light claim in Pennsylvania

1955The distinction between cases in which the owner of an illegally parked vehicle is held for the consequences of such parking and when such parking is held not to be the proximate cause of the accident is drawn in Kline et al. v. Moyer and Albert, supra (p. 363), as follows: “It is clear that when an unlighted, parked truck is seen by the operator of an approaching vehicle, the fact of its being unlighted becomes thereafter of legal inconsequence, because the purpose of a light as warning has been otherwise accomplished.

1944This Court said in Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 363 , 191 A. 43 , in a well-considered opinion by Mr. Justice Horace Stern: “It is clear that when an unlighted, parked truck is seen by the operator of an approaching *498 vehicle, the fact of its being unlighted becomes thereafter of legal inconsequence, because the purpose of a light as warning has been otherwise accomplished.

1950Co. of North America, 282 Pa. 224, 234 , 127 A. 620 .

1950Co. of North America, 282 Pa. 224, 234 , 127 A. 620 .

2025Inc., 170 A.3d 560 , 568 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2017) (footnote omitted).

2017Forest Highlands Community Ass’n v. Hammer, 879 A.2d 223 , 226 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.Super. 1998)).

2017Forest Highlands Community Ass’n v. Hammer, 879 A.2d 223 , 226 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.Super. 1998)).

2014Cf. Commonwealth v. Chandler, 505 Pa. 113 , 477 A.2d 851 (1984) (reversing superior court’s reversal of suppression of evidence obtained with a warrant marked with the magistrate’s “jurat” that he had sworn the affiant but not signed and filled out by the magistrate (so as to show he had independently detennined probable cause)).

2014Cf. Commonwealth v. Chandler, 505 Pa. 113 , 477 A.2d 851 (1984) (reversing superior court’s reversal of suppression of evidence obtained with a warrant marked with the magistrate’s “jurat” that he had sworn the affiant but not signed and filled out by the magistrate (so as to show he had independently detennined probable cause)).

2014The trial court based this result on its conclusion that false light claims cannot be premised upon the publication of public facts about the plaintiff, citing Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979 (Pa. Super. 1997).

1997DOT claims that the trial court erred in originally sustaining Light’s objection to the officer’s hearsay testimony, and DOT cites Menosky v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 464 , 550 A.2d 1372 (1988), to support its view that the hearsay testimony is admissible over objection in order to explain the officer’s conduct.

1997DOT claims that the trial court erred in originally sustaining Light’s objection to the officer’s hearsay testimony, and DOT cites Menosky v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 464 , 550 A.2d 1372 (1988), to support its view that the hearsay testimony is admissible over objection in order to explain the officer’s conduct.

1983And in Diehl v. City of McKeesport, 60 Pa. Commw. 561 , 432 A. 2d 288 (1981), the court lists eight factors which may be used by the court under the statutory rules of construction to construe a municipal ordinance, commencing with “the occasion and necessity for the statute.” Thus when we review the amended ordinance in the light of these factors and the Statutory Construction Act, we are persuaded that the Borough Council intended to make meaning of a home occupation clear and unambiguous, one that clearly, to our mind, fits the applicants in this instance.

1983And in Diehl v. City of McKeesport, 60 Pa. Commw. 561 , 432 A. 2d 288 (1981), the court lists eight factors which may be used by the court under the statutory rules of construction to construe a municipal ordinance, commencing with “the occasion and necessity for the statute.” Thus when we review the amended ordinance in the light of these factors and the Statutory Construction Act, we are persuaded that the Borough Council intended to make meaning of a home occupation clear and unambiguous, one that clearly, to our mind, fits the applicants in this instance.

1981If the evidence, so considered, measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury, and it is error to grant a directed verdict, as the trial judge did in this case. [Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 , 95 S.Ct. 132 , 42 L.Ed.2d 111 (1974)].

1981If the evidence, so considered, measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury, and it is error to grant a directed verdict, as the trial judge did in this case. [Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 , 95 S.Ct. 132 , 42 L.Ed.2d 111 (1974)].

1981If the evidence, so considered, measures up to the New York Times standard, the case is one for the jury, and it is error to grant a directed verdict, as the trial judge did in this case. [Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 , 95 S.Ct. 132 , 42 L.Ed.2d 111 (1974)].

1979“Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been commit ted.” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 , 80 S.Ct. 168, 171 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).

1979“Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been commit ted.” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 , 80 S.Ct. 168, 171 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).

1977In Commonwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa.Super. 361 , 308 A.2d 120 (1973), the appellant was driving a car which crashed into a light standard.

1977In Commonwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa.Super. 361 , 308 A.2d 120 (1973), the appellant was driving a car which crashed into a light standard.

1976And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” That principle was reiterated on the state level in two cases, the first being State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 167 , citing Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60 , 63: “The purpose of the rule of strict construction is not to enable a person to avoid the clear import of a law through some mere technicality, but to enable the people of the State to know clearly and

1976Advise the merchant to seek such advice from his attorney.” That proscription must be read in the light of the principle expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , in which the court said (p. 391): “That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.

1976And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” That principle was reiterated on the state level in two cases, the first being State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 167 , citing Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60 , 63: “The purpose of the rule of strict construction is not to enable a person to avoid the clear import of a law through some mere technicality, but to enable the people of the State to know clearly and

1976And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” That principle was reiterated on the state level in two cases, the first being State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 167 , citing Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60 , 63: “The purpose of the rule of strict construction is not to enable a person to avoid the clear import of a law through some mere technicality, but to enable the people of the State to know clearly and

1974Pennsylvania cases establish that the insured bears the burden of showing compliance with the terms and conditions of a clause requiring prompt notification of the happening of the accident as a condition precedent to establishing the insurer’s liability under the policy: Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484 (1959); Jeannette Glass Company v. Indemnity Insurance Company, 370 Pa. 409 (1952); Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, 338 Pa. 211 (1940); Unverzagt v. Prestera, 339 Pa. 141 (1940); Bethlehem Steel v. Continental Casualty Co., 208 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.

1974Pennsylvania cases establish that the insured bears the burden of showing compliance with the terms and conditions of a clause requiring prompt notification of the happening of the accident as a condition precedent to establishing the insurer’s liability under the policy: Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484 (1959); Jeannette Glass Company v. Indemnity Insurance Company, 370 Pa. 409 (1952); Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, 338 Pa. 211 (1940); Unverzagt v. Prestera, 339 Pa. 141 (1940); Bethlehem Steel v. Continental Casualty Co., 208 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.

1974Pennsylvania cases establish that the insured bears the burden of showing compliance with the terms and conditions of a clause requiring prompt notification of the happening of the accident as a condition precedent to establishing the insurer’s liability under the policy: Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484 (1959); Jeannette Glass Company v. Indemnity Insurance Company, 370 Pa. 409 (1952); Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, 338 Pa. 211 (1940); Unverzagt v. Prestera, 339 Pa. 141 (1940); Bethlehem Steel v. Continental Casualty Co., 208 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.