permissible standard in California

2024We decline at present, however, to prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.”].) Further, courts reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards have agreed “ ‘[n]et worth’ is subject to easy manipulation and . . . should not be the only permissible standard.” (Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065, fn. 3 ; accord Zaxis Wireless Communications v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577 , 580–582 [affirming a punitive damages award of $300,000, although the defendant had a negative net worth of $6.3 million]; Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (

2024We decline at present, however, to prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.”].) Further, courts reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards have agreed “ ‘[n]et worth’ is subject to easy manipulation and . . . should not be the only permissible standard.” (Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065, fn. 3 ; accord Zaxis Wireless Communications v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577 , 580–582 [affirming a punitive damages award of $300,000, although the defendant had a negative net worth of $6.3 million]; Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (

2024We decline at present, however, to prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.”].) Further, courts reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards have agreed “ ‘[n]et worth’ is subject to easy manipulation and . . . should not be the only permissible standard.” (Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065, fn. 3 ; accord Zaxis Wireless Communications v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577 , 580–582 [affirming a punitive damages award of $300,000, although the defendant had a negative net worth of $6.3 million]; Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (

2024We decline at present, however, to prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.”].) Further, courts reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards have agreed “ ‘[n]et worth’ is subject to easy manipulation and . . . should not be the only permissible standard.” (Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065, fn. 3 ; accord Zaxis Wireless Communications v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577 , 580–582 [affirming a punitive damages award of $300,000, although the defendant had a negative net worth of $6.3 million]; Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (

2013(Kelly, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 37 p. 915; Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7, 119 ; Zhadan v. Downtown Los Angeles Motor Distributors, Inc. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 821, 839 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) In Kelly, we alluded to the concept expressed in Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 , footnote 3 (Lara), that " '[n]et worth' is subject to easy manipulation and, in our view, it should not be the only permissible standard." ( Kelly, supra, at pp. 915 .) For example, in Vallbona, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 1525 , it was sufficient that the defendant made

2013(Kelly, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 37 p. 915; Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7, 119 ; Zhadan v. Downtown Los Angeles Motor Distributors, Inc. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 821, 839 ; Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777 .) In Kelly, we alluded to the concept expressed in Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1065 , footnote 3 (Lara), that " '[n]et worth' is subject to easy manipulation and, in our view, it should not be the only permissible standard." ( Kelly, supra, at pp. 915 .) For example, in Vallbona, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th 1525 , it was sufficient that the defendant made

2015(See Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1330 [dismissal of cross-complaint with prejudice bars defendant from asserting an affirmative defense to plaintiff’s breach of contract claims that is not responsive to plaintiff’s allegations of contract performance].) Based on all of these factors, Yeh’s assertion that Arkius caused the water damage is not a permissible defense to payment under Contract Nos. 3 and 4.

2001Indeed, it is likely that blind adherence to any one standard could sometimes result in awards which neither deter nor punish or which deter or punish too much.”]; Michelson v. Hamada, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1596; Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 624-625 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ].) In this case the jury considered net worth and a variety of other factors included on the financial documents presented by Zaxis to conclude Motor Sound had the ability to pay a punitive damage award of $300,000.

2001Indeed, it is likely that blind adherence to any one standard could sometimes result in awards which neither deter nor punish or which deter or punish too much.”]; Michelson v. Hamada, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1596; Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 624-625 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ].) In this case the jury considered net worth and a variety of other factors included on the financial documents presented by Zaxis to conclude Motor Sound had the ability to pay a punitive damage award of $300,000.

2001Indeed, it is likely that blind adherence to any one standard could sometimes result in awards which neither deter nor punish or which deter or punish too much.”]; Michelson v. Hamada, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1596; Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 624-625 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ].) In this case the jury considered net worth and a variety of other factors included on the financial documents presented by Zaxis to conclude Motor Sound had the ability to pay a punitive damage award of $300,000.

1993However, the District was satisfied the amendments would produce a net decrease of VOC emissions with respect to each challenged category of architectural coatings affected thereby, and therefore, that the rule amendments further the policy of the state to “take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.” (§ 21001, subd. (a); City of Santee v. County of San Diego (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1449 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 340 ].) The fact that industry representatives disagree with the District’s conclusions is of no legal consequence (Guidelines, §

1993However, the District was satisfied the amendments would produce a net decrease of VOC emissions with respect to each challenged category of architectural coatings affected thereby, and therefore, that the rule amendments further the policy of the state to “take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.” (§ 21001, subd. (a); City of Santee v. County of San Diego (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1449 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 340 ].) The fact that industry representatives disagree with the District’s conclusions is of no legal consequence (Guidelines, §

1993However, the District was satisfied the amendments would produce a net decrease of VOC emissions with respect to each challenged category of architectural coatings affected thereby, and therefore, that the rule amendments further the policy of the state to “take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.” (§ 21001, subd. (a); City of Santee v. County of San Diego (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1449 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 340 ].) The fact that industry representatives disagree with the District’s conclusions is of no legal consequence (Guidelines, §

1993However, the District was satisfied the amendments would produce a net decrease of VOC emissions with respect to each challenged category of architectural coatings affected thereby, and therefore, that the rule amendments further the policy of the state to “take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.” (§ 21001, subd. (a); City of Santee v. County of San Diego (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1449 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 340 ].) The fact that industry representatives disagree with the District’s conclusions is of no legal consequence (Guidelines, §

1983We therefore disapprove People v. Bullwinkle (1980) supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 82 , 86-90, and a dictum in People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 948 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ]. 10 We conclude that the magistrate erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the cigarette that he is charged with possessing.

1983We therefore disapprove People v. Bullwinkle (1980) supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 82 , 86-90, and a dictum in People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 948 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ]. 10 We conclude that the magistrate erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the cigarette that he is charged with possessing.

1983As recently said in a related context, “Since this significant risk of intrusion is not counterbalanced by an equivalent police necessity it cannot be tolerated.” (People v. Mosqueda (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 918, 924 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 591 ].) For all the foregoing reasons we hold that the so-called “accelerated booking search” is not a permissible exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 13, of the California Constitution.

1983As recently said in a related context, “Since this significant risk of intrusion is not counterbalanced by an equivalent police necessity it cannot be tolerated.” (People v. Mosqueda (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 918, 924 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 591 ].) For all the foregoing reasons we hold that the so-called “accelerated booking search” is not a permissible exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 13, of the California Constitution.

1977Since the statute makes no mention of estoppel as a permissible defense, we conclude that claimant’s offer of proof was properly denied pursuant to the express wording of the section that ‘no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation can be received.’ ” ( 196 Cal.App.2d at p. 505 .) As was said in Estate of Turney (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [ 226 P.2d 80 ], referring to section 70, “A party seeking to rebut the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself within the literal terms of one of *375 the exceptions.” (See also Corker v. Corker (1891) 87 Cal. 643, 648-649 [

1977Since the statute makes no mention of estoppel as a permissible defense, we conclude that claimant’s offer of proof was properly denied pursuant to the express wording of the section that ‘no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation can be received.’ ” ( 196 Cal.App.2d at p. 505 .) As was said in Estate of Turney (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [ 226 P.2d 80 ], referring to section 70, “A party seeking to rebut the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself within the literal terms of one of *375 the exceptions.” (See also Corker v. Corker (1891) 87 Cal. 643, 648-649 [

1977Since the statute makes no mention of estoppel as a permissible defense, we conclude that claimant’s offer of proof was properly denied pursuant to the express wording of the section that ‘no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation can be received.’ ” ( 196 Cal.App.2d at p. 505 .) As was said in Estate of Turney (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [ 226 P.2d 80 ], referring to section 70, “A party seeking to rebut the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself within the literal terms of one of *375 the exceptions.” (See also Corker v. Corker (1891) 87 Cal. 643, 648-649 [

1977Since the statute makes no mention of estoppel as a permissible defense, we conclude that claimant’s offer of proof was properly denied pursuant to the express wording of the section that ‘no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation can be received.’ ” ( 196 Cal.App.2d at p. 505 .) As was said in Estate of Turney (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [ 226 P.2d 80 ], referring to section 70, “A party seeking to rebut the statutory presumption of revocation must bring himself within the literal terms of one of *375 the exceptions.” (See also Corker v. Corker (1891) 87 Cal. 643, 648-649 [

1967(People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ] ; People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 702-703 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 401 P.2d 382 ] ; People v. Paisley, 214 Cal.App.2d 225, 231 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 307 ].) The testimony for the People, if accepted, as it was, by the jury, was amply sufficient to support the convictions.

1967(People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ] ; People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 702-703 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 401 P.2d 382 ] ; People v. Paisley, 214 Cal.App.2d 225, 231 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 307 ].) The testimony for the People, if accepted, as it was, by the jury, was amply sufficient to support the convictions.

1967The former inquiry turns ordinarily on an abstract consideration of the law governing that stage in any case tried in the same jurisdiction (see, e.g., In re Levi (1952) 39 Cal.2d 41, 45-46 [ 241 P.2d 403 ]), and does not authorize unbridled speculation as to what benefit an attorney might have been to the particular defendant in the particular case before the court. 15 The virtually identical provision of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been declared applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.