light rule in Oklahoma

1975In the light of the rule announced in Hill v. Anderson et al., Okl., 363 P.2d 849 (1961) the pleadings are adequate to require the trial court to hear and consider evidence that bears on the intention of the parties concerning the scope of the grant.

1971In the light of the rule announced in Hill v. Anderson et al., Okl., 363 P.2d 849 (1961) the pleadings are adequate to require the trial court to hear and consider evidence that bears on the intention of the parties concerning the scope of the grant.

2020Because Walton and Singer established by a preponderance of the evidence a valid defense, we find the district court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss with respect to Thacker's abuse of process claim was in error. ¶13 Thacker also alleges a false light claim against Walton for Walton's publicly critical evaluation of Thacker during a November 15, 2017 podcast. 11 The elements of a false light claim are: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a)

2020Because Walton and Singer established by a preponderance of the evidence a valid defense, we find the district court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss with respect to Thacker's abuse of process claim was in error. ¶13 Thacker also alleges a false light claim against Walton for Walton's publicly critical evaluation of Thacker during a November 15, 2017 podcast. 11 The elements of a false light claim are: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a)

2020A plaintiff who is a public figure who complains of defamation must prove the further element of malice in the publication[.] Sturgeon v. Retherford Publ'n, Inc ., 1999 OK CIV APP 78, ¶10 , 987 P.2d 1218, 1223 . ¶18 In much the same manner as the false light claim addressed above, we find Thacker has not met the elements of his defamation claim.

2020A plaintiff who is a public figure who complains of defamation must prove the further element of malice in the publication[.] Sturgeon v. Retherford Publ'n, Inc ., 1999 OK CIV APP 78, ¶10 , 987 P.2d 1218, 1223 . ¶18 In much the same manner as the false light claim addressed above, we find Thacker has not met the elements of his defamation claim.

2011Id. at 252 .

2011Therefore, a plaintiff cannot avoid the general protection of speech afforded by the United *1037 States and Oklahoma Constitutions by filing a false light claim. 15 We agree with this Court's statement in Jordan v. World Publ'g Co., that one cannot cireumvent the First Amendment by the label with which the suit is described. 1994 OK CIV APP 30, 1113-14 , 872 P.2d 946, 948 . 134 Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the protection of speech established by the First Amendment.

2011Therefore, a plaintiff cannot avoid the general protection of speech afforded by the United *1037 States and Oklahoma Constitutions by filing a false light claim. 15 We agree with this Court's statement in Jordan v. World Publ'g Co., that one cannot cireumvent the First Amendment by the label with which the suit is described. 1994 OK CIV APP 30, 1113-14 , 872 P.2d 946, 948 . 134 Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the protection of speech established by the First Amendment.

2011Vulgar, offensive and shocking language is "not entitled to constitutional protection under all circumstances," FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 , 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978), and "fighting words" that inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of peace are punishable.

2011Vulgar, offensive and shocking language is "not entitled to constitutional protection under all circumstances," FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 , 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978), and "fighting words" that inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of peace are punishable.

1968Therein we quoted with approval as follows: “The proximate cause of any injury must be the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury; if the negligence complained of merely furnished a condition by which the injury was possible and a subsequent independent act caused the injury, the existence of such condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.” The decision also states: “We believe, in the light of such a test as applied to the fact situation in this case, that, even if the omission to furnish these steps was negligence, the subsequent and in

1963The rule governing such situations is properly set forth in paragraph one of the court syllabus in the case of Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Wheeler, Okl., 344 P.2d 1055 , as follows: “In actions of legal cognizance a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence or motion for directed verdict should be overruled unless there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover ; and, in passing upon a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider true all of the evidence favorable to the party against whom the demurrer or motion is directed togethe

1963In considering these three contentions of the plaintiff, it should be borne in mind that the rule governing findings of fact by the trial court is as was stated in Thomas v. Owens, 206 Okl. 50 , 241 P.2d 1114 , in the third paragraph of the syllabus, wherein we said: “In an action of equitable cognizance, presumption is in favor of the trial court’s finding, and it will not be set aside on appeal unless against the clear weight of the evidence.” In the light of this rule, let us examine plaintiff’s first complaint relative to the court’s findings Nos. 14, 6 and 12.

1963In considering these three contentions of the plaintiff, it should be borne in mind that the rule governing findings of fact by the trial court is as was stated in Thomas v. Owens, 206 Okl. 50 , 241 P.2d 1114 , in the third paragraph of the syllabus, wherein we said: “In an action of equitable cognizance, presumption is in favor of the trial court’s finding, and it will not be set aside on appeal unless against the clear weight of the evidence.” In the light of this rule, let us examine plaintiff’s first complaint relative to the court’s findings Nos. 14, 6 and 12.

1963Since it did not dispose of all the issues in the proceeding, it did not rise to the dignity of a “judgment.” It amounted merely to an announcement by the trial judge “of what judgment the court would render when all of the issues raised by the pleadings had been tried out.” Foreman v. Riley, 88 Okl. 75 , 211 P. 495 .

1963Since it did not dispose of all the issues in the proceeding, it did not rise to the dignity of a “judgment.” It amounted merely to an announcement by the trial judge “of what judgment the court would render when all of the issues raised by the pleadings had been tried out.” Foreman v. Riley, 88 Okl. 75 , 211 P. 495 .

1961Patrick’s, Inc. v. Mosseriano, Okl., 292 P.2d 1003 ; St.

1961Patrick's, Inc. v. Mosseriano, Okl., 292 P.2d 1003 ; St.

1951In Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 107 Okla. 140 , 231 P. 237 , 52 A.L.R. 1213 , we said: "To be effective after the grantor's death, the deed must have been executed by the grantor in the form and manner required by law for the execution of deeds, and in the lifetime of the grantor he, the said grantor, must have caused such deed and the title to such real estate to have passed completely beyond his power and control, and have caused the title to same to pass into the control of the grantee, although the document itself may have been reposed in the hands of some third party, and a life estate reserve

1951In Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 107 Okla. 140 , 231 P. 237 , 52 A.L.R. 1213 , we said: "To be effective after the grantor's death, the deed must have been executed by the grantor in the form and manner required by law for the execution of deeds, and in the lifetime of the grantor he, the said grantor, must have caused such deed and the title to such real estate to have passed completely beyond his power and control, and have caused the title to same to pass into the control of the grantee, although the document itself may have been reposed in the hands of some third party, and a life estate reserve

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1944Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624 , 119 P. 2d 825 ; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200 , 80 P. 2d 628 ; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267 , 81 P. 2d 305 ; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204 , 73 P. 2d 404 ; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64 , 47 P. 2d 107 ; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164 , 240 P. 62 , in support of the contention so made.

1941We have considered the evidence in this case in the light of the rule suggested by plaintiff, and, as expressed in Stewart v. Bowser, 178 Okla. 382 , 62 P. 2d 1195 .

1941We have considered the evidence in this case in the light of the rule suggested by plaintiff, and, as expressed in Stewart v. Bowser, 178 Okla. 382 , 62 P. 2d 1195 .

1935Again, the rule that insurance contracts shall be taken most strongly against the insurer applies, and when the provisions as to loans are read in the light of this rule, the argument of appellant on this branch of the case fails.” In Carter v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (Pa.) 107 Atl. 847 , the court, in discussing a life insurance policy and a state of facts substantially identical with those involved here, said: *178 “Tliat the indebtedness of the insured equaled or exceeded the loan value is conceded, and defendant’s right to forfeit the policy for that reason cannot be denied.

1930“In the case of Ross v. Groom, 90 Okla. 270 , 217 Pac. 480 , being case No. 14005 on the docket of this court, in construing this same statute, this court said: “ * * Under our statute, personal notice on the relatives of the minor residing in the county, or persons having the care of the minor, is not required, but only such notice as the county judge deems reasonable.’ “The notice having been given by posting, in accordance with the direction and order of the county judge, and the county court being a court of general jurisdiction in probate matters, we think, under the above construction of

1930“In the case of Ross v. Groom, 90 Okla. 270 , 217 Pac. 480 , being case No. 14005 on the docket of this court, in construing this same statute, this court said: “ * * Under our statute, personal notice on the relatives of the minor residing in the county, or persons having the care of the minor, is not required, but only such notice as the county judge deems reasonable.’ “The notice having been given by posting, in accordance with the direction and order of the county judge, and the county court being a court of general jurisdiction in probate matters, we think, under the above construction of

1930“In the case of Ross v. Groom, 90 Okla. 270 , 217 Pac. 480 , being case No. 14005 on the docket of this court, in construing this same statute, this court said: “ * * Under our statute, personal notice on the relatives of the minor residing in the county, or persons having the care of the minor, is not required, but only such notice as the county judge deems reasonable.’ “The notice having been given by posting, in accordance with the direction and order of the county judge, and the county court being a court of general jurisdiction in probate matters, we think, under the above construction of

1930“In the case of Ross v. Groom, 90 Okla. 270 , 217 Pac. 480 , being case No. 14005 on the docket of this court, in construing this same statute, this court said: “ * * Under our statute, personal notice on the relatives of the minor residing in the county, or persons having the care of the minor, is not required, but only such notice as the county judge deems reasonable.’ “The notice having been given by posting, in accordance with the direction and order of the county judge, and the county court being a court of general jurisdiction in probate matters, we think, under the above construction of

1929S. 1921, which expressly provides that the undertaking shall be “to the effect that the defendant will deliver the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and will pay all costs and damages that may be awarded against him. * * *” When the point is considered in the light of the principle laid down in the McVay Case, which is the controlling- rule in all cases of contracts (Farley v. Board of Education, 62 Okla. 181 , 162 Pac. 797 ), there is no basis on which to predicate defendants’ contention, as it becomes- quite clear that the omitted word is supplied by the statute which

1929S. 1921, which expressly provides that the undertaking shall be “to the effect that the defendant will deliver the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and will pay all costs and damages that may be awarded against him. * * *” When the point is considered in the light of the principle laid down in the McVay Case, which is the controlling- rule in all cases of contracts (Farley v. Board of Education, 62 Okla. 181 , 162 Pac. 797 ), there is no basis on which to predicate defendants’ contention, as it becomes- quite clear that the omitted word is supplied by the statute which

1927The trial court, however, made a specific finding that the claim, bill, and demand for the return of the usury, when considered together, constituted a sufficient compliance with the statute, and an examination of these instruments convinces us that this assignment of error is not well taken when considered in the light of the rule laid down in Westinghouse v. Robison, 42 Okla. 754 142 Pac. 1105 , and Hamilton v. Blakeney, 65 Okla. 154 , 165 Pac. 141 .

1927The trial court, however, made a specific finding that the claim, bill, and demand for the return of the usury, when considered together, constituted a sufficient compliance with the statute, and an examination of these instruments convinces us that this assignment of error is not well taken when considered in the light of the rule laid down in Westinghouse v. Robison, 42 Okla. 754 142 Pac. 1105 , and Hamilton v. Blakeney, 65 Okla. 154 , 165 Pac. 141 .

1927The trial court, however, made a specific finding that the claim, bill, and demand for the return of the usury, when considered together, constituted a sufficient compliance with the statute, and an examination of these instruments convinces us that this assignment of error is not well taken when considered in the light of the rule laid down in Westinghouse v. Robison, 42 Okla. 754 142 Pac. 1105 , and Hamilton v. Blakeney, 65 Okla. 154 , 165 Pac. 141 .

1927The trial court, however, made a specific finding that the claim, bill, and demand for the return of the usury, when considered together, constituted a sufficient compliance with the statute, and an examination of these instruments convinces us that this assignment of error is not well taken when considered in the light of the rule laid down in Westinghouse v. Robison, 42 Okla. 754 142 Pac. 1105 , and Hamilton v. Blakeney, 65 Okla. 154 , 165 Pac. 141 .

1914Besides: “A demurrer to the evidence admits all the facts which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all the inferences or conclusions which may be reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence, and, upon a demurrer to the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to every inference which the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, reasonably tends to prove.” (Anthony v. Bliss, 39 Okla. 237 , 134 Pac. 1122 .) See Edmisson v. Drumm-Flato Co., 13 Okla. 440 , 73 Pac. 958 ; Shawnee L. & P. Co. v. Sears, 21 Okla. 13 , 90 Pac. 449 ; Ziska v. Ziska, 20 Okla. 634 , 95

1914Besides: “A demurrer to the evidence admits all the facts which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all the inferences or conclusions which may be reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence, and, upon a demurrer to the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to every inference which the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, reasonably tends to prove.” (Anthony v. Bliss, 39 Okla. 237 , 134 Pac. 1122 .) See Edmisson v. Drumm-Flato Co., 13 Okla. 440 , 73 Pac. 958 ; Shawnee L. & P. Co. v. Sears, 21 Okla. 13 , 90 Pac. 449 ; Ziska v. Ziska, 20 Okla. 634 , 95