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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wisconsin v. Yodergreen2 sentences1988"In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the *284 defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's distress was in fact `part of the belief and practices' of the religious group." Id. (citing Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 245 , 644 P.2d 577, 604 (1982). 1988“In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiffs distress was in fact ‘part of the belief and practices’ of the religious group.” Id. (citing Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 245 , 644 P.2d 577, 604 (1982). | 1 | 4 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeahgreen2 sentences2015See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (rejecting government's contention that constitutional inquiry must end when text does not mention religion, as "facial neutrality is not determinative" of a Free Exercise claim). 2015See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 , 113 S.Ct. 2217 , 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (rejecting government's contention that constitutional inquiry must end when text does not mention religion, as "facial neutrality is not determinative" of a Free Exercise claim). | 1 | 2 |
Locke v. Daveygreen2 sentences2015The Court upheld the program against a free exercise challenge only after concluding that it could find nothing âthat suggests animus toward religion.â Id. at 725. 2015The Court upheld the program against a free exercise challenge only after concluding that it could find nothing "that suggests animus toward religion." Id. at 725 , 124 S.Ct. 1807 . | 1 | 1 |
National Labor Relations Board, and Social Services Union Local 535 Seiu, Afl-Cio, Intervenor v. Hanna Boys Centergreen2 sentences1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). 1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS's free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. [5] See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of *1141 religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Seegergreen2 sentences1995See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 , 85 S.Ct. 850 , 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (for purpose of exemption from draft, a "religious" belief is simply the "ultimate," imperative, belief of an individual; belief in an external power not necessary). 1995See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 , 85 S.Ct. 850 , 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (for purpose of exemption from draft, a "religious" belief is simply the "ultimate," imperative, belief of an individual; belief in an external power not necessary). | 1 | 1 |
Destefano v. Grabriangreen2 sentences1995A. In Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo.1988) our supreme court held that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment was not implicated by a civil action against a priest for damages suffered as a result of the priest’s consensual sexual relationship with a parishioner, which commenced during the course of pastoral marriage counseling with both the parishioner and her husband. 1995We first reject the defendants' general assertion that, under the evidence presented here, any judgment against either of them would, in violation of the First Amendment, constitute an unlawful abridgement of their freedom of religion under the free exercise clause thereof or an improper intrusion into religious matters under its establishment clause, or both. *220 A. In Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo.1988) our supreme court held that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment was not implicated by a civil action against a priest for damages suffered as a result of the priest's | 1 | 1 |
Attorney General v. Desiletsgreen2 sentences1994See Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316 , 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994) (Statutory mandate that landlords cannot discriminate against cohabitating unmarried couples substantially burdened landlords' sincerely held religious belief protected by the Massachusetts state constitution. 1994See Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316 , 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994) (Statutory mandate that landlords cannot discriminate against cohabitating unmarried couples substantially burdened landlords' sincerely held religious belief protected by the Massachusetts state constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Young Life v. Division of Employment & Traninggreen1 sentence1989II, § 4. 22 In rejecting Young Life’s state constitutional argument, we stated that the Division’s decision does not violate the Article II, Section 4 proscription against “preference” for “any religious denomination or mode of worship.” Young Life is neither a denomination nor a mode of worship as those terms are used in the state constitution. 650 P.2d at 526 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Christofferson v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, ETC.green2 sentences1988"In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the *284 defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's distress was in fact `part of the belief and practices' of the religious group." Id. (citing Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 245 , 644 P.2d 577, 604 (1982). 1988"In the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the *284 defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's distress was in fact `part of the belief and practices' of the religious group." Id. (citing Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 245 , 644 P.2d 577, 604 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lorillard v. Pons
green
2 sentences1996Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 , 98 S.Ct. 866, 872 , 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). [7] Although the Geary court utilized the Establishment Clause "entanglement" mode of analysis, Geary is equally apposite under Free Exercise analysis because of its general determination that, under the Catholic Bishop test, an inquiry into whether a religious institution's asserted reasons for its discriminatory actions are pretextual does not present a significant risk of infringing First Amendment interests. [8] The majority cites numerous cases from jurisdictions outside of this state for the proposition that 1996Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 , 98 S.Ct. 866, 872 , 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). [7] Although the Geary court utilized the Establishment Clause "entanglement" mode of analysis, Geary is equally apposite under Free Exercise analysis because of its general determination that, under the Catholic Bishop test, an inquiry into whether a religious institution's asserted reasons for its discriminatory actions are pretextual does not present a significant risk of infringing First Amendment interests. [8] The majority cites numerous cases from jurisdictions outside of this state for the proposition that | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Johnson v. Chi Feng Su
green
2 sentences1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). 1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS's free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. [5] See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of *1141 religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Mesnick v. General Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). 1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS's free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. [5] See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of *1141 religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
New Medico Neurologic Center of Michigan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS’s free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. 5 See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). 1996I would hold that we need not decide whether the Smith standard applies because the UCRS's free exercise claim in this case does not even survive the less restrictive Sherbert balancing test. [5] See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Sherbert rather than Smith where there was no state interference with the free exercise of *1141 religious beliefs), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 , 112 S.Ct. 2965 , 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Harris v. Harris
green
2 sentences1995Harris v. Harris, 343 So.2d 762 (Miss.1977) (mother, who belonged to a fundamentalist sect which believed in snake handling, had a right to practice her faith and to indoctrinate her child in her religious beliefs so long as she had custody and there was no proof that child was exposed to risk of being bitten by a snake). 1995Harris v. Harris, 343 So.2d 762 (Miss.1977) (mother, who belonged to a fundamentalist sect which believed in snake handling, had a right to practice her faith and to indoctrinate her child in her religious beliefs so long as she had custody and there was no proof that child was exposed to risk of being bitten by a snake). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
green
2 sentences1993Similarly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), the Court invalidated an Arizona statute which imposed a dura-tional residency requirement as a condition to an indigent’s eligibility for nonemergen-cy hospitalization or medical care. 1993Similarly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), the Court invalidated an Arizona statute which imposed a dura-tional residency requirement as a condition to an indigent’s eligibility for nonemergen-cy hospitalization or medical care. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division
green
2 sentences1993For example, in rejecting Indiana’s defense of a welfare regulation which granted unemployment benefits only to those whose termination was for “good cause [arising] in connection with work,” against a free exercise challenge, the Court in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), concluded that “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief.... the infringement upon free exercise is ... substantial.” Id. at 717-18 , 1993For example, in rejecting Indiana’s defense of a welfare regulation which granted unemployment benefits only to those whose termination was for “good cause [arising] in connection with work,” against a free exercise challenge, the Court in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 , 101 S.Ct. 1425 , 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), concluded that “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief.... the infringement upon free exercise is ... substantial.” Id. at 717-18 , | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
green
2 sentences1980We recognize that a proper respect for the free exercise clause requires the state to pursue a course of neutrality toward religion, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 , 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), and that a statute which is neutral on its face, may in its application, offend the constitutional requirement of government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. 1980We recognize that a proper respect for the free exercise clause requires the state to pursue a course of neutrality toward religion, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 , 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), and that a statute which is neutral on its face, may in its application, offend the constitutional requirement of government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.