light presumption in Indiana

1910Co. v. Harrington (1892), 131 Ind. 426 , it was said: “In the absence of some evidence to the contrary, we think the appellee had the right to presume that the appellant would obey the city ordinance and would not run its trains at a greater rate of speed than four miles an hour at the point where the injury occurred, and while the wrongful conduct of the appellant in this regard would not excuse her from the exercise of reasonable care, yet in determining whether she did use such care her conduct is to be judged in the light of such presumption.” In the case of Chicago, etc., R.

1904Co. v. Harrington (1891), 131 Ind. 426 , it was said: “In the absence of some evidence to the contrary, we think the appellee had the right to presume that the appellant would obey the city ordinance, * * * and while the wrongful conduct of the appellant in this regard would not excuse her from the exercise of reasonable care, yet in determining whether she did use such care her conduct is to be judged in the light of such presumption.” That case is in harmony with the instruction here given.

2015Id. at 420 , 26 N.E. at 899 .

2015Id. at 420 , 26 N.E. at 899 .

1871In Chapman v. Long, 10 Ind. 465 , it was held, that “where a sale of real estate precedes the execution of the deed by some time, a verbal reservation to anything that would legally pass by the deed without such reservation will be presumed to be merged in the deed, and where the deed is executed at the time of the sale, such reservation will be considered in the light of an exception or defeasance, and being repugnant to the legal effect of the deed, will be held void.” In Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56 , the above decision was referred to and approved, but this case was in express terms overrule

1864In Chapman v. Long, 10 Ind. 465 , it was held, that “where a sale of real estate precedes the execution of the deed by some time, a verbal reservation to any thing that would legally pass by the deed without such reservation will be presumed to be merged in the deed, and where the deed is executed at the time of the sale, such a reservation will be considered in the light of an exception or defeasance, and, being repugnant to the legal effect of the deed, will be held void.” This decision is supported by authority, and we are inclined to follow it.

1986In Husk v. State (1985), Ind.App., 476 N.E.2d 149 , evidence that there was a moderate odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath, that he was unable to complete dexterity tests, that his blood alcohol level was .11%, and that he admitted drinking was held sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated.

1978If the evidence, so considered, measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury, and it is error to grant a directed verdict, as the trial judge did in this case.” *565 In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, supra, it was stated: “Principles applicable to summary judgment motions generally, are applicable to such motions when made in a defamation action.” 404 F. Supp. at 1050 .

1975(Our emphasis.) The case of Sullivan v. State (1957), [ 236 Ind. 446 , 139 N.E.2d 893 ] supra, is to be construed in the light of such a principle.

1975(Our emphasis.) The case of Sullivan v. State (1957), [ 236 Ind. 446 , 139 N.E.2d 893 ] supra, is to be construed in the light of such a principle.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1972Hitch, is a man of good character and in this case I instruct you that you should consider the evidence in the light of this presumption.” Although the tendered instruction was correct as an abstract proposition of law, Chesterfield v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 282 , 141 N. E. 632 ; Ross v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 281 , 182 N. E. 865 ; Holland v. State (1892), 131 Ind. 568 , 31 N. E. 359 , the defendant has failed to cite us to any case where the jury was so instructed, and our independent research has disclosed none.

1925Closson v. Billman (1904), 161 Ind. 610, 614 , 69 N. E. 449 .

1925Closson v. Billman (1904), 161 Ind. 610, 614 , 69 N. E. 449 .

1910Co. v. Boggs (1885), 101 Ind. 522, 527 , 51 Am.

1898Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426 , it is said: “In the absence of some evidence to the contrary, we think the appellee had the right to presume that the appellant would obey the city ordinance and would not run its trains at a greater rate of speed than four miles an hour at the point where the injury occurred, and while the wrongful conduct of the appellant in this regard would not excuse her from the exercise of reasonable care, yet in determining whether she did nse snch care her conduct is to be judged in the light of such presumption.” In Pennsylvania Co. v. Stegemeir, 118 Ind. 305 , where

1895Con-.' sidering the decision in the light of the rule, and unembarrassed by the inconsistencies suggested, its reasoning does not commend itself to our judgment with the force of the case of East Line, etc., Co. v. Culberson, supra. The answers to interrogatories preclude any possible joint or servient relations between the operating company and the appellant.

1874In the light of the doctrine laid down in Booher v. Golds- borough, 44 Ind. 490 , the averments are wholly insufficient to-set aside the deed upon the ground that .its execution ^as-procured by fraud.

1871In Chapman v. Long, 10 Ind. 465 , it was held, that “where a sale of real estate precedes the execution of the deed by some time, a verbal reservation to anything that would legally pass by the deed without such reservation will be presumed to be merged in the deed, and where the deed is executed at the time of the sale, such reservation will be considered in the light of an exception or defeasance, and being repugnant to the legal effect of the deed, will be held void.” In Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56 , the above decision was referred to and approved, but this case was in express terms overrule

1871In Chapman v. Long, 10 Ind. 465 , it was held, that “where a sale of real estate precedes the execution of the deed by some time, a verbal reservation to anything that would legally pass by the deed without such reservation will be presumed to be merged in the deed, and where the deed is executed at the time of the sale, such reservation will be considered in the light of an exception or defeasance, and being repugnant to the legal effect of the deed, will be held void.” In Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56 , the above decision was referred to and approved, but this case was in express terms overrule