repealing clause in Alabama

1924In Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150 , 7 South. 824 , a case dealing with a similar repealing clause, it was said: “The office of construction is to ascertain what the language of an act means, and not what the Legislature may have intended.” Again quoting from Lord Campbell: “It is far better that we should abide by the words of a statute, than seek to reform it according to the supposed intent.” See, also, State ex rel.

1906Although the charter of Montgomery was local, in the sense' that it applied' to a municipality, the exemption therein secured to persons taking out a privilege license from the city was, in a broad and just sense, special and exceptional, and hence inconsistent with that provision of the revenue law of 1903, which declared: “The court of county commissioners of each county, except in case's otherwise provided, may at any regular or special term, add to the taxes specified in this section such amounts not exceeding fifty per cent, of such taxes for county purposes as in their judgment inay be n

1916The act of 1915 contains a repealing clause (section 22, p. 533), and was manifestly intended by the Legislature to restate and cover the entire subject of registration and licensing of automobiles, and repeals the provisions of the former statute (1911) relating to that subject.— Isbell v. Shelby County, 10 Ala. App. 639 , 65 South. 706 ; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112 , 40 South. 297 ; Edson v. State, 134 Ala. 50 , 32 South. 308 ; 3 Brickell’s Digest, p. 750, § 49.

1913If, however, this repealing clause did not exist, or in case it relates to general and special laws only, and not to local laws, and whether the act of 1898-99 is a local or special law, as defined by tbe present Constitution, matters not, for the reason that section 1067 of the Code deals with all offices to be created or filled by the town council in towns of less than 6,000 inhabitants, and leaves it discretionary with them, except as to clerks, and as this law deals fully and completely with the subject, it operates as a repeal of section 4 of the act of 1898-99. — Prowell v. State, 142 Al

1942As noted in Stone v. Cecilia Goetz, supra [ 8 So.2d 208 1 ], this pay plan may be rejected by the Personnel Board in its entirety, or modified, or adopted as the wisdom of- the Personnel Board dictates; and the provision authorizing the Director to submit such a pay plan “in no wise limit (s) or restrict(s) the Personnel Board which was authorized to adopt, modify or reject entirely the proposed plan of the Director.” The conclusion finds further support in the broad language of the repealing clause of the Civil Service Act and the construction accorded this clause by our court in the Goetz ca

1942As noted in Stone v. Cecilia Goetz, supra [ 8 So.2d 208 1 ], this pay plan may be rejected by the Personnel Board in its entirety, or modified, or adopted as the wisdom of- the Personnel Board dictates; and the provision authorizing the Director to submit such a pay plan “in no wise limit (s) or restrict(s) the Personnel Board which was authorized to adopt, modify or reject entirely the proposed plan of the Director.” The conclusion finds further support in the broad language of the repealing clause of the Civil Service Act and the construction accorded this clause by our court in the Goetz ca

1935Tucker v. McLendon et al., 210 Ala. 562 , 98 So. 797 ; Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150 , 7 So. 824 ; State ex rel.

1935Tucker v. McLendon et al., 210 Ala. 562 , 98 So. 797 ; Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150 , 7 So. 824 ; State ex rel.

1928Section 10 of the Act of 1915, supra, was construed by this court in Patterson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 483 , 79 So. 157 .

1928Section 10 of the Act of 1915, supra, was construed by this court in Patterson v. State, 16 Ala. App. 483 , 79 So. 157 .

1924Bibb v. Town of Warrior, 181 Ala. 642 , 62 South. 69 .

1924Bibb v. Town of Warrior, 181 Ala. 642 , 62 South. 69 .

1916Courts in other jurisdictions seem to have generally placed a construction on statutes, providing for an automobile registration fee, holding it not to be a property tax, but a privilege tax, levied in the exercise of the police power to control and regulate travel on the public highways. — Commonwealth, etc., v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79 , 14 N. E. 255 , 108 Am.

1916The act of 1915 contains a repealing clause (section 22, p. 533), and was manifestly intended by the Legislature to restate and cover the entire subject of registration and licensing of automobiles, and repeals the provisions of the former statute (1911) relating to that subject.— Isbell v. Shelby County, 10 Ala. App. 639 , 65 South. 706 ; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112 , 40 South. 297 ; Edson v. State, 134 Ala. 50 , 32 South. 308 ; 3 Brickell’s Digest, p. 750, § 49.

1916The act of 1915 contains a repealing clause (section 22, p. 533), and was manifestly intended by the Legislature to restate and cover the entire subject of registration and licensing of automobiles, and repeals the provisions of the former statute (1911) relating to that subject.— Isbell v. Shelby County, 10 Ala. App. 639 , 65 South. 706 ; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112 , 40 South. 297 ; Edson v. State, 134 Ala. 50 , 32 South. 308 ; 3 Brickell’s Digest, p. 750, § 49.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The sufficiency of the title before quoted, as for any supposed violation of section 45 of the Constitution, must be pronounced in view of the following .authorities: State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574 , 69 South. 723 ; Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165 , 54 South. 283 ; Griffin v. Drennen, 145 Ala. 128 , 40 South. 1016 ; Sheffield Co. v. Pool, 169 Ala. 420 , 53 South., 1027 . (2) The local act under review was published in June, 1915, in a newspaper in Conecuh county.

1916The act of 1915 contains a repealing clause (section 22, p. 533), and was manifestly intended by the Legislature to restate and cover the entire subject of registration and licensing of automobiles, and repeals the provisions of the former statute (1911) relating to that subject.— Isbell v. Shelby County, 10 Ala. App. 639 , 65 South. 706 ; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112 , 40 South. 297 ; Edson v. State, 134 Ala. 50 , 32 South. 308 ; 3 Brickell’s Digest, p. 750, § 49.

1916The act of 1915 contains a repealing clause (section 22, p. 533), and was manifestly intended by the Legislature to restate and cover the entire subject of registration and licensing of automobiles, and repeals the provisions of the former statute (1911) relating to that subject.— Isbell v. Shelby County, 10 Ala. App. 639 , 65 South. 706 ; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112 , 40 South. 297 ; Edson v. State, 134 Ala. 50 , 32 South. 308 ; 3 Brickell’s Digest, p. 750, § 49.

1916Courts in other jurisdictions seem to have generally placed a construction on statutes, providing for an automobile registration fee, holding it not to be a property tax, but a privilege tax, levied in the exercise of the police power to control and regulate travel on the public highways. — Commonwealth, etc., v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79 , 14 N. E. 255 , 108 Am.

1913If, however, this repealing clause did not exist, or in case it relates to general and special laws only, and not to local laws, and whether the act of 1898-99 is a local or special law, as defined by tbe present Constitution, matters not, for the reason that section 1067 of the Code deals with all offices to be created or filled by the town council in towns of less than 6,000 inhabitants, and leaves it discretionary with them, except as to clerks, and as this law deals fully and completely with the subject, it operates as a repeal of section 4 of the act of 1898-99. — Prowell v. State, 142 Al

1913If, however, this repealing clause did not exist, or in case it relates to general and special laws only, and not to local laws, and whether the act of 1898-99 is a local or special law, as defined by tbe present Constitution, matters not, for the reason that section 1067 of the Code deals with all offices to be created or filled by the town council in towns of less than 6,000 inhabitants, and leaves it discretionary with them, except as to clerks, and as this law deals fully and completely with the subject, it operates as a repeal of section 4 of the act of 1898-99. — Prowell v. State, 142 Al

1913If, however, this repealing clause did not exist, or in case it relates to general and special laws only, and not to local laws, and whether the act of 1898-99 is a local or special law, as defined by tbe present Constitution, matters not, for the reason that section 1067 of the Code deals with all offices to be created or filled by the town council in towns of less than 6,000 inhabitants, and leaves it discretionary with them, except as to clerks, and as this law deals fully and completely with the subject, it operates as a repeal of section 4 of the act of 1898-99. — Prowell v. State, 142 Al

1913If, however, this repealing clause did not exist, or in case it relates to general and special laws only, and not to local laws, and whether the act of 1898-99 is a local or special law, as defined by tbe present Constitution, matters not, for the reason that section 1067 of the Code deals with all offices to be created or filled by the town council in towns of less than 6,000 inhabitants, and leaves it discretionary with them, except as to clerks, and as this law deals fully and completely with the subject, it operates as a repeal of section 4 of the act of 1898-99. — Prowell v. State, 142 Al

1909Section 6733 of the Code of 1907 fixes and defines the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and concludes as follows: “And all local or special laws in conflict herewith are expressly repealed(Italics supplied.) While the repealing clause of the section in question does no more than to repeal laws in conflict therewith, and which would be the result, regardless of the insertion of said clause, hut for the proviso of section 10 of the Code of 1907 in reference to local laws on this subject (Ogbourne v. Ogbourne, 60 Ala. 616 ; District of Columbia v. Sisters of Visitation, 15 App. D.

1906Although the charter of Montgomery was local, in the sense' that it applied' to a municipality, the exemption therein secured to persons taking out a privilege license from the city was, in a broad and just sense, special and exceptional, and hence inconsistent with that provision of the revenue law of 1903, which declared: “The court of county commissioners of each county, except in case's otherwise provided, may at any regular or special term, add to the taxes specified in this section such amounts not exceeding fifty per cent, of such taxes for county purposes as in their judgment inay be n

1894Especially would this be true, when, if the repeals in the act were allowed to stand, it would destroy the system of laws, as it would in this case, which the legislature, was intending and attempting to perfect by amendment;, and leave us without any mechanics’ lien law at all. — State v. Bland, 121 Ind. 514 ; State v. Van Cliff, 38 N. J.

1877The repealing clause of the act of 1872 is general — of “all laws and parts of laws contravening this act; ” and it does not operate a repeal of an existing statute, relating to the same subject-matter, not in conflict with the provisions of the act. —People v. Durick, 20 Cal. 94 .