grounds that the hearing officer’s decision was “contradictory to law.” Code § 2.2-3006(B). 6 The state employee grievance procedure creates a “tripartite review procedure” setting forth the following roles: (1) the hearing officer is the finder of fact and final authority of factfinding; (2) DHRM and EDR [Employment Dispute Resolution] determine whether the hearing officer’s ruling is in compliance with personnel policy and grievance procedure respectiv | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tate Morris v. George Mason University
green
1 sentence2022“Under this framework, in an appeal of a grievance proceeding, a reviewing court, whether it is a circuit or appellate court, may reverse or modify the decision only if it is ‘contradictory to law.’” Morris, 74 Va. App. at 538 (quoting Osburn v. Va. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 295 Va. 10, 17 (2018)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sullivan v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016After an instruction was given to the jury on the charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery, Sullivan objected on the grounds that that instruction was “predicated upon section 4438 of the Code, while the indictment is drawn under section 4439 of the Code, and that the indictment in this case is fatally defective as an indictment under section 4438 of the Code.” Id. at 873 , 161 S.E. at 298-99 . 2016After an instruction was given to the jury on the charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery, Sullivan objected on the grounds that that instruction was “predicated upon section 4438 of the Code, while the indictment is drawn under section 4439 of the Code, and that the indictment in this case is fatally defective as an indictment under section 4438 of the Code.” Id. at 873 , 161 S.E. at 298-99 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller
green
1 sentence2012While the majority acknowledges that employers are conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Act, the majority summarily holds that the Navy could not have accepted the provisions of the Virginia Act because " 'the Supremacy Clause immunizes the activities of the Federal Government from state interference.' " (quoting Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 , 181 n.1 (1988)). 2 If a claim were filed against the Navy under the Virginia Act, the Navy could undoubtedly defend against it on the grounds that the claim is preempted by a conflicting federal act 3 or that the | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Flippo v. CSC Associates III, L.L.C.
green
2 sentences2007In Flippo, 262 Va. at 65-66 , 547 S.E.2d at 227 , we pointed out that in applying an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's award of sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1, we use an "objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in fact." Such an objective standard of reasonableness requires consideration of several factors. 2007In Flippo, 262 Va. at 65-66 , 547 S.E.2d at 227 , we pointed out that in applying an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's award of sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1, we use an "objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in fact." Such an objective standard of reasonableness requires consideration of several factors. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Chappell v. Smith
green
2 sentences2006This Court held: "Neither [former] Rule 3:19 nor any statute prohibits counsel for a defendant in default from. . . offering evidence in mitigation of damages." Id. at 276 , 156 S.E.2d at 575 . 2006This Court held: "Neither [former] Rule 3:19 nor any statute prohibits counsel for a defendant in default from. . . offering evidence in mitigation of damages." Id. at 276 , 156 S.E.2d at 575 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mack v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2003Id. at 390 . 2003In Mack v. Starwood Hotels, 57 Va. Cir. 390 (Norfolk 2002), the court exercised its discretion to allow the late filing of a grounds of defense where a misunderstanding may have occurred between plaintiffs counsel and defendant’s counsel, but stated that “ifthe plaintiff has incurred attorney’s fees in unsuccessfully seeking default judgment, this court will consider an award of attorney’s fees against the defendant for its tardiness in answering” and requested briefs on that issue. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
CA JONES v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2002See also Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979); Lee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108 (1979); and Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231 (1970). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Simon v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2002See also Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979); Lee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108 (1979); and Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231 (1970). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Ashe v. Swenson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Lee v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2002See also Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979); Lee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108 (1979); and Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231 (1970). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Steven Christopher Sevachko v. Commonwealth of VA
green
1 sentence2002The defendant has now moved to dismiss the pending indictment and/or to bar its prosecution on the grounds of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion” as set forth in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Sevachko v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 346 (2001). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2002See also Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 743 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979); Lee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108 (1979); and Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231 (1970). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bowers v. Hardwick red | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Shevel's, Inc. v. Southeastern Associates, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Kelly v. Schneller green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Carson v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Robinson v. Barrow-Penn & Co. neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Eaves v. Vial green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc. green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Shreck v. Virginia Hot Springs Co. neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Orndorff v. Howell neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| P. L. Farmer, Inc. v. Cimino green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Worrell v. Kinnear Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Nethers v. Nethers neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Preston v. Salem Improvement Co. neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Wessel v. Bargamin green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Dudley v. Carter Red Ash Collieries Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Co. neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| McAdams v. Lotton green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Liskey v. Paul green | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Stimmel v. Benthall neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.