repealing clause in North Carolina

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1940Hammond v. Charlotte, 205 N. C., 469 , 171 S. E., 612 .

1940Hammond v. Charlotte, 205 N. C., 469 , 171 S. E., 612 .

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1940The question raised in this case, we think, is settled in S. v. Fink, 179 N. C., 712 (715-16).

1940The question raised in this case, we think, is settled in S. v. Fink , 179 N.C. 712 (715-16).

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1957Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194 , 88 S.E. 231 ; Commrs. v. Commrs., 186 N.C. 202 , 119 S.E. 206 ; Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149 , 79 S.E. 2d 748 .

1957Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194 , 88 S.E. 231 ; Commrs. v. Commrs., 186 N.C. 202 , 119 S.E. 206 ; Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149 , 79 S.E. 2d 748 .

1957Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194 , 88 S.E. 231 ; Commrs. v. Commrs., 186 N.C. 202 , 119 S.E. 206 ; Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149 , 79 S.E. 2d 748 .

1957Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194 , 88 S.E. 231 ; Commrs. v. Commrs., 186 N.C. 202 , 119 S.E. 206 ; Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149 , 79 S.E. 2d 748 .

1948Rogers v. U. 8., 185 U. S., 83 ; Wilson v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 638 ; Alexander v. Lowrance, 182 N. C., 642 ; Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., 196 ; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 688 ; Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431 ; School Comrs. v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197 .’” Certainly if the legislative intent were sufficiently clear the general statute would prevail without a repealing clause; but repeal by implication is not favored and we do not find that the legislative intent justifies that construction.

1948Rogers v. U. 8., 185 U. S., 83 ; Wilson v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 638 ; Alexander v. Lowrance, 182 N. C., 642 ; Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., 196 ; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 688 ; Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431 ; School Comrs. v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197 .’” Certainly if the legislative intent were sufficiently clear the general statute would prevail without a repealing clause; but repeal by implication is not favored and we do not find that the legislative intent justifies that construction.

1948Rogers v. U. 8., 185 U. S., 83 ; Wilson v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 638 ; Alexander v. Lowrance, 182 N. C., 642 ; Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., 196 ; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 688 ; Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431 ; School Comrs. v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197 .’” Certainly if the legislative intent were sufficiently clear the general statute would prevail without a repealing clause; but repeal by implication is not favored and we do not find that the legislative intent justifies that construction.

1948Rogers v. U. 8., 185 U. S., 83 ; Wilson v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 638 ; Alexander v. Lowrance, 182 N. C., 642 ; Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., 196 ; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 688 ; Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431 ; School Comrs. v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197 .’” Certainly if the legislative intent were sufficiently clear the general statute would prevail without a repealing clause; but repeal by implication is not favored and we do not find that the legislative intent justifies that construction.

1948Rogers v. U. 8., 185 U. S., 83 ; Wilson v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 638 ; Alexander v. Lowrance, 182 N. C., 642 ; Bramham v. Durham, 171 N. C., 196 ; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 688 ; Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431 ; School Comrs. v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197 .’” Certainly if the legislative intent were sufficiently clear the general statute would prevail without a repealing clause; but repeal by implication is not favored and we do not find that the legislative intent justifies that construction.

1928The statement in Hartsfield v. Craven County, 194 N. C., 358 , in regard to the effect of this repealing clause on the local act referred to therein must be considered in connection with the facts in that ease.

1926It may be tbat tbe plaintiff in this action has been greatly wronged and humiliated by tbe. unlawful shedding of blood done by her husband; but, as stated by tbe late Chief Justice Clark in tbe case of Lee v. Lee, supra, “With us the law-making power has adhered to tbe obligation of tbe marriage vow, tbat tbe parties ‘take each other for better or for worse, to live together in sickness and in health till death do them part/ with tbe exceptions only where tbe misconduct of tbe parties, and not their misfortunes, are made, by our statute to justify tbe divorce.” Upon the record, we bold tbat tb

1924S. v. Woodside, 31 N. C., 500 ; Black’s Law Dictionary.” In chapter 136, Public Laws 1923, sec. 378, the repealing clause is as follows: “All laws and clauses of laws, including all acts passed by the General Assembly of one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.” We do not think the position here taken disturbs the principle laid down in Felmet v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 251 .