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14 Missouri opinions name it 3 courts 1884–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
County of Jefferson v. Quiktrip Corp.green2 sentences2015The adoption of Proposition C repealed section 393.1050 by implication, for “[w]hen two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even without a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repug-nancy to repeal the first.” Cnty. of Jefferson v. Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. banc 1995) (internal citation omitted). 2015The adoption of Proposition C repealed section 393.1050 by implication, for “[w]hen two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even without a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first.” Cnty. of Jefferson v. Quicktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. banc 1995) (internal citation omitted). | 3 | 4 |
City of Kirkwood v. Allengreen2 sentences1990Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. banc 1983); City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. banc 1966). 1985City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30 , 34 (Mo. banc 1966). | 2 | 3 |
Morrow v. City of Kansas Citygreen2 sentences1998Id., citing Morrow v. City of Kansas City, 788 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. banc 1990). 1995“When two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even without a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first.” Morrow v. City of Kansas City, 788 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. banc 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Colabianchi v. Colabianchigreen2 sentences1989However, the 1988 amendment deleted the sentence containing the phrase "the amount provided by this section shall be the total compensation for all services performed by such sheriff." We are guided by the following rules of statutory construction: "Where there are two acts on one subject, both should be given effect if possible, but if they are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even sans a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first." Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 , 63 (Mo. banc 1983). "[A]nd this is true though the la 1989However, the 1988 amendment deleted the sentence containing the phrase "the amount provided by this section shall be the total compensation for all services performed by such sheriff." We are guided by the following rules of statutory construction: "Where there are two acts on one subject, both should be given effect if possible, but if they are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, even sans a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first." Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61 , 63 (Mo. banc 1983). "[A]nd this is true though the la | 1 | 2 |
State v. Olinghousegreen2 sentences2011See also State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 1980) (noting unconstitutionality would nullify amendment); Williams Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ginsburg, 347 Mo. 119 , 146 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1940) (holding that if a new statutory section is unconstitutional, the repealing clause is likewise invalid, and the old section remains in force). [9] It has been persuasively articulated that the judicially created doctrine of severance from the Hammerschmidt decision was a bad concept and in fact does damage to the legislative process and the doctrine of separation of powers. 2011See also State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 1980) (noting unconstitutionality would nullify amendment); Williams Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ginsburg, 347 Mo. 119 , 146 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1940) (holding that if a new statutory section is unconstitutional, the repealing clause is likewise invalid, and the old section remains in force). . | 1 | 1 |
Williams Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ginsburggreen2 sentences2011See also State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 1980) (noting unconstitutionality would nullify amendment); Williams Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ginsburg, 347 Mo. 119 , 146 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1940) (holding that if a new statutory section is unconstitutional, the repealing clause is likewise invalid, and the old section remains in force). [9] It has been persuasively articulated that the judicially created doctrine of severance from the Hammerschmidt decision was a bad concept and in fact does damage to the legislative process and the doctrine of separation of powers. 2011See also State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 1980) (noting unconstitutionality would nullify amendment); Williams Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ginsburg, 347 Mo. 119 , 146 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1940) (holding that if a new statutory section is unconstitutional, the repealing clause is likewise invalid, and the old section remains in force). [9] It has been persuasively articulated that the judicially created doctrine of severance from the Hammerschmidt decision was a bad concept and in fact does damage to the legislative process and the doctrine of separation of powers. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pogue v. Swink
green
1 sentence1989Also, as explained by the Missouri Supreme Court in Pogue v. Swink, 261 S.W.2d 40 , 43 (Mo. 1953), "Another principle of law also applies; that is: The rule that where a later act covers the entire subject of a prior act or acts, manifesting a legislative intent that the later act prescribes the law with respect to the subject matter, the later act supersedes the earlier act or acts." To understand the significance of Section 57.317 , it is necessary to begin with an examination of this law's predecessors. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Fogle v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance
green
1 sentence1951S. 1929) were not expressly repealed since the repealing clause of the 1937 Act (Sec. 89, Laws 1937, p. 278) provided only generally for repeal of “acts or parts of acts contrary to; in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this act.” As to this, we said in the Cameron ease ( 342 Mo. 1 . c. 839) : “The rule is that where the repealing clause is incidental to the rest of the act and the act is unconstitutional, the repealing clause is likewise invalid and the prior general law is left unrepealed.” We, therefore, further hold that, since Section 43 (Sec. 118.510) of the *670 Act of 193 | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Perkins v. Burks
green
2 sentences1937Moss v. Hamilton, supra ( 303 Mo. 302 , 260 S.W. 466 ) this court so construed it, saying: `In the act of 1915, supra, clerks of the circuit court and their deputies were placed upon a salary basis, rather than the old fee basis theretofore existing.'" [Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248 , 255, 78 S.W.2d 845 .] This section was not changed, repealed or amended, prior to plaintiff's term, to put either county clerks or their deputies on a salary basis, regardless of the fees of the office. 1937Moss v. Hamilton, supra ( 303 Mo. 302 , 260 S.W. 466 ) this court so construed it, saying: `In the act of 1915, supra, clerks of the circuit court and their deputies were placed upon a salary basis, rather than the old fee basis theretofore existing.'" [Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248 , 255, 78 S.W.2d 845 .] This section was not changed, repealed or amended, prior to plaintiff's term, to put either county clerks or their deputies on a salary basis, regardless of the fees of the office. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
State Ex Rel. Moss v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences1937Moss v. Hamilton, supra ( 303 Mo. 302 , 260 S.W. 466 ) this court so construed it, saying: `In the act of 1915, supra, clerks of the circuit court and their deputies were placed upon a salary basis, rather than the old fee basis theretofore existing.'" [Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248 , 255, 78 S.W.2d 845 .] This section was not changed, repealed or amended, prior to plaintiff's term, to put either county clerks or their deputies on a salary basis, regardless of the fees of the office. 1937Moss v. Hamilton, supra ( 303 Mo. 302 , 260 S.W. 466 ) this court so construed it, saying: `In the act of 1915, supra, clerks of the circuit court and their deputies were placed upon a salary basis, rather than the old fee basis theretofore existing.'" [Perkins v. Burks, 336 Mo. 248 , 255, 78 S.W.2d 845 .] This section was not changed, repealed or amended, prior to plaintiff's term, to put either county clerks or their deputies on a salary basis, regardless of the fees of the office. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
State ex rel. Dosenbach v. St. Joseph's Convent of Mercy
neutral
1 sentence1897Joseph Convent, 116 Mo. 575 . | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Young v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1897There are three ways in which a statute may be repealed: 11 First, by a repealing clause; second, by such repugnance that the two laws may not, in reason, both stand; third, by a revision of the whole subject-matter of the former law, which is evidently intended as a substitute for it.” Young v. R'y, 33 Mo. App. 509 ; State ex rel. v. St. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Price v. Hopkin
green
1 sentence1884In Price v. Hopkins ( 13 Mich. 318, 326 ), it is said by Mr. Justice Cooley: “The idea embodied in this constitutional provision is, not that the passage of the law is notice, but that ninety days from the end of the session are required to bring knowledge of the law to the public at large. | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.