14 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Advocacy Organization for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Insurancegreen2 sentences2020See AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379 (“We will not attempt to delineate the permissible factors for determining what is ‘reasonable,’ because it is not necessary to do so in resolving plaintiffs’ arguments.”); see also Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-450 . 2012In AOPP , this Court found it unnecessary to “delineate the permissible factors for determining what is ‘reasonable’ . . . .” AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379 . | 2 | 2 |
Bronson Methodist Hospital v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2020See AOPP, 257 Mich App at 379 (“We will not attempt to delineate the permissible factors for determining what is ‘reasonable,’ because it is not necessary to do so in resolving plaintiffs’ arguments.”); see also Bronson, 295 Mich App at 449-450 . 2015We noted in Bronson Methodist Hosp, 295 Mich App at 443 , that the term “reasonable” is not defined by the no-fault act and recognized that he Court in AOPP had “declined to ‘delineate the permissible factors’ ” that may be considered when determining whether a charge is reasonable. | 1 | 2 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen1 sentence2026See Bruen, 597 US at 80 (Kavanagh, J., concurring). -14- (a) A firearm, other than a pistol, unless the firearm is unloaded and is 1 or more of the following: (i) Taken down. (ii) Enclosed in a case. (iii) Carried in the trunk of the vehicle. (iv) Inaccessible from the interior of the vehicle. | 1 | 1 |
Baumgartner v. Hamgreen1 sentence1968See Baumgartner v. Ham (1965), 374 Mich 169 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hospital
green
2 sentences1970In Anderson v. Sanders (1968), 14 Mich App 58 , citing Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hospital (1964), 373 Mich 184 , this Court reversed an accelerated judgment stating: “Permissible inquiry on a hearing pursuant to a motion for accelerated judgment does not include reconciling disputed fact questions where credibility is in issue, nor does it include fact finding except where the facts are such that no reasonable minds might disagree.” An application of Anderson to the present controversy reveals that the facts were such that reasonable minds could disagree. 1968Permissible inquiry on a hearing pursuant to a motion for accelerated judgment does not include reconciling disputed fact questions where credibility ■ is in issue, nor does it include fact finding except where the facts are such that no reasonable minds might disagree (Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hospital [1964], 373 Mich 184 ). | 2 | 1968–1970 |
People v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2024Thomas, 260 Mich App at 455 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Sanders
green
1 sentence2016In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 394 , illustrates a permissible challenge to a court’s want of jurisdiction. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Baker
green
2 sentences2010“The rule in this State is that where the victim is of tender years the testimony of the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture; and delay in making the complaint is excusable so far as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstance.” People v Baker, 251 Mich 322, 326 ; 232 NW 381 (1930) (holding also that only a child’s first statement made is admissible under the exception). 2010“The rule in this State is that where the victim is of tender years the testimony of the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evidence, if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture; and delay in making the complaint is excusable so far as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstance.” People v Baker, 251 Mich 322, 326 ; 232 NW 381 (1930) (holding also that only a child’s first statement made is admissible under the exception). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Gage
green
2 sentences2010This Court first recognized the common-law tender years rule in People v Gage, 62 Mich 271 ; 28 NW 835 (1886), as a permissible rule to allow hearsay in order to corroborate the testimony of a child complainant. 2010This Court first recognized the common-law tender years rule in People v Gage, 62 Mich 271 ; 28 NW 835 (1886), as a permissible rule to allow hearsay in order to corroborate the testimony of a child complainant. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n
green
2 sentences2003Nasser, supra at 55 . 4 We will not attempt to delineate the permissible factors for determining what is “reasonable,” because it is not necessary to do so in resolving plaintiffs’ arguments. 2003Nasser, supra at 55 , 457 N.W.2d 637 . [4] We will not attempt to delineate the permissible factors for determining what is "reasonable," because it is not necessary to do so in resolving plaintiffs' arguments. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Ross
green
2 sentences2000People v Bryars, 168 Mich App 523, 526-527 ; 425 NW2d 125 (1988); People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495 ; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). 2000People v Bryars, 168 Mich App 523, 526-527 ; 425 NW2d 125 (1988); People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495 ; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Bryars
green
2 sentences2000People v Bryars, 168 Mich App 523, 526-527 ; 425 NW2d 125 (1988); People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495 ; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). 2000People v Bryars, 168 Mich App 523, 526-527 ; 425 NW2d 125 (1988); People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 495 ; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Windall Hill
green
2 sentences1992Permissible factors to consider when deciding whether departure is appropriate were recently set forth in People v Windall Hill, 192 Mich App 102 ; 480 NW2d 913 (1991). 1992Permissible factors to consider when deciding whether departure is appropriate were recently set forth in People v Windall Hill, 192 Mich App 102 ; 480 NW2d 913 (1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta
green
2 sentences1985Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v de la Cuesta, 458 US 141 ; 102 S Ct 3014 ; 73 L Ed 2d 664 (1982), plaintiffs abandoned their restraint on alienation claim. 1985Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v de la Cuesta, 458 US 141 ; 102 S Ct 3014 ; 73 L Ed 2d 664 (1982), plaintiffs abandoned their restraint on alienation claim. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Anderson v. Sanders
green
1 sentence1970In Anderson v. Sanders (1968), 14 Mich App 58 , citing Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hospital (1964), 373 Mich 184 , this Court reversed an accelerated judgment stating: “Permissible inquiry on a hearing pursuant to a motion for accelerated judgment does not include reconciling disputed fact questions where credibility is in issue, nor does it include fact finding except where the facts are such that no reasonable minds might disagree.” An application of Anderson to the present controversy reveals that the facts were such that reasonable minds could disagree. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.