light rule in Texas

1968We have examined this record in the light of the rule announced by our Supreme Court in In re: King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 and find sufficient evidence to support the finding of the jury to the special issues here under attack.

1968We have examined this record in the light of the rule announced by our Supreme Court in In re: King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 and find sufficient evidence to support the finding of the jury to the special issues here under attack.

2006I disagree with the Court’s decision not to reconsider Light’s test for determining whether a covenant not to compete is “ancillary to or part of’ an otherwise enforceable agreement. 883 S.W.2d at 647 n. 14.

2006I disagree with the Court's decision not to reconsider Light's test for determining whether a covenant not to compete is "ancillary to or part of" an otherwise enforceable agreement. 883 S.W.2d at 647 n. 14.

2024According to the plaintiff, the owner “knew of the danger of a high voltage power line being adjacent to and within nine or nine and one-half feet of the light standard,” but “failed to warn him of the potential danger of the situation.” Id. at 331 .

2024The appellate court disagreed, holding that “the proximity of the power line to the light standard” was not a premises defect, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were instead “caused by the performance of his duties in painting the light [poles].” Id. at 333 .

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action “concerns untrue statements about a party”); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 (“evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized”); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action "concerns untrue statements about a party"); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 ("evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized"); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action “concerns untrue statements about a party”); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 (“evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized”); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action "concerns untrue statements about a party"); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 ("evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized"); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action “concerns untrue statements about a party”); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 (“evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized”); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1994See e.g., Clarke, 793 S.W.2d at 331 (false light action "concerns untrue statements about a party"); Gill, 644 S.W.2d at 224 ("evidence will not support a cause of action for false light because we believe no false statements of fact were ever publicized"); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987) (in New Jersey, truth is an absolute defense to the false light action).

1980In Lindsey v. State, 393 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex.Cr.App.1965), the only authority cited in Satterwhite, supra, the holding is expressed in this language: “In passing upon this question in the light of the rule laid down in the Green case [Green v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 330 , 320 S.W.2d 139 ], it necessarily behooves this Court to look to the nature of the case, the amount of evidence adduced and considered by the jury in making a determination as to an abuse of discretion.

1965R. 330, 320 S.W.2d 139 : “The exercise of discretion is measured by the time the jury have been kept together, considered in the light of the nature of the case and the evidence.” In passing upon this question in the light of the rule laid down in the Green case, it necessarily behooves this Court to look to the nature of the case, the amount of evidence adduced and considered by the jury in making a determination as to an abuse of discretion.

1946Polk, 117 Tex. 73 , 297 S. W:219; and Mexia Inaepenaent.School District v. City of Mexla, supra) and these statutes.shtiuldbe construed in the light of that presumption.

1939Polk, 117 Tex. 73 , 297 S. W. 219 , snd the st'st' ute and constitutional provisions in ques- tion must be construed in the light of that presumption.

2020Pierce, 506 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775 ).

2020Pierce, 506 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775 ).

2020Pierce, 506 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775 ).

2020Pierce, 506 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 775 ).

2011In this case, the trial court and court of appeals held that the covenant not to compete was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement under the Light test. 287 S.W.3d at 381-82 .

2011In this case, the trial court and court of appeals held that the covenant not to compete was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement under the Light test. 287 S.W.3d at 381-82 .

2008The State raised the defensive theory of retaliation as a permissible 404(b) purpose for which to present Alice = s relevant extraneous-offense evidence, and the trial court granted the State = s request A in light of defense = s cross [examination]. @ See Moses , 105 S.W.3d at 627 ; Ransom , 920 S.W.2d at 301.

1994Id., citing Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 134 , 218 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1949).

1994Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that “while not specifically alleged in her complaint, [plaintiffs] action [for libel, for violation of a statutory right to privacy, and for appropriation or a common law right to privacy] presents a classic false light claim”), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2114 , 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985).

1994Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that "while not specifically alleged in her complaint, [plaintiff's] action [for libel, for violation of a statutory right to privacy, and for appropriation or a common law right to privacy] presents a classic false light claim"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2114 , 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985).

1994Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that “while not specifically alleged in her complaint, [plaintiffs] action [for libel, for violation of a statutory right to privacy, and for appropriation or a common law right to privacy] presents a classic false light claim”), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2114 , 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985).

1994Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that "while not specifically alleged in her complaint, [plaintiff's] action [for libel, for violation of a statutory right to privacy, and for appropriation or a common law right to privacy] presents a classic false light claim"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2114 , 85 L.Ed.2d 479 (1985).

1994Id., citing Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 134 , 218 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1949).

1994Id., citing Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 134 , 218 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1949).

1992In National Bonding Agency v. Deme-son, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ), the defendant bonding agency displayed a “wanted” poster depicting the plaintiff, describing her as a “bond jumper,” and referring to her sexual habits.

1992In National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1983, no writ), the defendant bonding agency displayed a "wanted" poster depicting the plaintiff, describing her as a "bond jumper," and referring to her sexual habits.

1992Yeager v. Local Union 20, Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 , 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); but see Angelotta v. ABC, 820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.1987) (Ohio does not recognize a false light claim).

1992Yeager v. Local Union 20, Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 , 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); but see Angelotta v. ABC, 820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.1987) (Ohio does not recognize a false light claim).