free exercise clause in New Jersey

1992Thus, although the sincerity of a religious institution’s belief may relate to a court’s decision whether to grant a First Amendment-based exemption from neutral and involuntary government regulations, see id. at 715-16 , 101 S.Ct. at 1430-31 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 632 , it rarely disposes of a Free Exercise challenge to voluntarily-assumed contractual obligations.

1992Thus, although the sincerity of a religious institution’s belief may relate to a court’s decision whether to grant a First Amendment-based exemption from neutral and involuntary government regulations, see id. at 715-16 , 101 S.Ct. at 1430-31 , 67 L.Ed.2d at 632 , it rarely disposes of a Free Exercise challenge to voluntarily-assumed contractual obligations.

2025“Substantive entanglement involves the same concerns as the Free Exercise Clause analysis and may occur, for example, when a church’s freedom to choose its ministers is at stake.” McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 42 .

2025“Substantive entanglement involves the same concerns as the Free Exercise Clause analysis and may occur, for example, when a church’s freedom to choose its ministers is at stake.” McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 42 .

2018The District Court found the case indistinguishable from Locke , 540 U.S. 712 , 124 S.Ct. 1307 , in which the Court "upheld against a free exercise challenge the State of Washington's decision not to fund degrees in devotional **570 theology as part of a state scholarship program." Ibid.

2018The District Court found the case indistinguishable from Locke , 540 U.S. 712 , 124 S.Ct. 1307 , in which the Court "upheld against a free exercise challenge the State of Washington's decision not to fund degrees in devotional **570 theology as part of a state scholarship program." Ibid.

2018Dep't of Educ. , 386 F.3d 344 , 353-54 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting effort to frame a free exercise claim under "the rubric of equal protection" as a "crabbed approach [that] will not wash" because the Free Exercise Clause "defines the scope of the fundamental right to religion incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee").

2018Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872 , 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (rejecting Free Exercise claim and finding that members of religious organization were not entitled to dispensation from criminal law which prohibited use of peyote).

2018Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872 , 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (rejecting Free Exercise claim and finding that members of religious organization were not entitled to dispensation from criminal law which prohibited use of peyote).

2003In coercing the husband, the civil court is, in essence, overruling or superseding any judgment which the Beth Din can or will enter, contrary to accepted First Amendment principles. [ Ibid. ] Aflalo determined that the Free Exercise clause ( U.S. Const. amend.

2003I) did not allow the court authority to compel either husband or wife to appear before the religious tribunal, whether to obtain a get or to discuss reconciliation. [3] Id. at 544 , 685 A. 2d 523 .

1996Geary, supra, 7 F. 3d at 327-31 ; DeMarco, supra, 4 F. 3d at 169-72 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-4 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion...." Thus, both Geary, supra, and DeMarco, supra, remain highly relevant for purposes of establishment clause analysis.

1996Geary, supra, 7 F. 3d at 327-31 ; DeMarco, supra, 4 F. 3d at 169-72 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-4 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion...." Thus, both Geary, supra, and DeMarco, supra, remain highly relevant for purposes of establishment clause analysis.

1996Geary, supra, 7 F. 3d at 327-31 ; DeMarco, supra, 4 F. 3d at 169-72 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-4 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion...." Thus, both Geary, supra, and DeMarco, supra, remain highly relevant for purposes of establishment clause analysis.

1996Geary, supra, 7 F. 3d at 327-31 ; DeMarco, supra, 4 F. 3d at 169-72 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-4 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion...." Thus, both Geary, supra, and DeMarco, supra, remain highly relevant for purposes of establishment clause analysis.

1996The expressed purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, [ supra ]," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1), in Free Exercise Clause situations which the Supreme Court had "virtually eliminated" in Employment Div. v. Smith, supra. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). [2] For purposes of constitutional analysis, we readily *643 defer to and accept the RFRA restoration of the "compelling interest" test to Free Exercise Clause analysis. [3] We conclude that the State's interest in abolishing age and gender discrimination is compelling, beyond cavil, N.J.S.A. 10

1996The expressed purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, [ supra ]," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1), in Free Exercise Clause situations which the Supreme Court had "virtually eliminated" in Employment Div. v. Smith, supra. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). [2] For purposes of constitutional analysis, we readily *643 defer to and accept the RFRA restoration of the "compelling interest" test to Free Exercise Clause analysis. [3] We conclude that the State's interest in abolishing age and gender discrimination is compelling, beyond cavil, N.J.S.A. 10

1996The expressed purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, [ supra ]," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1), in Free Exercise Clause situations which the Supreme Court had "virtually eliminated" in Employment Div. v. Smith, supra. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). [2] For purposes of constitutional analysis, we readily *643 defer to and accept the RFRA restoration of the "compelling interest" test to Free Exercise Clause analysis. [3] We conclude that the State's interest in abolishing age and gender discrimination is compelling, beyond cavil, N.J.S.A. 10

1996The expressed purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, [ supra ]," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1), in Free Exercise Clause situations which the Supreme Court had "virtually eliminated" in Employment Div. v. Smith, supra. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). [2] For purposes of constitutional analysis, we readily *643 defer to and accept the RFRA restoration of the "compelling interest" test to Free Exercise Clause analysis. [3] We conclude that the State's interest in abolishing age and gender discrimination is compelling, beyond cavil, N.J.S.A. 10

1996The expressed purpose of the Act was "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, [ supra ]," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1), in Free Exercise Clause situations which the Supreme Court had "virtually eliminated" in Employment Div. v. Smith, supra. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). [2] For purposes of constitutional analysis, we readily *643 defer to and accept the RFRA restoration of the "compelling interest" test to Free Exercise Clause analysis. [3] We conclude that the State's interest in abolishing age and gender discrimination is compelling, beyond cavil, N.J.S.A. 10

1996The court rejected petitioner's argument that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment gives religious groups a constitutional right to autonomy and requires courts to defer to [their] decisions." Id. 460 N.W. 2d at 433 .

1996The court rejected petitioner's argument that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment gives religious groups a constitutional right to autonomy and requires courts to defer to [their] decisions." Id. 460 N.W. 2d at 433 .

1994In reaching this decision, the court relied upon Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164 , 1168 *193 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 3333 , 92 L.Ed. 2d 739 (1986).

1994In reaching this decision, the court relied upon Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164 , 1168 *193 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 3333 , 92 L.Ed. 2d 739 (1986).

1994In reaching this decision, the court relied upon Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164 , 1168 *193 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 3333 , 92 L.Ed. 2d 739 (1986).

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1989Super. 298 , 476 A. 2d 869 (App.Div. 1984).

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1989Cir.1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 930 , 89 *643 S.Ct. 1190, 22 L.Ed. 2d 459 (1969), the circuit court found the following statement in the F.C.C. opinion to be "unanswerable": For the FCC to promulgate rules regarding permissible and impermissible speech relating to religion would be not only an egregious interference with free speech in broadcasting, but also an unconstitutional infraction of the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. [ 403 F. 2d at 171-172 ] Free speech can be regulated only as to "time, place and manner." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402 , 416 A.

1974In Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1939), the Supreme Court distinguished between the freedom to believe and the freedom to exercise one's belief embodied in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment: * * * the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act.

1974In Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900 , 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1939), the Supreme Court distinguished between the freedom to believe and the freedom to exercise one's belief embodied in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment: * * * the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act.