light rule in California

2024False Light Cause of Action For the second claim Bowman aims at, we adhere to the principle that “[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13 ; Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652 , 687.) For the reasons just discussed with respect to Garcia’s defamation cause of action, we conclude Garcia carried his 10 Bowman asserts in the alternative that he s

2024“If the person defamed is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves, by clear and convincing evidence [citation], that the libelous statement was made with “‘actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” (Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 256 .) Similarly, if the defamation involves an issue of public concern, proof of actual malice is 3 Henreid does not advance any argument on appeal regarding his cause of action for “right of privacy—false light.” In any event, “[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with

2026(See Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 207 , 218 [“‘To establish a false light claim 20 based on a defamatory publication, a plaintiff “must meet the same requirements” as for a defamation claim.’”]; De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 845, 865 [“‘“[a] ‘false light’ cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim”’”]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264 [“‘[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requiremen

2025Proc., § 44 [Libel and slander are the means by which defamation may be effected.]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264 [“ ‘[W]hen a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.’ ”].) 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 In June 2020, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against defendant.

1963Proc., § 437c'.). *469 In the light of the rule' of liberal construction applicable to affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, our Supreme Court hás held that the facts alleged in the affidavits of the party against whom the motion is made must be accepted as true, and with regard to the requirement that the facts must be set forth “with particularity,” has stated “that such affidavits to be sufficient need not necessarily be composed wholly of strictly evidentiary facts.” (Eagle Oil & Ref. co. v. Prentice, supra, p. 556 ; see Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler co., 179 Cal.App.

1963Proc., § 437c'.). *469 In the light of the rule' of liberal construction applicable to affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, our Supreme Court hás held that the facts alleged in the affidavits of the party against whom the motion is made must be accepted as true, and with regard to the requirement that the facts must be set forth “with particularity,” has stated “that such affidavits to be sufficient need not necessarily be composed wholly of strictly evidentiary facts.” (Eagle Oil & Ref. co. v. Prentice, supra, p. 556 ; see Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler co., 179 Cal.App.

2020(T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238-1239 [discussing the views expressed on this subject].) One view downplays the significance of the clear and convincing standard of proof in this 3 Dissenting in Stromerson, supra, 22 Cal.2d 808 , Justice Traynor wrote, “While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule requiring such evidence ‘the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding should be considered by the appellate court in the light of that rule.’ (She

2020(T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238-1239 [discussing the views expressed on this subject].) One view downplays the significance of the clear and convincing standard of proof in this 3 Dissenting in Stromerson, supra, 22 Cal.2d 808 , Justice Traynor wrote, “While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule requiring such evidence ‘the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding should be considered by the appellate court in the light of that rule.’ (She

2024“If the person defamed is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves, by clear and convincing evidence [citation], that the libelous statement was made with “‘actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” (Reader’s Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 256 .) Similarly, if the defamation involves an issue of public concern, proof of actual malice is 3 Henreid does not advance any argument on appeal regarding his cause of action for “right of privacy—false light.” In any event, “[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with

2015In Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123 , the court explained that a false light claim must be dismissed if it claims the same harm as a defamation claim: "Plaintiff's second cause of action clearly is based on false light invasion of privacy.

2011In Stanworth , the court considered the defendant’s contention that “the rule announced by us in Daniels applies not only to aggravated kidnaping (§ 209) but to so-called simple kidnaping (§ 207).” (Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 596 .) The court concluded that it does not. “[W]here only simple kidnaping is involved, it is clear that the victim’s movements cannot be evaluated in the light of a standard which makes reference to the commission of another crime.” (Id. at p. 600.) Thus, in determining whether the evidence supported the asportation element of simple kidnapping, the court refused

2011However, the defendant in Shadden was not charged with simple kidnapping under section 207, subdivision (a), but with kidnapping with intent to commit rape under section 209, subdivision (b)(1). “[T]he standard for proving the asportation element of simple kidnapping is not the same as that for aggravated kidnapping.” (People v. Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 435 .) This is so because, as our Supreme Court has made clear, these two types of kidnapping do not share the same asportation element: “[W]here only simple kidnaping is involved, it is clear that the victim’s movements cannot be eva

2020All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.” (Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (1910) 158 Cal. 474, 484 ; Couts v. Winston (1908) 153 Cal. 686, 688-689 .) Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence.

2020All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.” (Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (1910) 158 Cal. 474, 484 ; Couts v. Winston (1908) 153 Cal. 686, 688-689 .) Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence.

1999The defendant had moved the rape victim for an "unspecified distance from the elevator to the storage room, and from the storage room to her apartment." ( Ibid. ) In assessing whether this evidence was sufficient to establish asportation for simple kidnapping, the court estimated the distance from the record and compared it to the movements in several other kidnapping cases. ( Id. at pp. 573-574, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 .) Based entirely on this comparison of distances, the court found the evidence insufficient because "the factual situation most nearly resembles those encountered in

1999The defendant had moved the rape victim for an "unspecified distance from the elevator to the storage room, and from the storage room to her apartment." ( Ibid. ) In assessing whether this evidence was sufficient to establish asportation for simple kidnapping, the court estimated the distance from the record and compared it to the movements in several other kidnapping cases. ( Id. at pp. 573-574, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 .) Based entirely on this comparison of distances, the court found the evidence insufficient because "the factual situation most nearly resembles those encountered in

1979The trial court was the exclusive judge of all questions of credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence, and must be assumed to have considered all the evidence given in the light of such rules as are laid down by the law for the guidance of court and jury in the determination of questions of fact.’ In People v. Holman, 72 Cal.App.2d 75, 89 [ 164 P.2d 297 ], the court states: ‘The rule “That a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others” (Code Civ.

1979The trial court was the exclusive judge of all questions of credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence, and must be assumed to have considered all the evidence given in the light of such rules as are laid down by the law for the guidance of court and jury in the determination of questions of fact.’ In People v. Holman, 72 Cal.App.2d 75, 89 [ 164 P.2d 297 ], the court states: ‘The rule “That a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others” (Code Civ.

1979(Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal.2d 154, 184 [ 168 P.2d 946 ]; People v. Castro, 85 Cal.App. 228, 230 [ 259 P. 117 ].) In Robinson v. Robinson, 159 Cal. 203 [ 113 P. 155 ], it was contended by plaintiif-appellant that an analysis of the testimony of defendant as shown by the record made it appear that some of defendant’s evidence was false, and that the court must therefore consider his whole evidence in the light of the rule declared by [former] section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that ‘a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others.’ The court states (p.

1979(Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal.2d 154, 184 [ 168 P.2d 946 ]; People v. Castro, 85 Cal.App. 228, 230 [ 259 P. 117 ].) In Robinson v. Robinson, 159 Cal. 203 [ 113 P. 155 ], it was contended by plaintiif-appellant that an analysis of the testimony of defendant as shown by the record made it appear that some of defendant’s evidence was false, and that the court must therefore consider his whole evidence in the light of the rule declared by [former] section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that ‘a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others.’ The court states (p.

1979(Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal.2d 154, 184 [ 168 P.2d 946 ]; People v. Castro, 85 Cal.App. 228, 230 [ 259 P. 117 ].) In Robinson v. Robinson, 159 Cal. 203 [ 113 P. 155 ], it was contended by plaintiif-appellant that an analysis of the testimony of defendant as shown by the record made it appear that some of defendant’s evidence was false, and that the court must therefore consider his whole evidence in the light of the rule declared by [former] section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that ‘a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others.’ The court states (p.

1979(Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal.2d 154, 184 [ 168 P.2d 946 ]; People v. Castro, 85 Cal.App. 228, 230 [ 259 P. 117 ].) In Robinson v. Robinson, 159 Cal. 203 [ 113 P. 155 ], it was contended by plaintiif-appellant that an analysis of the testimony of defendant as shown by the record made it appear that some of defendant’s evidence was false, and that the court must therefore consider his whole evidence in the light of the rule declared by [former] section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that ‘a witness false in one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others.’ The court states (p.

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

2022(Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. 13 (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234, 238 ; Mitchell, at p. 218.)5 Where, as here, “a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action.” (Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13 ; accord, Mitchell, at p. 218.) We thus need and do examine only the elements of the defamation claim that are in dispute to determine whether Sharp met his burden to submit evidence that, if credited, would s

2017G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 636 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 ].) “ ‘A “false light” cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim, and should meet the same requirements of the libel claim, including proof of malice [where malice is required for the libel claim].’ ” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 616 [ 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 ]; accord, Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 146, 161 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; see generally Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 234 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 215 , 721 P.2d 97 ] [

1999When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action. "(Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 35, fn. 16 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 459 P.2d 912 ]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1136 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 838 ].) The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on Eisenberg’s false light claim for the same reasons its grant of summary judgment on the first cause of action was correct. 14 The case of Seubert, su

1999When a false light claim is coupled with a defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as the defamation cause of action. "(Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 35, fn. 16 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 459 P.2d 912 ]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1136 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 838 ].) The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on Eisenberg’s false light claim for the same reasons its grant of summary judgment on the first cause of action was correct. 14 The case of Seubert, su

1986The court quoted from Kapellas to observe that "a `false light' cause of action `is in substance equivalent to ... [a] libel claim, and should meet the same requirements of the libel claim...." ( 4 Cal.3d at p. 543 .) It concluded that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to support a false light claim since plaintiff had neither made a retraction request nor alleged special damages.

1986The court quoted from Kapellas to observe that “a ‘false light’ cause of action ‘is in substance equivalent to . . . [a] libel claim, and should meet the same requirements ofthe libel claim.. . .” ( 4 Cal.3d at p. 543 .) It concluded that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to support a false light claim since plaintiff had neither made a retraction request nor alleged special damages.

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th

1968These facts constituted probable cause for the police to believe that defendant might have stolen the vehicle in the light of the principle that the test of reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the defendant may have committed it. 2 (See People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 348 P.2d 577 ].) Since Conlin had reasonable cause to suspect that defendant had stolen the vehicle, the officer had the right to search th