indemnification claim in Connecticut

1999III "The element of an independent legal relationship for an indemnification claim may be based on a contractual relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant." Savino v. Christensen , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 371390 (April 17, 1998, Fracasse, J .), citing Burkert v. Petrol Plus Naugatuck Inc. , 216 Conn. 65 , 74 , 579 A.2d 26 (1990); Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 145 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989) (finding that an independent legal duty is an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of General Statutes § 31-284 ).

1999III "The element of an independent legal relationship for an indemnification claim may be based on a contractual relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant." Savino v. Christensen , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 371390 (April 17, 1998, Fracasse, J .), citing Burkert v. Petrol Plus Naugatuck Inc. , 216 Conn. 65 , 74 , 579 A.2d 26 (1990); Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 145 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989) (finding that an independent legal duty is an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of General Statutes § 31-284 ).

1997Smith. "[C]ontrary to the holding in Atkinson v. Berloni, supra, 23 Conn. App. 325 , a third party plaintiff, outside the context of workers' compensation law, need not establish the existence of CT Page 6488 an independent legal relationship between itself and the alleged indemnitor as a condition for recovery on the basis of a common law claim for indemnity." Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 701-02 , (1997).

1996This argument is belied by the fact that in Atkinson v. Berloni, Id., page 326 and Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138 , 141 (1989) the legal sufficiency of an indemnification claim was tested by the appellate courts after a trial court had ruled on a motion to strike, see also Waddicor v. Bozrah Light Power Co., 8 CSCR 407 (1993), Jones v. Bouriogiannis, 1994 CT Case Base 3938 (1994).

1996A similar situation was presented in Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 , 593 A.2d 524 , cert. granted, 220 Conn. 910 , 597 A.2d 335 (1991), to which the legislature responded with General Statutes § 52-598a .

1995Public Act 93-370, which had an effective date of October 1, 1993, provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 926 [statute of limitations] of the general statutes, an action for indemnification may be brought within three years from the date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement." Klotz relies on the case of Protter v. Brown Thompson Co. ; 25 Conn. App. 360 , cert. granted in part and later withdrawn, 220 Conn. 910 (1991); to assert that the indemnification claim is time barred.

1998Coca Cola asserts that in order to maintain an indemnification claim, Canteen must allege the four separate elements outlined in Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 698 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997): 1) that the other tortfeasor was negligent; 2) that the other tortfeasor's negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and injuries; 3) that the other tortfeasor was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the joint tortfeasor; and 4) that the joint tortfeasor did not know of such negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and could reasonably rely on the other tort

1998Coca Cola asserts that in order to maintain an indemnification claim, Canteen must allege the four separate elements outlined in Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 698 , 694 A.2d 788 (1997): 1) that the other tortfeasor was negligent; 2) that the other tortfeasor's negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and injuries; 3) that the other tortfeasor was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the joint tortfeasor; and 4) that the joint tortfeasor did not know of such negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and could reasonably rely on the other tort

1996A similar situation was presented in Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 , 593 A.2d 524 , cert. granted, 220 Conn. 910 , 597 A.2d 335 (1991), to which the legislature responded with General Statutes § 52-598a .

1995Public Act 93-370, which had an effective date of October 1, 1993, provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 926 [statute of limitations] of the general statutes, an action for indemnification may be brought within three years from the date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement." Klotz relies on the case of Protter v. Brown Thompson Co. ; 25 Conn. App. 360 , cert. granted in part and later withdrawn, 220 Conn. 910 (1991); to assert that the indemnification claim is time barred.

1996A similar situation was presented in Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 , 593 A.2d 524 , cert. granted, 220 Conn. 910 , 597 A.2d 335 (1991), to which the legislature responded with General Statutes § 52-598a .

1996It was to a similar situation presented in Protter v. Brown Thompson Co., 25 Conn. App. 360 , cert. granted, 220 Conn. 910 , 597 A.2d 335 (1991), to which the legislature responded with General Statutes § 52-598a .

2002In Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc ., 247 Conn. 342 (1998), the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that an indemnification clause in an automobile lease agreement was not unconscionable, per se .

2002In support of its claim, MBCC cites to the cases of Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. , 247 Conn. 342 , 721 A.2d 1187 (1998) and Burkle v. Car Truck Leasing Co. , 1 Conn. App. 54 , 467 A.2d 1255 (1983).

1996King Co., 32 Conn. Sup. 210 , 214 , 347 A.2d 20 (Super.Ct. 1975) (exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an indemnification claim by the manufacturer of allegedly defective bracket where the employer allegedly supplied the steel used in manufacturing the bracket, creating "an entirely independent and separate duty").

1996King Co., 32 Conn. Sup. 210 , 214 , 347 A.2d 20 (Super.Ct. 1975) (exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an indemnification claim by the manufacturer of allegedly defective CT Page 8894 bracket where the employer allegedly supplied the steel used in manufacturing the bracket, creating "an entirely independent and separate duty").

1996King Co., 32 Conn. Sup. 210 , 214 , 347 A.2d 20 (Super.Ct. 1975) (exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an indemnification claim by the manufacturer of allegedly defective bracket where the employer allegedly supplied the steel used in manufacturing the bracket, creating "an entirely independent and separate duty").

1996King Co., 32 Conn. Sup. 210 , 214 , 347 A.2d 20 (Super.Ct. 1975) (exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act did not bar an indemnification claim by the manufacturer of allegedly defective CT Page 8894 bracket where the employer allegedly supplied the steel used in manufacturing the bracket, creating "an entirely independent and separate duty").

2017The trial court then ordered "that there be a trial on the indemnification claim of the second count of the complaint sounding in negligence ...." Id., at 305 , 365 A.2d 1180 .

2017The trial court then ordered "that there be a trial on the indemnification claim of the second count of the complaint sounding in negligence ...." Id., at 305 , 365 A.2d 1180 .

2016Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435, 438 , 528 A.2d 364 (1987) (‘‘any municipal liability which may attach is predicated on prior findings of individual negligence on the part of the employee and the municipality’s employment relationship with that individual’’).

2016Wu v. Fairfield, 204 Conn. 435, 438 , 528 A.2d 364 (1987) (‘‘any municipal liability which may attach is predicated on prior findings of individual negligence on the part of the employee and the municipality’s employment relationship with that individual’’).

2015Appx. 65 (2d Cir. 2012), Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 282 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (laches unavailable because ‘‘the plaintiff’s complaint was one for the collection of payment due on a promissory note, which is an action at law’’ and request in complaint for ‘‘ ‘[s]uch other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper’ is not a specific demand for equitable relief’’), John H.

2015Appx. 65 (2d Cir. 2012), Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 282 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (laches unavailable because ‘‘the plaintiff’s complaint was one for the collection of payment due on a promissory note, which is an action at law’’ and request in complaint for ‘‘ ‘[s]uch other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper’ is not a specific demand for equitable relief’’), John H.

2015Before turning to the relevant facts, as set forth in the trial court’s memorandum of decision, and procedural history underlying this appeal, we first recount the facts as set forth in our decision in Socci v. Pasiak, supra, 137 Conn. App. 562 , the underlying tort action that gave rise to this insurance coverage dispute.

2015Conn. 2011) (laches not available defense to indemnification claim because plaintiff filed action ‘‘within the relevant four-year statute of limitation to enforce an indemnification clause in a lease agreement’’ and ‘‘[t]he [c]ourt is not persuaded that there is anything exceptional about this case that would permit [the defendant] to assert laches as a defense’’), aff’d, 469 Fed.

2009Moreover, to conclude that a plaintiff must always name a municipal employee as a defendant and then plead a separate indemnification claim under § 7-465 (a), would be inconsistent with our long-standing body of case law that “repeatedly has eschewed applying the law in such a hypertechnicai manner so as to elevate form over substance.” 27 Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 34 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004); see also Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 66 Conn. App. 279, 285-86 , 784 A.2d 383 (2001) (emphasizing that interpretation of Genera

2009Moreover, to conclude that a plaintiff must always name a municipal employee as a defendant and then plead a separate indemnification claim under § 7-465 (a), would be inconsistent with our long-standing body of case law that “repeatedly has eschewed applying the law in such a hypertechnicai manner so as to elevate form over substance.” 27 Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 34 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004); see also Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 66 Conn. App. 279, 285-86 , 784 A.2d 383 (2001) (emphasizing that interpretation of Genera

2007The court determined that, under the Appellate Court’s decision in McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 486 , 890 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 798 (2006), the claim of indemnification must fail because the plaintiff, having purchased the property “as is,” could not prove that the defendant had caused its injury, a point that the plaintiff conceded at oral argument to the trial court concerning the motion for *544 summary judgment.

2007The court determined that, under the Appellate Court’s decision in McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 486 , 890 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 798 (2006), the claim of indemnification must fail because the plaintiff, having purchased the property “as is,” could not prove that the defendant had caused its injury, a point that the plaintiff conceded at oral argument to the trial court concerning the motion for *544 summary judgment.

2007The court determined that, under the Appellate Court’s decision in McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 486 , 890 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 798 (2006), the claim of indemnification must fail because the plaintiff, having purchased the property “as is,” could not prove that the defendant had caused its injury, a point that the plaintiff conceded at oral argument to the trial court concerning the motion for *544 summary judgment.

2007The court determined that, under the Appellate Court’s decision in McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 486 , 890 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928 , 895 A.2d 798 (2006), the claim of indemnification must fail because the plaintiff, having purchased the property “as is,” could not prove that the defendant had caused its injury, a point that the plaintiff conceded at oral argument to the trial court concerning the motion for *544 summary judgment.

2002In support of its claim, MBCC cites to the cases of Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. , 247 Conn. 342 , 721 A.2d 1187 (1998) and Burkle v. Car Truck Leasing Co. , 1 Conn. App. 54 , 467 A.2d 1255 (1983).

2002In support of its claim, MBCC cites to the cases of Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc. , 247 Conn. 342 , 721 A.2d 1187 (1998) and Burkle v. Car Truck Leasing Co. , 1 Conn. App. 54 , 467 A.2d 1255 (1983).

2002Stat. § 38a-321 provides an appropriate procedure for an insurance company to defend against an indemnification claim that procedure does not address the duty to defend." State Farm Fire Casualty v. Bullock , supra. (Blue opinion).

2001Partnership v. Beacon Industries, Inc ., 239 Conn. 284 , 306 , 685 A.2d 305 (1996). "[A]llegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morel v. Unicco Service Co ., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 307697 (December 4, 1995, Maiocco, J .).

2001Partnership v. Beacon Industries, Inc ., 239 Conn. 284 , 306 , 685 A.2d 305 (1996). "[A]llegations of contractual indemnification must be supported by the terms of the contract or the contract itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morel v. Unicco Service Co ., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 307697 (December 4, 1995, Maiocco, J .).

2001With respect to property claims only, the contract provides that indemnity is "against any and all loss." In that event, "[s]ection 52-598 expressly provides that a cause of action for indemnity does not arise until the determination of the underlying action against the party seeking indemnification." Sivilla v. Philips Medical Systems of N. Am., Inc ., 46 Conn. App. 699 , 711 (1997) There is no dispute that lawsuits filed against Amoco by parties seeking damages arising out of leakage from the subject tank have not been settled or reduced to judgment.

2001Consequently, this court finds that the plaintiffs' fourth count is premised upon the stricken common law negligence cause of action asserted in count one, "and since the indemnification sought in count [four] under § 7-465 is to be derived from that stricken count, such cause of action is unsupported and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Peters v. Town of Greenwich, supra, 28 Conn. L.

2001Consequently, this court finds that the plaintiffs' fourth count is premised upon the stricken common law negligence cause of action asserted in count one, "and since the indemnification sought in count [four] under § 7-465 is to be derived from that stricken count, such cause of action is unsupported and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Peters v. Town of Greenwich, supra, 28 Conn. L.