indemnification clause in District of Columbia

2011Having concluded that the settlement agreement had preserved the manufacturer’s indemnification claim, we then held, by reference to strong public policy established in the case law, that this claim was freely assignable, and that assignment of that claim to the plaintiff pursuant to the settlement agreement was allowable — indeed, “wholly consistent with prior decisions of this court favoring a policy of free assignability of claims,” id. at 812 (citing Brandenburger & Davis, Inc. v. Estate of Lewis, 771 A.2d 984, 988 (D.C.2001)), unless the agreement “contains clear, unambiguous language pro

2007Id. at 803.

2007Because “the injured person is the very one for whose protection the rule against the assignment of tort claims was designed, it would be anomalous to invoke the rule to bar the assignment of an indemnification claim to that person.” Id.

2007Thus, the plaintiff had “had its opportunity under Rule 54 to prove its attorney’s fees at trial, and chose not to do so”; nor had it obtained “agree[ment of the parties] to litigate the matter of ... fees after the trial on the [underlying] claim”; and thus it “lost its opportunity to prove its entitlement to attorney’s fees.” Id.; *137 see also Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 415 F.3d 354, 359-61 (4th Cir.2005) (where seller’s “legal costs [were] recoverable as a remedy for the buyer’s failure ‘to accept all or any part of the ...

2007Co., 850 So.2d 24, 27-28 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2003) (construing similar language in an indemnity clause broadly against the subcontractor where two of the subcontractor’s employees were injured and had sued the contractor and subcontractor, finding the subcontractor hable for the contractor’s pre-suit costs of investigating the workplace accident, where the subcontractor had failed to participate in the investigation, and concluding that the subcontractor’s “liability ... attached at the inception of the workplace accident for all costs and expenses of [contractor’s] defense, which included the inv

2000See Rose, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 250 , 501 F.2d at 810 (noting that settling defendants "cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their [settlement] payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them").

2000See Rose, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 250 , 501 F.2d at 810 (noting that settling defendants “cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their [settlement] payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them”).

2000See Rose, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 250 , 501 F.2d at 810 (noting that settling defendants "cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their [settlement] payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them").

2000See Rose, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 250 , 501 F.2d at 810 (noting that settling defendants “cannot equitably insist on a continuing involvement in the litigation for the purpose of invoking contribution to lessen their [settlement] payment when they have no exposure to an increase in payment if contribution should be sought from them”).

1998Schlosser was closely followed by Grunley, supra, which involved an indemnification clause worded exactly the same as the-clause found in the N.P.P.-Canning contract.

1998Compare Grunley, supra, 676 A.2d at 478 , with note 6, supra. This court in Grunley concluded that the indemnification agreement signed by the parties in that case was “substantially identical” to the contract language in Schlosser, and that it was thus bound to hold that the agreement “was sufficiently comprehensive ... to include indemnification for damages resulting from the negligence of [the indemnitee].” 8 Grunley, supra, 676 A.2d at 478 .

1998We are unpersuaded by Canning’s invitation to distinguish this case from the cases analyzed above because Canning was an “innocent indemnitor.” As we have previously held, the indemnification clause agreed to by Canning is “so broad and sweeping” that it covers damages “incurred in whole or in part by the negligence of the indemnitee.” Schlosser, supra, 673 A.2d at 653 (quoting Moses-Ecco, supra, 115 U.S.App.

1998We are unpersuaded by Canning’s invitation to distinguish this case from the cases analyzed above because Canning was an “innocent indemnitor.” As we have previously held, the indemnification clause agreed to by Canning is “so broad and sweeping” that it covers damages “incurred in whole or in part by the negligence of the indemnitee.” Schlosser, supra, 673 A.2d at 653 (quoting Moses-Ecco, supra, 115 U.S.App.

1998See 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (“If the document is facially unambiguous, its language should be relied upon as providing the best objective manifestation of the parties’ intent.

1993Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 131 A.2d 877, 878 (D.C.1957), in which this court held that the indemnification clause in the contract between appellant and appellee was “so broad and comprehensive that although it contained no express stipulation indemnifying against [appellee’s] own negligence, it accomplishes the same purpose.” The clause in Princemont provided that Princemont would “assume all liability for *637 any and all loss and damage to property and claims for injury to or death of persons in connection with or growing out of the use of said premises.” Id. at 877 .

1993Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 131 A.2d 877, 878 (D.C.1957), in which this court held that the indemnification clause in the contract between appellant and appellee was “so broad and comprehensive that although it contained no express stipulation indemnifying against [appellee’s] own negligence, it accomplishes the same purpose.” The clause in Princemont provided that Princemont would “assume all liability for *637 any and all loss and damage to property and claims for injury to or death of persons in connection with or growing out of the use of said premises.” Id. at 877 .

1984See Missouri Pacific R.R. v. International Paper Co., 618 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir.1980); Seaboldt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 296, 298 (3d Cir.1961).

1984See Missouri Pacific R.R. v. International Paper Co., 618 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir.1980); Seaboldt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 296, 298 (3d Cir.1961).