permissible exception in Texas

2015See Cantu, 366 S.W.3d at 778 (testimony did not convey interviewer’s opinion as to whether child was telling truth; testimony indicated only that interviewer believed allegations came from child rather than from someone telling child what to allege); Charley v. State, No. 05-08-01694-CR, 2011 WL 386858 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (expert was not asked and did not testify that child was telling truth; testimony was that child was able to provide sensory details which was important because she would not have been able to do so had

2012See Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 366 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (expert’s testimony was appropriate because she explained how she interviews children and that she saw no indications the child in that case had been coached); Charley v. State, No. 05-08-01694-CR, 2011 WL 386858 , at *4-5, 2011 Tex.App.

2026Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. 1982) (observing that now-Section 161.103(c) has “been upheld as a permissible exception to the prohibition against pre-suit waiver”), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2020).

2004In the present context, the most important thing to remember about the Texas law of procedural default is that it only applies to the last categoiy.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex.1982) (upholding a pre-suit waiver of citation in an affidavit relinquishing parental rights as a permissible exception, under the Family Code, to the otherwise applicable prohibition of such waivers); Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 868-870 (Tex.1978) (upholding the

2018App. 1999) (holding expert’s “testimony that the complainant did not exhibit the traits of manipulation” admissible because it “did not constitute a direct comment upon the truth of the complainant’s allegations”); Cantu v. State, 366 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (holding that asking about indications of coaching is a permissible inquiry of an expert).

2015See Cantu, 366 S.W.3d at 778 (testimony did not convey interviewer’s opinion as to whether child was telling truth; testimony indicated only that interviewer believed allegations came from child rather than from someone telling child what to allege); Charley v. State, No. 05-08-01694-CR, 2011 WL 386858 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (expert was not asked and did not testify that child was telling truth; testimony was that child was able to provide sensory details which was important because she would not have been able to do so had

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29 , 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 7

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (Tex. 1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 787 (expla

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29 , 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 7

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (Tex. 1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 787 (expla

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29 , 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 7

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29 , 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 7

2006See Bevill v. State , 573 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Bevill v. State, 573 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (stating, when jury may be called upon to assess punishment, both State and defendant have right to qualify jury on full range of punishment); Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954, 956-57 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that admonition of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.01, section 1— that, unless otherwise excepted, allegations of prior convictions for purpose of enhancement shall not be read to jury until punishment hearing — is not offended by either State or accused informing and qualifying prospective jurors as to full range of

2014The San Antonio court recently issued a new opinion in Aviles, rejecting its earlier reliance on the Beeman dictum and holding that section 724.012(b)(3)(B) is not a permissible exception to the warrant requirement. 2014 WL 3843756, at *3 .10 The Supreme Court’s remand of Aviles suggests that section 724.012(b)(3)(B) cannot serve as the sole basis for mandating a warrantless blood draw when the totality of the circumstances surrounding the blood draw indicate a lack of valid consent.

2014The San Antonio court recently issued a new opinion in Aviles, rejecting its earlier reliance on the Beeman dictum and holding that section 724.012(b)(3)(B) is not a permissible exception to the warrant requirement. 443 S.W.3d at 294 . 10 The Supreme Court’s remand of Aviles suggests that section 724.012(b)(3)(B) cannot serve as the sole basis for mandating a warrant-less blood draw when the totality of the circumstances surrounding the blood draw indicate a lack of valid consent.

2026Based on Section 161.103’s plain language, the court concluded that the Legislature “has abrogated the common law rule . . . [b]y requiring the affidavit of relinquishment to be signed by the parent, whether or not a minor, and by permitting the affidavit to contain a waiver of process.” S.A.S., 613 S.W.2d at 543 (stating that the only reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended to permit a minor to waive service under the specific circumstances set out in the statute). (2) In re M.M.S.

2020Sandusky, 387 F.3d at 574.

2019Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 155 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that the State of New Mexico exceeded the permissible inquiry in an extradition case and remanding for further consideration); California v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 482 U.S. 400, 412 (1987); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290 (1978).

2019Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 155 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that the State of New Mexico exceeded the permissible inquiry in an extradition case and remanding for further consideration); California v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 482 U.S. 400, 412 (1987); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290 (1978).

2019Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 155 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that the State of New Mexico exceeded the permissible inquiry in an extradition case and remanding for further consideration); California v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 482 U.S. 400, 412 (1987); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290 (1978).

2018See Burrows v. State, 492 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2018See Burrows v. State, 492 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Miga, 96 S.W.3d at 212 (stating that interest “is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial”); State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 738 (Tex. 1941) (noting that right to compensation for damage to property includes recovery for “legal interest on the damages from the time the injury was inflicted”); see also DiGiuseppe, 269 S.W.3d at 603 (stating that litigant is not required to raise issue regarding alternative theory of recovery until reviewing court reverses trial court’s judgment); Boyce Iron Works, 747 S.W.2d at 787 (expla

2015See Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d) (a juror’s injection of his own personal experiences, knowledge, or expertise is not considered an “outside influence,” because those representations emanate from inside the jury).

2014See Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 665-66 ; cf. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563 .

2014Analysis In his sole appellate issue, McNeil contends that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), section 724.012 of the Texas Trans *299 portation Code is not a permissible exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and in the absence of proof of exigent circumstances or other recognized exception, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

2014Analysis In his sole appellate issue, McNeil contends that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), section 724.012 of the Texas Trans *299 portation Code is not a permissible exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and in the absence of proof of exigent circumstances or other recognized exception, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

2013Evid. 403; see Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 879 .

2006See Bevill v. State, 573 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (stating, when jury may be called upon to assess punishment, both State and defendant have right to qualify jury on full range of punishment); Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954, 956-57 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that admonition of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.01, section 1— that, unless otherwise excepted, allegations of prior convictions for purpose of enhancement shall not be read to jury until punishment hearing — is not offended by either State or accused informing and qualifying prospective jurors as to full range of

2006See Bevill v. State, 573 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (stating, when jury may be called upon to assess punishment, both State and defendant have right to qualify jury on full range of punishment); Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954, 956-57 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding that admonition of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.01, section 1— that, unless otherwise excepted, allegations of prior convictions for purpose of enhancement shall not be read to jury until punishment hearing — is not offended by either State or accused informing and qualifying prospective jurors as to full range of