light rule in Kentucky

2026Here, the jury’s verdict was so palpably against the evidence that we can only conclude “it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.” Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 19 .

2026In McCall v. Courier–Journal and Louisville Times 4 Kentucky Administrative Regulations. -15- Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), our Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1976), which sets forth the requirements for a false light claim as follows: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in r

1980The crux of the litigation revolves around whether a substantial reduction of income is “good cause” for voluntarily leaving employment when viewed in the light of the test set forth in Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Murphy, Ky., 539 S.W.2d 293 (1976), to the effect that such a reason “exists only when the worker is faced with circumstances so compelling as to leave no reasonable alternative but loss of employment,” and in a voluntary quit case, the burden of proving good cause rests on the employee.

1980Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Day, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 656 (1970).

1969In Mascolino v. Noland & Cowden Enterprises, Inc., Ky., 391 S.W.2d 710 , we pointed out that in construing and enforcing restrictions on real property the court must seek the intention of the grantor or creator of the restrictions from the language used, considered in the light of such factors as the general scheme of the subdivision, and that as a matter of judicial construction the court may not substitute what the grantor may have intended to say for the plain import of what he said.” (emphasis added) To the same effect see McMahan v. Hunsinger, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 820, 822 .

1969In Mascolino v. Noland & Cowden Enterprises, Inc., Ky., 391 S.W.2d 710 , we pointed out that in construing and enforcing restrictions on real property the court must seek the intention of the grantor or creator of the restrictions from the language used, considered in the light of such factors as the general scheme of the subdivision, and that as a matter of judicial construction the court may not substitute what the grantor may have intended to say for the plain import of what he said.” (emphasis added) To the same effect see McMahan v. Hunsinger, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 820, 822 .

1943One of these rules, often applied by this court in the construction of statutes, is the rule of ejusdem generis, defined in Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 264 Ky. 338 , 94 S. W. (2d) 645 , 649 as follows: “The rule of ejusdem generis is that where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, and to include only things or persons of the same kind, class or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is a clear manifestation o

1943One of these rules, often applied by this court in the construction of statutes, is the rule of ejusdem generis, defined in Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 264 Ky. 338 , 94 S. W. (2d) 645 , 649 as follows: “The rule of ejusdem generis is that where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, and to include only things or persons of the same kind, class or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is a clear manifestation o

1943In the light of the rule of pleading announced and applied in the case of City of Bowling Green v. Bandy, 208 Ky. 259 , 270 S. W. 837 , where a like action was brought by an employee of the city to recover damages for injuries sustained while engaged, as its employee, at the task of performing a governmental function of the city, we deem this contention meritorious.

1943In the light of the rule of pleading announced and applied in the case of City of Bowling Green v. Bandy, 208 Ky. 259 , 270 S. W. 837 , where a like action was brought by an employee of the city to recover damages for injuries sustained while engaged, as its employee, at the task of performing a governmental function of the city, we deem this contention meritorious.

1939The court in that case, in reaching the conclusion that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to overcome the presumption, quotes with approval from 2 Blashfield’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, page 1648, to the effect that evidence of this character “must be of a conclusive or unimpeached character, or must be undisputed, clear and convincing, and that such presumption is not overcome as a matter of law by evidence presented on behalf of the defendant by interested wit nesses, or by evidence which is of a suspicious nature, or is impeached to any extent, or by evidence which is contradic

1936“A conviction on circumstantial evidence alone was approved in Smith v. Com., 140 Ky. 593 , 131 S. W. 499 ; Slaton v. Com., 193 Ky; 449, 236 S. W. *227 952; McKinney v. Com., 208 Ky. 322 , 270 S. W. 800 ; Newton v. Com., 222 Ky. 817 , 2 S. W. (2d) 661 .” Viewing the established facts and circumstances in the present case as they are proven by the testimony of witnesses in the light of the rule, and by the reason for it, controlling circumstantial evidence, it is our conclusion that Wilder’s administrator was entitled to have the issues presented by his pleading and evidence submitted to the ju

1936“A conviction on circumstantial evidence alone was approved in Smith v. Com., 140 Ky. 593 , 131 S. W. 499 ; Slaton v. Com., 193 Ky; 449, 236 S. W. *227 952; McKinney v. Com., 208 Ky. 322 , 270 S. W. 800 ; Newton v. Com., 222 Ky. 817 , 2 S. W. (2d) 661 .” Viewing the established facts and circumstances in the present case as they are proven by the testimony of witnesses in the light of the rule, and by the reason for it, controlling circumstantial evidence, it is our conclusion that Wilder’s administrator was entitled to have the issues presented by his pleading and evidence submitted to the ju

1936“A conviction on circumstantial evidence alone was approved in Smith v. Com., 140 Ky. 593 , 131 S. W. 499 ; Slaton v. Com., 193 Ky; 449, 236 S. W. *227 952; McKinney v. Com., 208 Ky. 322 , 270 S. W. 800 ; Newton v. Com., 222 Ky. 817 , 2 S. W. (2d) 661 .” Viewing the established facts and circumstances in the present case as they are proven by the testimony of witnesses in the light of the rule, and by the reason for it, controlling circumstantial evidence, it is our conclusion that Wilder’s administrator was entitled to have the issues presented by his pleading and evidence submitted to the ju

1936“A conviction on circumstantial evidence alone was approved in Smith v. Com., 140 Ky. 593 , 131 S. W. 499 ; Slaton v. Com., 193 Ky; 449, 236 S. W. *227 952; McKinney v. Com., 208 Ky. 322 , 270 S. W. 800 ; Newton v. Com., 222 Ky. 817 , 2 S. W. (2d) 661 .” Viewing the established facts and circumstances in the present case as they are proven by the testimony of witnesses in the light of the rule, and by the reason for it, controlling circumstantial evidence, it is our conclusion that Wilder’s administrator was entitled to have the issues presented by his pleading and evidence submitted to the ju

1936“A conviction on circumstantial evidence alone was approved in Smith v. Com., 140 Ky. 593 , 131 S. W. 499 ; Slaton v. Com., 193 Ky; 449, 236 S. W. *227 952; McKinney v. Com., 208 Ky. 322 , 270 S. W. 800 ; Newton v. Com., 222 Ky. 817 , 2 S. W. (2d) 661 .” Viewing the established facts and circumstances in the present case as they are proven by the testimony of witnesses in the light of the rule, and by the reason for it, controlling circumstantial evidence, it is our conclusion that Wilder’s administrator was entitled to have the issues presented by his pleading and evidence submitted to the ju

1934Rawleigh v. Donoho, 238 Ky. 480 , 38 S. W. (2d) 227 ; Loudon v. Scott, and Miller v. Toles, supra. Williams, over the objections of Dr. Stacy, was permitted to ask Drs.

1934Rawleigh v. Donoho, 238 Ky. 480 , 38 S. W. (2d) 227 ; Loudon v. Scott, and Miller v. Toles, supra. Williams, over the objections of Dr. Stacy, was permitted to ask Drs.

1928Jones v. Jones ’ Ex’rs, 198 Ky. 756 , 250 S. W. 92 ; State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Rose’s Adm’r, 219 Ky. 562 , 293 S. W. 1087 . *707 Beading the will of David Irvine in the light of this principle, we are convinced that he intended, by the language he used, to vest in his daughter Elizabeth S. Irvine a life estate in the property here in question, free from the control of any husband she might have, and with a power of sale for purposes of reinvestment.

1928Jones v. Jones ’ Ex’rs, 198 Ky. 756 , 250 S. W. 92 ; State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Rose’s Adm’r, 219 Ky. 562 , 293 S. W. 1087 . *707 Beading the will of David Irvine in the light of this principle, we are convinced that he intended, by the language he used, to vest in his daughter Elizabeth S. Irvine a life estate in the property here in question, free from the control of any husband she might have, and with a power of sale for purposes of reinvestment.

1928Jones v. Jones ’ Ex’rs, 198 Ky. 756 , 250 S. W. 92 ; State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Rose’s Adm’r, 219 Ky. 562 , 293 S. W. 1087 . *707 Beading the will of David Irvine in the light of this principle, we are convinced that he intended, by the language he used, to vest in his daughter Elizabeth S. Irvine a life estate in the property here in question, free from the control of any husband she might have, and with a power of sale for purposes of reinvestment.

1928Jones v. Jones ’ Ex’rs, 198 Ky. 756 , 250 S. W. 92 ; State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Rose’s Adm’r, 219 Ky. 562 , 293 S. W. 1087 . *707 Beading the will of David Irvine in the light of this principle, we are convinced that he intended, by the language he used, to vest in his daughter Elizabeth S. Irvine a life estate in the property here in question, free from the control of any husband she might have, and with a power of sale for purposes of reinvestment.

1925Co. v. De Atley, 159 Ky. 687 .” In .the light of that principle of law, how can it be said that the risk of injury from breathing smoke while working in a tunnel is more than one of the ordinary risks of the service?

1923Lastly it is insisted that the court failed to instruct the jury upon the whole law of the case in that he should have given an instruction on accidental shooting, and in support of this contention the cases of Eastridge v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 126 ; Wayne v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 698 , and Crum v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 807 , are relied on.

1923In the light of the rule as stated we will now proceed to determine what the testator meant by the language he employed in the third clause of his will. ^ Some of the confusion, apparent in the cases cited in briefs of counsel, may be removed when we consider the distinction between a contingent remainder and. a vested defeasible one, since some of them are made to turn upon the technical rule that the law prefers a construction permitting the creation of vested interests rather than contingent ones, and in dealing with and applying that rule vested defeasible interests are sometimes treated a

1923Lastly it is insisted that the court failed to instruct the jury upon the whole law of the case in that he should have given an instruction on accidental shooting, and in support of this contention the cases of Eastridge v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 126 ; Wayne v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 698 , and Crum v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 807 , are relied on.

1908Counsel for appellee rely upon the case of McDonald v. Norman, Auditor, 95 Ky. 593 , 16 Ky. Law Rep. 137 , 26 S. W. 808 , to support her contention, but in so doing they evidently overlooked the fact that in the more recent case of Walker v. Coulter, Auditor, this court said, in referring to the McDonald case: “That case can, therefore, not be considered authority upon the construction of this clause of the Constitution (section 249) and in "the light of this clause was incorrectly decided and would áoubtless not have been so decided had the attention of the court been called to the constituti

1908Counsel for appellee rely upon the case of McDonald v. Norman, Auditor, 95 Ky. 593 , 16 Ky. Law Rep. 137 , 26 S. W. 808 , to support her contention, but in so doing they evidently overlooked the fact that in the more recent case of Walker v. Coulter, Auditor, this court said, in referring to the McDonald case: “That case can, therefore, not be considered authority upon the construction of this clause of the Constitution (section 249) and in "the light of this clause was incorrectly decided and would áoubtless not have been so decided had the attention of the court been called to the constituti