repealing clause in Indiana

1943Donohue (1907), 168 Ind. 180, 191 , 80 N. E. 153, 156 , it is said: “. . . a repealing clause, like any other provision of the statute, is *472 to be subjected to rules of construction, and the intent will prevail over the literal import of the words.” And in Indianapolis Union Railway Co. et al. v. Waddington, Adm’r (1907), 169 Ind. 448, 453 , 82 N. E. 1030, 1032 , we said: “Even an express declaration of a repeal will not be given that effect when it is apparent that the legislature did not so intend.” This principle is recognized in Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.

1943Donohue (1907), 168 Ind. 180, 191 , 80 N. E. 153, 156 , it is said: “. . . a repealing clause, like any other provision of the statute, is *472 to be subjected to rules of construction, and the intent will prevail over the literal import of the words.” And in Indianapolis Union Railway Co. et al. v. Waddington, Adm’r (1907), 169 Ind. 448, 453 , 82 N. E. 1030, 1032 , we said: “Even an express declaration of a repeal will not be given that effect when it is apparent that the legislature did not so intend.” This principle is recognized in Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.

1930In State v. Reynolds (1886), 108 Ind. 353, 358 , 9 N. E. 287 , this court quoted with apparent approval the following language, found in Payne v. Conner (1813),3 Bibb.

1930In State v. Reynolds (1886), 108 Ind. 353, 358 , 9 N. E. 287 , this court quoted with apparent approval the following language, found in Payne v. Conner (1813),3 Bibb.

1943In the case of Daly v. Carr (1934), 206 Ind. 554, 557 , 190 N. E. 429, 430 , this court, in discussing ch. 131 of the Acts of 1883, said: “The law of 1883 is not re-enacted as a part of the Act, though within its purview, and, therefore, by the express provision of the repealing clause, and by all of the rules of construction, it must be deemed repealed.” The “Good Time Law” of 1883 thus having been distinctly held to be repealed, the cross-errors assigned by the appellee need not be further considered.

1943In the case of Daly v. Carr (1934), 206 Ind. 554, 557 , 190 N. E. 429, 430 , this court, in discussing ch. 131 of the Acts of 1883, said: “The law of 1883 is not re-enacted as a part of the Act, though within its purview, and, therefore, by the express provision of the repealing clause, and by all of the rules of construction, it must be deemed repealed.” The “Good Time Law” of 1883 thus having been distinctly held to be repealed, the cross-errors assigned by the appellee need not be further considered.

1943Donohue (1907), 168 Ind. 180, 191 , 80 N. E. 153, 156 , it is said: “. . . a repealing clause, like any other provision of the statute, is *472 to be subjected to rules of construction, and the intent will prevail over the literal import of the words.” And in Indianapolis Union Railway Co. et al. v. Waddington, Adm’r (1907), 169 Ind. 448, 453 , 82 N. E. 1030, 1032 , we said: “Even an express declaration of a repeal will not be given that effect when it is apparent that the legislature did not so intend.” This principle is recognized in Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.

1943Donohue (1907), 168 Ind. 180, 191 , 80 N. E. 153, 156 , it is said: “. . . a repealing clause, like any other provision of the statute, is *472 to be subjected to rules of construction, and the intent will prevail over the literal import of the words.” And in Indianapolis Union Railway Co. et al. v. Waddington, Adm’r (1907), 169 Ind. 448, 453 , 82 N. E. 1030, 1032 , we said: “Even an express declaration of a repeal will not be given that effect when it is apparent that the legislature did not so intend.” This principle is recognized in Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.

1937State v. Williams (1910), 173 Ind. 414 , 90 N. E. 754 .

1937State v. Williams (1910), 173 Ind. 414 , 90 N. E. 754 .

1934McCardle et al. v. Board, etc. (1924), 195 Ind. 281 , 144 N. E. 877 ; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry.

1934McCardle et al. v. Board, etc. (1924), 195 Ind. 281 , 144 N. E. 877 ; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry.

1930In discussing a similar repealing clause in another statute, in State, ex rel., v. Ives (1906), 167 Ind. 13 , 78 N. E. 225 , it is said: “The language of the repealing clause of said last-mentioned act, so far as pertinent to this case, is as follows: ‘all former laws within the purview of this act except laws not inconsistent herewith and enacted at the present session of the General Assembly are hereby repealed.’ Dealing with said repealing clause, and not with the general doctrine of repeals by implication, we think it may be said that said act did not necessarily repeal all prior legislati

1930In discussing a similar repealing clause in another statute, in State, ex rel., v. Ives (1906), 167 Ind. 13 , 78 N. E. 225 , it is said: “The language of the repealing clause of said last-mentioned act, so far as pertinent to this case, is as follows: ‘all former laws within the purview of this act except laws not inconsistent herewith and enacted at the present session of the General Assembly are hereby repealed.’ Dealing with said repealing clause, and not with the general doctrine of repeals by implication, we think it may be said that said act did not necessarily repeal all prior legislati

1927This view is supported by many authorities among which are the following: In the case of Thiel v. Philadelphia (1914), 245 Pa. St. 406, 91 Atl. 490 , the court said: “It is well settled that where the provisions of a revising statute are to take effect at a future period, or upon the happening of a certain contingency, or the doing of certain acts, and the statute contains a clause repealing former laws on the same subject, the repealing clause does not take effect until the provisions of the repealing act go into operation.

1927In Board of Education of Ogden City v. Hunter (1916), 48 Utah 373 , 159 Pac. 1019 , it is held that where a statute is made effective only from a future date but in terms repeals the former law upon the subject, the repealing clause becomes effective only at the time the statute goes into effect.

1927In Board of Education of Ogden City v. Hunter (1916), 48 Utah 373 , 159 Pac. 1019 , it is held that where a statute is made effective only from a future date but in terms repeals the former law upon the subject, the repealing clause becomes effective only at the time the statute goes into effect.

1907Smith v. People (1872), 47 N. Y. 330 ; State, ex rel., v. Moorhouse (1896), 5 N. Dak. 406, 67 N. W. 140 ; Home Bldg., etc., Assn. v. Nolan (1898), 21 Mont. 205 , 53 Pac. 738 ; 1 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), §293.

1907Smith v. People (1872), 47 N. Y. 330 ; State, ex rel., v. Moorhouse (1896), 5 N. Dak. 406, 67 N. W. 140 ; Home Bldg., etc., Assn. v. Nolan (1898), 21 Mont. 205 , 53 Pac. 738 ; 1 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), §293.

1907Smith v. People (1872), 47 N. Y. 330 ; State, ex rel., v. Moorhouse (1896), 5 N. Dak. 406, 67 N. W. 140 ; Home Bldg., etc., Assn. v. Nolan (1898), 21 Mont. 205 , 53 Pac. 738 ; 1 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), §293.

1907Smith v. People (1872), 47 N. Y. 330 ; State, ex rel., v. Moorhouse (1896), 5 N. Dak. 406, 67 N. W. 140 ; Home Bldg., etc., Assn. v. Nolan (1898), 21 Mont. 205 , 53 Pac. 738 ; 1 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), §293.

1897In Williams v. State, ex rel., 86 Ind. 400 , it was held that “the purview of an act begins with its enacting clause and ends before the repealing clause. * * * In Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb. 180, it is said: ‘The meaning usually attached to this term by writers on law seems to be the enacting part of a statute in contradistinction to the preamble; and we think the provision of the act repealing all acts or parts of acts coming within its purview, should be understood as repealing all acts in relation to all cases which are provided for by the repealing act; and that the provisions of no act are

1897In Williams v. State, ex rel., 86 Ind. 400 , it was held that “the purview of an act begins with its enacting clause and ends before the repealing clause. * * * In Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb. 180, it is said: ‘The meaning usually attached to this term by writers on law seems to be the enacting part of a statute in contradistinction to the preamble; and we think the provision of the act repealing all acts or parts of acts coming within its purview, should be understood as repealing all acts in relation to all cases which are provided for by the repealing act; and that the provisions of no act are

1894The holdings of this court, in Henderson v. State, ex rel., 137 Ind. 552 , and State, ex rel., v. Krost, 140 Ind. 41 , were that the act in question included a complete system of fees as between the office and the public; that the salary provisions of the act should be considered in their application to the various classes of officers severally; that in either respect, considered apart from the other features of the law, the provisions could be considered and upheld or defeated without affecting other elements of the law, and that the repealing clause of the act was not defeated by the partial

1894The holdings of this court, in Henderson v. State, ex rel., 137 Ind. 552 , and State, ex rel., v. Krost, 140 Ind. 41 , were that the act in question included a complete system of fees as between the office and the public; that the salary provisions of the act should be considered in their application to the various classes of officers severally; that in either respect, considered apart from the other features of the law, the provisions could be considered and upheld or defeated without affecting other elements of the law, and that the repealing clause of the act was not defeated by the partial

1890Bishop Written Laws, section 34; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165 ; Sullivan v. Adams, 3 Gray, 476 ; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261 ; Shephardson v. Milwaukee, etc., R.

1890In the case of Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482 , it was held that a repealing clause attached tq an unconstitutional act of the Legislature might repeal a former valid statute upon the same subject.

1890In the case of Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482 , it was held that a repealing clause attached tq an unconstitutional act of the Legislature might repeal a former valid statute upon the same subject.

1890Bishop Written Laws, section 34; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165 ; Sullivan v. Adams, 3 Gray, 476 ; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261 ; Shephardson v. Milwaukee, etc., R.

1890Mr. Bishop, in commenting on this case in his valuable work “On the Written Laws,” section 34, says : “But not only the reason just süggested shows that this doctrine can not be sound in principle; it is also unsound, and it has been so adjudged, because, as observed in the Alabama court, if the new law is void, the provisions of the former law can not with propriety be said to be in conflict, or contravention of it.” The Supreme Court of Iowa, in considering this case in the ease of Childs v. Shower, supra, said: “ In that case, the repealing clause in an unconstitutional statute was ‘ that a

1882Im Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb, 180 , it is said: “The meaning usually attached to this term by writers on law seems to be the-enacting part of a statute in contradistinction to the preamble and we think the provision of the act repealing all acts or parts of acts coming within its purview, should be understood as repealing all acts in relation to all cases which are provided for by the repealing act; and that the provisions of no act are thereby repealed in relation to cases not provided for by it.” In order to come within the repealing clause of the act of April 15th, 1881, the matter must not o