12 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Management, Inc.green2 sentences2025“In the defensive use of claim preclusion, the status test for privity is broadly applied if the party against whom claim preclusion is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.” Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc., 595 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Iowa 1999). 2021When, as here, a party invokes claim preclusion as a defense, we apply a broader status test to determine “if the party against whom claim preclusion is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.” Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc., 595 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Iowa 1999). | 3 | 4 |
Goolsby v. Derbygreen2 sentences1998A “privy” for purposes of this doctrine is “ ‘one who, after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase.’ ” Id. (quoting Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Iowa 1971)). 1998This status test is not required where issue preclusion is invoked defensively if the party against whom the issue preclusion is invoked was “ ‘so connected in interest ■with one of the parties in the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant claim or issue and be properly bound by its resolution.’ ” Id. (quoting Opheim v. American Interinsurance Exch., 430 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Opheim v. American Interinsurance Exchangegreen2 sentences1998This status test is not required where issue preclusion is invoked defensively if the party against whom the issue preclusion is invoked was “ ‘so connected in interest ■with one of the parties in the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant claim or issue and be properly bound by its resolution.’ ” Id. (quoting Opheim v. American Interinsurance Exch., 430 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1988)). 1997Neither mutuality of the parties nor privity is required where issue preclusion is applied defensively if the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked was “so connected in interest with one of the parties in the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant claim or issue and be properly bound by its resolution.” Brown, 558 N.W.2d at 163 -64 (quoting Opheim v. American Interinsurance Exch., 430 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Kassoufgreen2 sentences1998Additionally, a status test must also be met— there must be mutuality of parties (the parties must be the same) or there must be privity “between the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked and the party against whom the issue was decided in the first litigation.” Brown, 558 N.W.2d at 163 . 1997There is ordinarily a status test to be met before applying these four requirements: “the parties in both actions must be the same,” or “there must be privity between the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked and the party against whom the issue was decided in the first litigation.” Brown v. Kassouf, 558 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 1997) (citing Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 123 ). | 1 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2024Knowingly introduces contraband into, or onto, the grounds of a . . . jail, . . . .” Iowa Code § 719.7 (3)(a). 3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 5 Two weeks later, Borchers appeared for a status hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Estin v. Estingreen2 sentences2001The greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic violence, as opposed to the “ ‘considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring in marriages from being [illegitimate]’ ” in dissolution proceedings, see Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 , 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1567 (1948)), makes application of the status exception to protective orders even more compelling than in dissolution actions. 2001The greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic violence, as opposed to the “ ‘considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring in marriages from being [illegitimate]’ ” in dissolution proceedings, see Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 , 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1567 (1948)), makes application of the status exception to protective orders even more compelling than in dissolution actions. | 1 | 1 |
Penn v. Iowa State Board of Regentsgreen2 sentences1999Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998). 1999Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998). | 1 | 1 |
McNider v. Fishergreen1 sentence1967See McNider v. Fisher, 197 Iowa 523, 525-528 , 197 N.W. 647 ; Brossard v. Chicago, M. & St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Bruce G. Thomas
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 294 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re the Marriage of Kimura
green
2 sentences2001The greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic violence, as opposed to the “ ‘considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring in marriages from being [illegitimate]’ ” in dissolution proceedings, see Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 , 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1567 (1948)), makes application of the status exception to protective orders even more compelling than in dissolution actions. 2001The greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic violence, as opposed to the " `considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring in marriages from being [illegitimate]' " in dissolution proceedings, see Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 , 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 , 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1567 (1948)), makes application of the status exception to protective orders even more compelling than in dissolution actions. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hunter v. City of Des Moines
green
1 sentence1997There is ordinarily a status test to be met before applying these four requirements: “the parties in both actions must be the same,” or “there must be privity between the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked and the party against whom the issue was decided in the first litigation.” Brown v. Kassouf, 558 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 1997) (citing Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 123 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kostal v. Stoner
green
1 sentence1979Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.