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12 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin 2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin | 2 | 2 |
Alexander v. Director, Department of Agriculturegreen2 sentences2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term “sufficient identification,” the Stofer court explained that the term “will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances.” 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . “ ‘[T]heprecision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.’ ” (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter, 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea, 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fina 2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin | 2 | 2 |
Polich v. Chicago School Finance Authoritygreen2 sentences2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin 2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin | 2 | 2 |
Gaynor v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAYgreen2 sentences2022App. 3d 288, 294 , 750 N.E.2d 307, 312 (2001), the appellate court further described the Beale court’s explanation of discovery available under Rule 224 as follows, “Beale held that, on occasion, the identification of a defendant may require more than simply a name and that, on those occasions, discovery under Rule 224 is not limited to the petitioner’s ascertainment of a name only. 2022The court further provided, “The extent of this permissible inquiry must be determined by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis and in consideration of the cause of action alleged.” Id. at 253 . - 10 - ¶ 27 In Gaynor v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 322 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Glaspergreen1 sentence2021The prosecutor did not suggest that the defendant had a duty to present evidence (see People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 212 (2009)) or argue that defense counsel should have asked certain questions of the State’s witnesses (see People v. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d 615, 622 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Edgecombegreen1 sentence2021The prosecutor did not suggest that the defendant had a duty to present evidence (see People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 212 (2009)) or argue that defense counsel should have asked certain questions of the State’s witnesses (see People v. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d 615, 622 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Finance v. Goldgreen1 sentence1976Department of Finance v. Gold, 369 Ill. 497, 504 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beale v. EdgeMark Financial Corp.
green
2 sentences2022The court further provided, “The extent of this permissible inquiry must be determined by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis and in consideration of the cause of action alleged.” Id. at 253 . - 10 - ¶ 27 In Gaynor v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 322 Ill. 2020When in the trial court’s discretion the petitioner seeks to establish actual liability or responsibility rather than potentiality for liability, discovery should be denied.” Id. at 252-53 . | 3 | 2020–2022 |
Hill v. Relyea
green
2 sentences2009The "precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved." Hill, 34 Ill.2d at 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 . 2009The “precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.” Hill, 34 Ill. 2d at 555 . | 3 | 2002–2009 |
Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin 2002Recognizing the inherent ambiguity in the term "sufficient identification," the Stofer court explained that the term "will have to receive additional content from its application to particular facts and circumstances." 68 Ill. 2d at 372 , 369 N.E.2d at 879 . "'[T]he precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Carter , 97 Ill. 2d 133, 137 , 454 N.E.2d 189, 190 (1982), quoting Hill v. Relyea , 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555 , 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966); see also Polich v. Chicago School Fin | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Varghese
green
1 sentence2026Varghese, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 877 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Boose
green
1 sentence1997In this matter, the court based its denial of defendant’s request to remove his shackles on the following permissible factors: (1) the charge against defendant was serious; (2) shackles were necessary to prevent flight; (3) defendant’s prior record was indicative of other acts of violence, i.e., at trial he was serving a sentence for a 1987 conviction of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and armed robbery; (4) there existed a potential for mob action or revenge from the victim’s family; and (5) the layout of the courthouse presented security problems of "monstrous proportions.” See Boose, | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence1992App. 3d 213 , 514 N.E.2d 211 , we held the necessity defense was not a permissible defense to criminal trespass in the abortion clinic setting. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Krizka
green
1 sentence1987(People v. Krizka (1980), 92 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.