free exercise clause in Massachusetts

2025See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (stressing importance of parental rights "when linked to a free exercise claim").

2025See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-234 ("the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens").

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2004See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).

2016In the present appeal, the Magazus' free exercise claim focuses on the purported violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, amending art. 18 of the Amendments. 22 assess a claim that the Commonwealth has impermissibly burdened the free exercise of religion in violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments by using the balancing test articulated in Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321-323 .10 See Rasheed, supra; Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 669-670 (2004).

2015In making a free exercise claim, it is the plaintiff’s initial burden to demonstrate that the “right to freely exercise his religious beliefs has been burdened.” Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 472 (2006).

2002Prince v. Massachusetts, supra at 166 . “[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-234 (1972).

1991The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” Prince, supra at 166-167 . “[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra at 233-234 .

2016In Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321 , this court stated that it “should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the protections of art. 46, § 1, [of the Amendments] and should not necessarily follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the First Amendment.” This pronouncement arose as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), “a much criticized opinion that weakened First Amendment protections for religious conduct.” Desilets, supra. See Abdul-Alázim v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr

2016In the present appeal, the Magazus' free exercise claim focuses on the purported violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, amending art. 18 of the Amendments. 22 assess a claim that the Commonwealth has impermissibly burdened the free exercise of religion in violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments by using the balancing test articulated in Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321-323 .10 See Rasheed, supra; Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 669-670 (2004).

2016In Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321 , this court stated that it “should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the protections of art. 46, § 1, [of the Amendments] and should not necessarily follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the First Amendment.” This pronouncement arose as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), “a much criticized opinion that weakened First Amendment protections for religious conduct.” Desilets, supra. See Abdul-Alázim v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr

2016This balancing test requires that we determine whether the State action about which a party has complained (here, a 10 In Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321 , this court stated that it "should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the protections of art. 46, § 1, [of the Amendments] and should not necessarily follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the First Amendment." This pronouncement arose as a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), "a much criticized opinion that weake

2025The right to direct the religious upbringing of one's child is located both in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court"); Prince, supra (recognizing rights "of parents to give [children] religious training and to encourage them in the pract

2025Most relevant to the facts before us, "these fundamental principles do not warrant the view that parents have an absolute right to refuse medical treatment for their children on religious grounds." McCauley, 409 Mass. at 137 .

2025The right to direct the religious upbringing of one's child is located both in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court"); Prince, supra (recognizing rights "of parents to give [children] religious training and to encourage them in the pract

2025The right to direct the religious upbringing of one's child is located both in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court"); Prince, supra (recognizing rights "of parents to give [children] religious training and to encourage them in the pract

2025The right to direct the religious upbringing of one's child is located both in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[4] See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court"); Prince, supra (recognizing rights "of parents to give [children] religious training and to encourage them in the pract

2024Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (for members of the civilian population, wearing religious garb is protected by the free exercise clause).

2018See Locke v. Davey , 540 U.S. 712 , 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307 , 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004).

2018See Locke v. Davey , 540 U.S. 712 , 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307 , 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004).

2016In the present appeal, the Magazus' free exercise claim focuses on the purported violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, amending art. 18 of the Amendments. 22 assess a claim that the Commonwealth has impermissibly burdened the free exercise of religion in violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments by using the balancing test articulated in Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321-323 .10 See Rasheed, supra; Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 669-670 (2004).

2015The degree of burden necessary to trigger a further analysis of the judge’s justification for her decision must be “substantial.” Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 761 (1995).

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006The free exercise clause of the United States Constitution protects the “freedom to believe and freedom to act,” Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 375 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982), quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (citing practice of giving Muslim prisoners different meal whenever pork is served as example of how Muslim inmates could freely observe their religious obligations); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003) (prison not required to provide Muslim inmates with halal meat because vegetarian meals provided); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003) (jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of providing Muslim inmate with pork-free diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Ci

2006See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate”); United States v. Acevedo-Delgado, 167 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (D.

2004See Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505, 510-511 (2002), and cases cited; Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 579-580 (2002).

2004As another example of a highly fact-specific application of the balancing test under the free exercise clause, see Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1273-1276 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).