indemnification clause in Maryland

2019Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 349 Md. 299 , 307-10, 708 A.2d 298 (1998) ; Kreter v. HealthSTAR Communications, Inc. , 172 Md.

2015Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 349 Md. 299, 310 , 708 A.2d 298 (1998) (contract’s indemnification clause expressed in “unequivocal terms” the intent to indemnify a party for its own negligence); Kreter v. HealthSTAR Communications, Inc., 172 Md.App. 243 , 914 A.2d 168 (2007) (concluding that the presumption did not apply because it would belie the parties’ actual intent).

2019In accordance with that presumption, a court will not interpret an indemnification clause "to indemnify a person against his own negligence unless an intention so to do is expressed in those very words or in other unequivocal terms." Crockett v. Crothers , 264 Md. 222 , 227, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).

2019In accordance with that presumption, a court will not interpret an indemnification clause "to indemnify a person against his own negligence unless an intention so to do is expressed in those very words or in other unequivocal terms." Crockett v. Crothers , 264 Md. 222 , 227, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).

2018Id. at 5-6 , 761 A.2d 935 .

2018Id. at 5-6 , 761 A.2d 935 .

2013Thereafter, BJ’s filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 2-501 5 alleging that no factual matters were in dispute and that, pursuant to our decision in Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525 , 644 A.2d 522 (1994), the exculpatory clause was valid and barred the Rosens’ claims as a matter of law. 6 The Rosens filed an opposition, contending that, among other things, the exculpatory and indemnification clauses were unen forceable, because they violated Maryland’s public policy interest of protecting children.

2013Thereafter, BJ’s filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 2-501 5 alleging that no factual matters were in dispute and that, pursuant to our decision in Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525 , 644 A.2d 522 (1994), the exculpatory clause was valid and barred the Rosens’ claims as a matter of law. 6 The Rosens filed an opposition, contending that, among other things, the exculpatory and indemnification clauses were unen forceable, because they violated Maryland’s public policy interest of protecting children.

2014"Libel and slander are two branches” of the tort of defamation, Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 67 Md.App. 743, 752 , 509 A.2d 727 (1986), the difference being that, ordinarily, "slander refers to words which are spoken while libel refers to words which are written,” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 622 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982), although slander may also encompass the written word.

2014"Libel and slander are two branches” of the tort of defamation, Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 67 Md.App. 743, 752 , 509 A.2d 727 (1986), the difference being that, ordinarily, "slander refers to words which are spoken while libel refers to words which are written,” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 622 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982), although slander may also encompass the written word.

2014"Libel and slander are two branches” of the tort of defamation, Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 67 Md.App. 743, 752 , 509 A.2d 727 (1986), the difference being that, ordinarily, "slander refers to words which are spoken while libel refers to words which are written,” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 622 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982), although slander may also encompass the written word.

2014"Libel and slander are two branches” of the tort of defamation, Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 67 Md.App. 743, 752 , 509 A.2d 727 (1986), the difference being that, ordinarily, "slander refers to words which are spoken while libel refers to words which are written,” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 622 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982), although slander may also encompass the written word.

2012Moreover, in Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243-44 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007), the Court of Appeals observed that “if two or more similar and ‘inextricably intertwined’ grounds for summary judgment exist,” an appellate court “may consider alternatively any related ground, if raised properly by the litigant in his, her, or its motion for summary judgment, if we find fault with the ground relied upon facially by the trial court.” Thus, although, ordinarily, we “will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment,” Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10 , 816 A.2d 844 (

2012Moreover, in Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243-44 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007), the Court of Appeals observed that “if two or more similar and ‘inextricably intertwined’ grounds for summary judgment exist,” an appellate court “may consider alternatively any related ground, if raised properly by the litigant in his, her, or its motion for summary judgment, if we find fault with the ground relied upon facially by the trial court.” Thus, although, ordinarily, we “will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment,” Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10 , 816 A.2d 844 (

2012Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 257 , 686 A.2d 298 (1996), by “denying] an injured party the right to recover damages from the person negligently causing the injury,” Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 491 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), while an indemnification clause “attempts to shift responsibility for the payment of damages to someone other than the negligent party, usually back to the injured party,” thereby “producing the same result as an exculpatory clause.” Id.

2012Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 257 , 686 A.2d 298 (1996), by “denying] an injured party the right to recover damages from the person negligently causing the injury,” Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 491 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), while an indemnification clause “attempts to shift responsibility for the payment of damages to someone other than the negligent party, usually back to the injured party,” thereby “producing the same result as an exculpatory clause.” Id.

2012Moreover, in Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243-44 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007), the Court of Appeals observed that “if two or more similar and ‘inextricably intertwined’ grounds for summary judgment exist,” an appellate court “may consider alternatively any related ground, if raised properly by the litigant in his, her, or its motion for summary judgment, if we find fault with the ground relied upon facially by the trial court.” Thus, although, ordinarily, we “will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment,” Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10 , 816 A.2d 844 (

2012Moreover, in Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243-44 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007), the Court of Appeals observed that “if two or more similar and ‘inextricably intertwined’ grounds for summary judgment exist,” an appellate court “may consider alternatively any related ground, if raised properly by the litigant in his, her, or its motion for summary judgment, if we find fault with the ground relied upon facially by the trial court.” Thus, although, ordinarily, we “will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment,” Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10 , 816 A.2d 844 (

2012As previously noted, “[w]ere the rule otherwise, it would circumvent the rule regarding exculpatory clauses and the policy of affording protection in the law to the rights of those who are unable effectively to protect those rights themselves.” Childress v. Madison County, supra, 777 S.W.2d at 7 .

2012As the Supreme Court of Utah observed, an indemnification clause, by shifting financial responsibility for a minor child’s injury from a tortfeasor to the child’s parent, “allow[s] negligent parties to circumvent” the “rule voiding waivers signed on behalf of a minor.” Hawkins v. Peart, supra, 37 P.3d at 1067 .

2012Although an indemnification clause “theoretically” binds only the parent who signed it, “as a practical matter, it could chill,” that court observed, a child’s pursuit of his own claims against a negligent party, as his parent “would be the ultimate source of compensation.” Id. at 1067-68 .

2012Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 257 , 686 A.2d 298 (1996), by “denying] an injured party the right to recover damages from the person negligently causing the injury,” Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 491 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), while an indemnification clause “attempts to shift responsibility for the payment of damages to someone other than the negligent party, usually back to the injured party,” thereby “producing the same result as an exculpatory clause.” Id.

2012Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 257 , 686 A.2d 298 (1996), by “denying] an injured party the right to recover damages from the person negligently causing the injury,” Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 491 , 834 P.2d 6 (1992), while an indemnification clause “attempts to shift responsibility for the payment of damages to someone other than the negligent party, usually back to the injured party,” thereby “producing the same result as an exculpatory clause.” Id.

2008On the contrary, it is typical of those which contemplate reimbursement when the indemnitee is required to pay damages on a third-party claim"); Otis Elevator Co. v. Toda Constr., 27 Cal. App.4th 559 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 404, 406 (1994) (declining to adopt a broad reading of an indemnity provision that called for attorney's fees where "[t]he provision does not specifically state . . . that [the plaintiff] would be entitled to such fees in an action to enforce the indemnity provision of the subcontract"); Merrimack School Dist. v. *288 National School Bus Service, Inc., 140 N.H. 9 , 661 A.2d 1197,

2008On the contrary, it is typical of those which contemplate reimbursement when the indemnitee is required to pay damages on a third-party claim”); Otis Elevator Co. v. Toda Constr., 27 Cal.App.4th 559 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 404, 406 (1994) (declining to adopt a broad reading of an indemnity provision that called for attorney’s fees where “[t]he provision does not specifically state ... that [the plaintiff] would be entitled to such fees in an action to enforce the indemnity provision of the subcontract”); Merrimack School Dist. v. National School Bus Service, Inc., 140 N.H. 9 , 661 A.2d 1197, 1200-01

2008Rigger involved a ten-year lease executed in 1960 that included an indemnification clause whereby the tenant was required to indemnify the landlord for injuries sustained by third parties on the premises. 269 Md. at 307 , 305 A.2d at 129 .

2008Rigger involved a ten-year lease executed in 1960 that included an indemnification clause whereby the tenant was required to indemnify the landlord for injuries sustained by third parties on the premises. 269 Md. at 307 , 305 A.2d at 129 .

2008Stated otherwise, whether indemnification coverage extends to first party litigation expenses is a matter of contract interpretation. [6] The dissent relies solely on Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976), which held that a broad indemnification clause allows for recovery of attorney's fees in a first party indemnification action.

2008The dissent relies solely on Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976), which held that a broad indemnification clause allows for recovery of attorney’s fees in a first party indemnification action.

2007It reasoned that when the damage was caused by the negligence of the indemnitee, the indemnification clause should be construed “most strongly against the party whose language [limited the indemnitee’s liability], and whose situation places him, at least, in a position of equal advantage in fixing the terms of the contract.” Id. at 174 .

2007In a similar vein, Linda also argues that “the only determination arising out of the [Charles Kreter litigation] relevant to the present case is that HealthSTAR was found liable to Charlie Kreter for its sole conduct under a fraud claim.” She reasons that the basis of the court’s decision cannot be considered because she “was not a party to the underlying case and she never had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein.” She relies on Anne Arundel County Bd. of Ed. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106-07 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005); Lizzi v. Washington Metro.

2007In a similar vein, Linda also argues that “the only determination arising out of the [Charles Kreter litigation] relevant to the present case is that HealthSTAR was found liable to Charlie Kreter for its sole conduct under a fraud claim.” She reasons that the basis of the court’s decision cannot be considered because she “was not a party to the underlying case and she never had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein.” She relies on Anne Arundel County Bd. of Ed. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106-07 , 887 A.2d 1029 (2005); Lizzi v. Washington Metro.