10 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. City of Topeka
green
2 sentences2000Indeed, the court has made the general observation that "the phrase `lowest responsible bidder' in a statute providing for competitive bids before awarding contracts for certain public improvements implies skill, judgment and integrity necessary to a faithful performance of the contract, as well as sufficient financial resources and ability." Fletcher v. Cherry, 207 Ark. 650 , 651 , 182 S.W.2d 211 (1944), quoting Williams v. City of Topeka, et al., 85 Kas. 857 , 118 P. 864 , 38 L.R.A., N.S., 672. 2000Indeed, the court has made the general observation that "the phrase `lowest responsible bidder' in a statute providing for competitive bids before awarding contracts for certain public improvements implies skill, judgment and integrity necessary to a faithful performance of the contract, as well as sufficient financial resources and ability." Fletcher v. Cherry, 207 Ark. 650 , 651 , 182 S.W.2d 211 (1944), quoting Williams v. City of Topeka, et al., 85 Kas. 857 , 118 P. 864 , 38 L.R.A., N.S., 672. | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Fletcher v. Cherry
neutral
2 sentences2000Indeed, the court has made the general observation that "the phrase `lowest responsible bidder' in a statute providing for competitive bids before awarding contracts for certain public improvements implies skill, judgment and integrity necessary to a faithful performance of the contract, as well as sufficient financial resources and ability." Fletcher v. Cherry, 207 Ark. 650 , 651 , 182 S.W.2d 211 (1944), quoting Williams v. City of Topeka, et al., 85 Kas. 857 , 118 P. 864 , 38 L.R.A., N.S., 672. 2000Indeed, the court has made the general observation that "the phrase `lowest responsible bidder' in a statute providing for competitive bids before awarding contracts for certain public improvements implies skill, judgment and integrity necessary to a faithful performance of the contract, as well as sufficient financial resources and ability." Fletcher v. Cherry, 207 Ark. 650 , 651 , 182 S.W.2d 211 (1944), quoting Williams v. City of Topeka, et al., 85 Kas. 857 , 118 P. 864 , 38 L.R.A., N.S., 672. | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2014While appellant contended in his petition for postconviction relief that counsel was remiss in not raising “any Miranda violation” with respect to the statements, he did not state the grounds on which a violation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), could have been alleged. 2014While appellant contended in his petition for postconviction relief that counsel was remiss in not raising “any Miranda violation” with respect to the statements, he did not state the grounds on which a violation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), could have been alleged. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sons v. State
green
2 sentences1950In Sons v. State, 116 Ark. 357 , 172 S. W. 1029 , we said: “We have held in repeated decisions that unexplained possession of property recently stolen constitutes evidence legally sufficient to warrant a conviction of larceny or of the crime of knowingly receiving stolen property; hut that an instruction that such evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction amounts to an instruction on the weight of the evidence and is, for that reason, an invasion of the province of the jury. 1950In Sons v. State, 116 Ark. 357 , 172 S. W. 1029 , we said: “We have held in repeated decisions that unexplained possession of property recently stolen constitutes evidence legally sufficient to warrant a conviction of larceny or of the crime of knowingly receiving stolen property; hut that an instruction that such evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction amounts to an instruction on the weight of the evidence and is, for that reason, an invasion of the province of the jury. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
International Harvester Co. of America v. Layton
neutral
2 sentences1933It was said, in the case of International Harvester Co. v. Layton, 148 Ark. 156 , 229 S. W. 22 , (to quote a headnote in that case), that: “A general finding of the trial court, sitting as a jury, in favor of the defendant, will be sustained if there is any substantial evidence to sustain any of the grounds of defense set up in the answer. ’ ’ It is therefore unnecessary to consider or decide the interesting questions of law which opposing counsel have discussed, as the court’s finding upon this question of fact is' decisive of the case. 1933It was said, in the case of International Harvester Co. v. Layton, 148 Ark. 156 , 229 S. W. 22 , (to quote a headnote in that case), that: “A general finding of the trial court, sitting as a jury, in favor of the defendant, will be sustained if there is any substantial evidence to sustain any of the grounds of defense set up in the answer. ’ ’ It is therefore unnecessary to consider or decide the interesting questions of law which opposing counsel have discussed, as the court’s finding upon this question of fact is' decisive of the case. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Kromer v. Central Coal & Coke Co.
neutral
2 sentences1928Where the record before this court on appeal does not show that a. motion for a new trial was (filed and-passed upon by the trial court, there is nothing that this court can review.” Kromer v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 129 Ark. 86 , 195 S. W. 370 , and cases there cited. 1928Where the record before this court on appeal does not show that a. motion for a new trial was (filed and-passed upon by the trial court, there is nothing that this court can review.” Kromer v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 129 Ark. 86 , 195 S. W. 370 , and cases there cited. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Mueller v. Coffman
neutral
1 sentence1921Dixon & Co. v. Scroggins, 136 Ark. 33 ; Mueller v. Coffman, 132 Ark. 45 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Dixon-Rogers Trading Co. v. O. O. Scroggins & Co.
neutral
1 sentence1921Dixon & Co. v. Scroggins, 136 Ark. 33 ; Mueller v. Coffman, 132 Ark. 45 . | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Doyle v. Martin
neutral
1 sentence1896Doyle v. Martin, 55 Ark. 37 ; Williamson v. Mimms, 49 Ark. 336 ; Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace, 57 Ark. 423 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace
green
1 sentence1896Doyle v. Martin, 55 Ark. 37 ; Williamson v. Mimms, 49 Ark. 336 ; Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace, 57 Ark. 423 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Williamson v. Mimms
neutral
1 sentence1896Doyle v. Martin, 55 Ark. 37 ; Williamson v. Mimms, 49 Ark. 336 ; Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace, 57 Ark. 423 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Carr v. State
green
1 sentence1894In Carr v. State, 42 Ark. 204 , Judge Smith says : “When the trials are separate, the wife of a co-defendant not on trial is a competent witness, unless her testimony will tend directly to the acquittal of her husband, as in conspiracy or other joint offense, where the interests of the defendants are inseparable.” See authorities cited in that opinion. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.