free exercise clause in Tennessee

2008Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 , 113 S.Ct. at 2226 ; Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F.Supp.2d at 653; Decker v. Carroll Academy, No. -7- 02A01-9709-CV-00242, 1999 WL 332705 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 1999) (No Tenn. R.

2008Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 , 113 S.Ct. at 2226 ; Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F.Supp.2d at 653; Decker v. Carroll Academy, No. -7- 02A01-9709-CV-00242, 1999 WL 332705 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 1999) (No Tenn. R.

2010Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213 , (Miss. 2005).

2008Aug. 14, 2000) (upholding the denial of a father’s passport because of child support arrearages, finding that restricting passports for persons who owe arrearages is reasonably related to the substantial government interest in promoting the payment of child support arrearages, that the restriction was a valid and neutral law of general applicability, and that the denial did not violate the free exercise clause simply because it prevented the father from traveling overseas for religious reasons); Office of Child Support v. Stansione, 910 A.2d 882 (Vt. 2006) (affirming revocation of mother’s dri

2008Aug. 14, 2000) (upholding the denial of a father’s passport because of child support arrearages, finding that restricting passports for persons who owe arrearages is reasonably related to the substantial government interest in promoting the payment of child support arrearages, that the restriction was a valid and neutral law of general applicability, and that the denial did not violate the free exercise clause simply because it prevented the father from traveling overseas for religious reasons); Office of Child Support v. Stansione, 910 A.2d 882 (Vt. 2006) (affirming revocation of mother’s dri

2005Hodges, 695 S.W.2d at 172 (quoting In re: Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1114-15 (1978)).

1985Id. 386 A.2d at 1114-15 .

1985After discussing the United States Supreme Court’s application of the balancing test to the facts in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island continued as follows: *173 We believe that because petitioner claimed that his act was protected by the free exercise clause, in order to justifiably curtail the exercise of that alleged right the trial justice should have first allowed peti

1985After discussing the United States Supreme Court’s application of the balancing test to the facts in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island continued as follows: *173 We believe that because petitioner claimed that his act was protected by the free exercise clause, in order to justifiably curtail the exercise of that alleged right the trial justice should have first allowed peti

1985After discussing the United States Supreme Court’s application of the balancing test to the facts in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island continued as follows: *173 We believe that because petitioner claimed that his act was protected by the free exercise clause, in order to justifiably curtail the exercise of that alleged right the trial justice should have first allowed peti

1985After discussing the United States Supreme Court’s application of the balancing test to the facts in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , 81 S.Ct. 1144 , 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island continued as follows: *173 We believe that because petitioner claimed that his act was protected by the free exercise clause, in order to justifiably curtail the exercise of that alleged right the trial justice should have first allowed peti

1985Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 , 91 S.Ct. 828, 842 , 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971).

1985Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 , 91 S.Ct. 828, 842 , 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971).

1985We think the following from Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), is also relevant to the inquiry into defendant’s alleged religious belief: Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.

1985We think the following from Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), is also relevant to the inquiry into defendant’s alleged religious belief: Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.