indemnification clause in Texas

2012Moreover, in light of Texas’s history of enforcement of the waiver clause; TX C.C., Inc., 233 S.W.3d at 571 ; Walker Eng’g, Inc., 102 S.W.3d at 843-44 ; Trinity Universal Ins.

2012Moreover, in light of Texas’s history of enforcement of the waiver clause; TX C.C., Inc., 233 S.W.3d at 571 ; Walker Eng’g, Inc., 102 S.W.3d at 843-44 ; Trinity Universal Ins.

2012Moreover, in light of Texas’s history of enforcement of the waiver clause; TX C.C., Inc., 233 S.W.3d at 571 ; Walker Eng’g, Inc., 102 S.W.3d at 843-44 ; Trinity Universal Ins.

2012Moreover, in light of Texas’s history of enforcement of the waiver clause; TX C.C., Inc., 233 S.W.3d at 571 ; Walker Eng’g, Inc., 102 S.W.3d at 843-44 ; Trinity Universal Ins.

2010Id.

2010Id.

2008In Banner Sign & Barricade, Inc. v. Price Construction, Inc. , 94 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied), the San Antonio Court of Appeals applied an indemnification clause substantially similar to the one involved here.

2008The indemnification clause at issue there "cover[ed] all claims and injuries of any nature whatsoever 'arising in any manner, directly or indirectly, out of or in connection with or in the course of or incidental to, any of [Banner]'s work or operations hereunder or in connection herewith.'" Id.

1993We also agree with appellants that if they were seeking to recover for their own negligence, they would be barred by the express negligence rule because the indemnification clause does not meet the requirements set forth in Ethyl Corp., 725 S.W.2d 705 .

1988Id. at 707 .

2026The court disavowed the proposition that its reasoning implied that “the inclusion of the phrase ‘any and all’ within an indemnification clause is insufficient to indemnify an indemnitee for its own negligence.” Id.

2026Ultimately, the court in Buenz determined that “any and all claims” absent any limiting language led the court to conclude that the agreement “clearly and explicitly provides indemnification for [indemnitee’s] own negligence pursuant to the rest of the contract terms.” Id. at 318 . 19 Under Illinois law, the duty to defend is separate and distinct from the duty to indemnify, and the duty to defend is broader.

2022Hooper buttressed its holding that the indemnity/hold-harmless provisions did not embrace interparty fee claims by noting that several of the contract’s other provisions provided for matters such as notice that the claim was being made and an assumption of defense; Hooper concluded that these provisions would be surplusage if read to extend “the indemnification clause to require defendant to reimburse plaintiff for attorney’s fees in the breach[-]of[-]contract action against defendant.” Id.

2012In re Service Corp. Int’l, 355 S.W.3d at 661 . 5 The indemnification clause in Section 6 of the subcontract is not a general liability indemnification clause but expressly pertains to claims or losses incurred due to delay in Barker’s performance of the subcontract work as directed by HCB or in accordance with the subcontract’s terms due to inadequate staffing; delay in preparation, procurement or purchasing; correction of defective work; sub-subcontractor delay, labor issues, and insolvency.

2009Hall St., 128 S.Ct. at 1400 .

1986The “specific instrumentality” argument has often been asserted by indemnitees who rely on indemnity provisions with language not “clear and unequivocal.” For example, in Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,) aff'd., 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975) an indemnification clause stated that “Lessee assumes responsibility for all claims asserted by any person whatever growing out of the erection and maintenance, use or possession of said equipment, and agrees to hold the Company harmless from all such claims ...” (emphasis added). 511 S.W.2d at 340 .

1986The “specific instrumentality” argument has often been asserted by indemnitees who rely on indemnity provisions with language not “clear and unequivocal.” For example, in Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,) aff'd., 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975) an indemnification clause stated that “Lessee assumes responsibility for all claims asserted by any person whatever growing out of the erection and maintenance, use or possession of said equipment, and agrees to hold the Company harmless from all such claims ...” (emphasis added). 511 S.W.2d at 340 .

1986The “specific instrumentality” argument has often been asserted by indemnitees who rely on indemnity provisions with language not “clear and unequivocal.” For example, in Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,) aff'd., 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.1975) an indemnification clause stated that “Lessee assumes responsibility for all claims asserted by any person whatever growing out of the erection and maintenance, use or possession of said equipment, and agrees to hold the Company harmless from all such claims ...” (emphasis added). 511 S.W.2d at 340 .

1969In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 316 F.2d 287 (5th Civ.1963), the court, after reviewing this State’s prior decisions, allowed indemnification against damages caused by the indemnitee’s own negligence.

1969In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 316 F.2d 287 (5th Civ.1963), the court, after reviewing this State's prior decisions, allowed indemnification against damages caused by the indemnitee's own negligence.