indemnification clause in Illinois

1979The law applicable to the instant indemnification clause is that an indemnity clause will not indemnify against one’s own negligence unless such indemnification is expressed in clear and explicit language or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. 1 (Zadak v. Cannon (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 118 , 319 N.E.2d 469 ; Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp. (1946), 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 ; McGinn v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. (1978), 68 Ill.

1979The law applicable to the instant indemnification clause is that an indemnity clause will not indemnify against one’s own negligence unless such indemnification is expressed in clear and explicit language or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. 1 (Zadak v. Cannon (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 118 , 319 N.E.2d 469 ; Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp. (1946), 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 ; McGinn v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. (1978), 68 Ill.

2016The indemnification clause clearly states that IRCA will “defend, indemnify and save harmless” WVB “from any and all expense (including costs and attorneys fees) arising from any injury, death or damage which may be sustained, incurred or received by any person *** or property and which may directly or indirectly result from the following: *** Any act, omission, neglect or misconduct of [IRCA] or any employee or agent of [IRCA] in connection with the performance of any covenant, term or provision of this Agreement, irrespective of whether such loss, claim, liability, obligation, suit, action a

2016The indemnification clause clearly states that IRCA will “defend, indemnify and save harmless” WVB “from any and all expense (including costs and attorneys fees) arising from any injury, death or damage which may be sustained, incurred or received by any person *** or property and which may directly or indirectly result from the following: *** Any act, omission, neglect or misconduct of [IRCA] or any employee or agent of [IRCA] in connection with the performance of any covenant, term or provision of this Agreement, irrespective of whether such loss, claim, liability, obligation, suit, action a

2007If defendant has waived its Kotecki cap, then it has assumed tort liability that otherwise would have been imposed against [the general contractor].” (Emphasis omitted.) West Bend, 337 Ill.

2007If defendant has waived its Kotecki cap, then it has assumed tort liability that otherwise would have been imposed against [the general contractor].” (Emphasis omitted.) West Bend, 337 Ill.

2003Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill.App.3d at 911 , 255 Ill.Dec. 82 , 748 N.E.2d 786 .

2003Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill.

1975Piping’s position is that the indemnification clause indemnifies Ford from the effects of its own negligence, that Ford was negligent with regard to the operation of fork lift trucks in the vicinity of the scaffold, and that the Illinois Supreme Court’s rule in Tatar v. Maxon Construction Co. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 64 , 294 N.E.2d 272 , and Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe' Building Corp. (1947), 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 , should apply to these facts.

1975Piping’s position is that the indemnification clause indemnifies Ford from the effects of its own negligence, that Ford was negligent with regard to the operation of fork lift trucks in the vicinity of the scaffold, and that the Illinois Supreme Court’s rule in Tatar v. Maxon Construction Co. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 64 , 294 N.E.2d 272 , and Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe' Building Corp. (1947), 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 , should apply to these facts.

2021The indemnification clause offers Auto-Owners no relief. ¶ 36 Auto-Owners, as well as the dissent, relies on Hacker, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 388 , to support the assertion there is no duty to defend the Shecklers.

2020“Affirmative matter” includes “a defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.” McIntosh, 2019 IL 123626, ¶ 16 .

2020The trial court agreed with Tandem 1 Tectonic also commenced an action against Erickson. -3- 1-19-1663 and dismissed Tectonic’s amended complaint with prejudice. ¶ 10 ANALYSIS ¶ 11 Tectonic argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its breach of contract action under section 2-619(a)(9), finding that the Agreement’s exculpatory clause applied instead of the indemnification clause. ¶ 12 A trial court properly dismisses an action under section 2-619(a)(9) where “the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.”

2020The trial court’s failure to allow Cleveland to present the affirmative defense of indemnification was error and is the basis for a new trial. 28 ¶ 69 Accordingly, I agree that the judgment entered on the verdict must be vacated and that this case should be remanded for a new trial. 29 No. 5-17-0458 Cite as: Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Cleveland, 2020 IL App (5th) 170458 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St.

2013Id. at 1068 .

2013Id. at 312 .

2013Id. at 311-12 .

2012Id.

1994The indemnification clause in Shaheed required the subcontractor to provide insurance for any liability caused by the acts or omissions of the subcontractor or the concurrent negligence of the contractor. ( Shaheed, 137 Ill.App.3d at 364 , 92 Ill.Dec. at 36 , 484 N.E.2d at 551 .) The contract required the subcontractor to provide insurance to cover the indemnity clause.

1994The indemnification clause in Shaheed required the subcontractor to provide insurance for any liability caused by the acts or omissions of the subcontractor or the concurrent negligence of the contractor. ( Shaheed, 137 Ill.App.3d at 364 , 92 Ill.Dec. at 36 , 484 N.E.2d at 551 .) The contract required the subcontractor to provide insurance to cover the indemnity clause.

1988Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than in Taiwan or Japan.” 480 U.S. at 114 , 94 L.

1988Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than in Taiwan or Japan.” 480 U.S. at 114 , 94 L.

1988Anixter Brothers, Inc. v. Central Steel & Wire Co. (1984), 123 Ill.

1988(Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 344, 348-50 , 459 N.E.2d 935 .) An indemnification claim may be filed in a pending action by third-party complaint or as a separate action after the original action is over and a judgment has been entered against a party or the party has settled a claim made against him.

1988(Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 344, 348-50 , 459 N.E.2d 935 .) An indemnification claim may be filed in a pending action by third-party complaint or as a separate action after the original action is over and a judgment has been entered against a party or the party has settled a claim made against him.

1988(Mesker Brothers, 8 Ill.

1984Ed. 2d 169, 179 , 96 S. Ct. 229, 236 , specifically upheld the validity of such agreements, stating the indemnity clause was not violative of public policy: “We hold only that the presence in an equipment lease of an indemnification clause directed to the lessor’s negligence is not in conflict with the safety concerns of the Commission or with the regulations it has promulgated.” Therefore, rather than providing third-party plaintiffs with a cause of action for implied indemnity, the lease agreement empowers Chief to recover for any damages assessed against it because of the negligent acts of

1982On the authority of Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 494 , 336 N.E.2d 881 , the trial court recognized that a violation of the Structural Work Act was in essence a negligent act and therefore any contract providing for the indemnification of such violation was void pursuant to section 1.

1982On the authority of Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 494 , 336 N.E.2d 881 , the trial court recognized that a violation of the Structural Work Act was in essence a negligent act and therefore any contract providing for the indemnification of such violation was void pursuant to section 1.

1980Since the accident occurred before the decision in Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 41 , 374 N.E.2d 455 , the claim does not and cannot arise out of the buyer’s failure to install effective devices.

1980Since the accident occurred before the decision in Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 41 , 374 N.E.2d 455 , the claim does not and cannot arise out of the buyer’s failure to install effective devices.