Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1857–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwellgreen2 sentences1995See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 1989See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
Bratton v. Rudnickgreen1 sentence2007In particular, the defendants sought to put in evidence the report of a meteorological expert which purported to demonstrate that the stormy weather, particularly on Sunday from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m., which totaled two inches of rain with sustained winds of thirty-to-forty miles per hour and gusts to fifty-five, was historically so unusual in its ferocity that it could be found to be an act of God, defined in the authorities as “the action of an irresistible physical force, or the violence of natural phenomenon, . . . not referable to participation by man through unreasonable failure to anticipate | 1 | 1 |
General Electric Co. v. Department of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences2004Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801 (1999); especially in the light of the presumption, the exemptions are narrowly construed, see id. at 801-802 , citing Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Commr. of Real Property Dept. of Boston, 380 Mass. 623 , 625 (1980); the reference to “any person” in § 10(a) means there is no requirement of “standing” by the person who requests production of records or any issue about the person’s motives or purpose in making the request. 2004Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801 (1999); especially in the light of the presumption, the exemptions are narrowly construed, see id. at 801-802 , citing Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Commr. of Real Property Dept. of Boston, 380 Mass. 623 , 625 (1980); the reference to “any person” in § 10(a) means there is no requirement of “standing” by the person who requests production of records or any issue about the person’s motives or purpose in making the request. | 1 | 1 |
Doliner v. Browngreen1 sentence1999Doliner v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 692, 695 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Time, Inc. v. Hillgreen1 sentence1995Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., Inc. 419 U.S. 245, 250 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.green1 sentence1995Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., Inc. 419 U.S. 245, 250 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Yerid v. Masongreen1 sentence1991Viewing the reported evidence in the light of these factors, a finding by the trial court was warranted that a statement by the seller’s real estate agents to prospective buyers that the market value of property offered for sale was at least as much as the advertised selling price was merely an unactionable expression of opinion, seller’s talk or “puffing.” See generally, Yerid v. Mason, 341 Mass. 527, 530 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
McMahon v. M & D BUILDERS, INC.green1 sentence1991As the agents’ statement of the current market value of Unit #304 was properly found by the trial court to be an expression of opinion or dealer’s talk, the agents’ additional representation that the unit could be “sold at a profit” after one year was clearly an opinion as to the increased future market value of the condominium and thus an unactionable statement of “conditions to exist in the future.” McMahon v. M & D Builders, supra at 57. | 1 | 1 |
Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucestergreen1 sentence1983The question whether the evidence supported a cause of action under the Gildea exception also must be considered in the light of the principle mentioned in LaPointe v. License Bd. of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 459 (1983), and Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 294 (1980), and the authorities there cited, that “[t]here is every presumption in favor of the honesty and sufficiency of the motives actuating public officers in actions ostensibly taken for the general welfare.” See General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
LaPointe v. License Board of Worcestergreen1 sentence1983The question whether the evidence supported a cause of action under the Gildea exception also must be considered in the light of the principle mentioned in LaPointe v. License Bd. of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 459 (1983), and Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 294 (1980), and the authorities there cited, that “[t]here is every presumption in favor of the honesty and sufficiency of the motives actuating public officers in actions ostensibly taken for the general welfare.” See General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Beneschgreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Anthonygreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bealgreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rudnickgreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lopesgreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Rourkegreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Davidgreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kiernangreen1 sentence1975See Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 131 (1935); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 306 Mass. 470, 481 (1940); Commonwealth v. O’Rourke, 311 Mass. 213, 220 (1942); Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 221-224 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 49 (1945); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 455 (1945); Common *96 wealth v. David, 335 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1957); Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 55-56 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
green
1 sentence2006Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 576 , cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pottle v. School Committee of Braintree
green
1 sentence2004Pottle v. School Comm. of Braintree, 395 Mass. 861 , 866 n.6 (1985). 5 2. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Attorney Gen. v. ASST. COMM'R OF THE REAL PROP. DEPT.
green
1 sentence2004Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801 (1999); especially in the light of the presumption, the exemptions are narrowly construed, see id. at 801-802 , citing Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Commr. of Real Property Dept. of Boston, 380 Mass. 623 , 625 (1980); the reference to “any person” in § 10(a) means there is no requirement of “standing” by the person who requests production of records or any issue about the person’s motives or purpose in making the request. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence1987Having satisfied ourselves that Barnes intelligently waived his right to counsel, we examine his claims of error in the light of our warning in earlier cases that the “right of self-representation is not ‘a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 834-835 n.46 (1975). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works
green
1 sentence1983Works, 289 Mass. 149, 192 , appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bingham Land Co. v. Central Maine Power Co.
neutral
1 sentence1983Works, 289 Mass. 149, 192 , appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Butler v. Town of East Bridgewater
green
1 sentence1973They could not act in an unreasonable, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious manner.” Butler v. East Bridgewater, 330 Mass. 33,38 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
green
1 sentence1958In the light of this principle, it would be hard to view as warranted a finding that the release was procured by “deliberately false and material statements . . . made to deceive” (see Dice case, 342 U. S. 359, 362 ) without an unduly elastic construction of the auditor’s equivocal findings and without permitting unreasonable inferences from those findings. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
O'Toole v. Pruyn
neutral
1 sentence1947Since the employee accepted the obvious existing nature and conditions of the jobfby going to work, that principle was commonly, though somewhat misleadingly, called the “contractual assumption of risk,” as distinguished from a quite different principle called the “voluntary assumption of risk,” which is discussed in O’Toole v. Pruyn, 201 Mass. 126 , Hietala v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 295 Mass. 186 , Engel v. Boston Ice Co. 295 Mass. 428 , Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554 , Rivers v. Krasowski, 303 Mass. 409, 412 , Burke v. Zatoonian, 309 Mass. 541, 543 , and Ryan v. Gray, 316 Mass. 259 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Hietala v. Boston & Albany Railroad green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Engel v. Boston Ice Co.
green
1 sentence1947Since the employee accepted the obvious existing nature and conditions of the jobfby going to work, that principle was commonly, though somewhat misleadingly, called the “contractual assumption of risk,” as distinguished from a quite different principle called the “voluntary assumption of risk,” which is discussed in O’Toole v. Pruyn, 201 Mass. 126 , Hietala v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 295 Mass. 186 , Engel v. Boston Ice Co. 295 Mass. 428 , Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554 , Rivers v. Krasowski, 303 Mass. 409, 412 , Burke v. Zatoonian, 309 Mass. 541, 543 , and Ryan v. Gray, 316 Mass. 259 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Holland v. Pitocchelli
neutral
1 sentence1947Since the employee accepted the obvious existing nature and conditions of the jobfby going to work, that principle was commonly, though somewhat misleadingly, called the “contractual assumption of risk,” as distinguished from a quite different principle called the “voluntary assumption of risk,” which is discussed in O’Toole v. Pruyn, 201 Mass. 126 , Hietala v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 295 Mass. 186 , Engel v. Boston Ice Co. 295 Mass. 428 , Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554 , Rivers v. Krasowski, 303 Mass. 409, 412 , Burke v. Zatoonian, 309 Mass. 541, 543 , and Ryan v. Gray, 316 Mass. 259 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Rivers v. Krasowski
green
1 sentence1947Since the employee accepted the obvious existing nature and conditions of the jobfby going to work, that principle was commonly, though somewhat misleadingly, called the “contractual assumption of risk,” as distinguished from a quite different principle called the “voluntary assumption of risk,” which is discussed in O’Toole v. Pruyn, 201 Mass. 126 , Hietala v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 295 Mass. 186 , Engel v. Boston Ice Co. 295 Mass. 428 , Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554 , Rivers v. Krasowski, 303 Mass. 409, 412 , Burke v. Zatoonian, 309 Mass. 541, 543 , and Ryan v. Gray, 316 Mass. 259 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Silver v. Cushner green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Burke v. Zatoonian green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Ryan v. Gray green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Maciejewski v. Graton & Knight Co. green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Commonwealth v. Plaisted green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Graham v. Roberts green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Hecht v. Boston Wharf Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| State Street Trust Co. v. Treasurer & Receiver General green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Johnson v. Jenks green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Johnson v. Talbot green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Taylor v. Creeley green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Speed v. Crawford green | 1 | 1857–1857 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.