status hearing in Georgia

2025“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume that the probate court’s actions would be supported by the record.” Burkett v. Estate of Burkett, 248 Ga. App. 719, 720 ( 548 SE2d 628 ) (2001) (footnote omitted). 2 order to the Superior Court of Fulton County.

2025“In the absence of a transcript, we must assume that the probate court’s actions would be supported by the record.” Burkett v. Estate of Burkett, 248 Ga. App. 719, 720 ( 548 SE2d 628 ) (2001) (footnote omitted). 2 order to the Superior Court of Fulton County.

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2021Wife did receive notice of a status hearing, but this was insufficient notice that the 4 Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2) ( 437 SE2d 457 ) (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 See Wright, 270 Ga. at 230-231 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calender); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845 ) (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, “notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divo

2020The appellants “ask this court to do what it is not authorized to do: to render an advisory opinion on hypothetical and legal questions that have not arisen but which appellants fear may arise at a future date.” Cheeks v. Miller, 262 Ga. 687, 689 ( 425 SE2d 278 ) (1993). 2.

2020The appellants “ask this court to do what it is not authorized to do: to render an advisory opinion on hypothetical and legal questions that have not arisen but which appellants fear may arise at a future date.” Cheeks v. Miller, 262 Ga. 687, 689 ( 425 SE2d 278 ) (1993). 2.

2020See Scruggs, 261 Ga. at 588-589 (1).

2019See Landrigan, 550 U. S. at 479 (III) (B) (2) (stating that the Supreme Court had “never required a specific colloquy to ensure that a defendant knowingly and intelligently refused to present mitigating evidence”).

2019The trial court asked Stinson if he wanted the court to delay the trial until the subpoena challenge could be resolved, and Stinson responded, “Yes, sir.” Thus, even if Person improperly requested a continuance in Stinson’s brief 59 See Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 205-206 (2) (b); Smith, 259 Ga. App. at 739 (3). 60 See Williams, 277 Ga. at 857 (6). 35 absence on August 10, Stinson rendered any error harmless when he requested and obtained a further continuance nine days later.61 Finally, although Stinson contends that Person was ineffective for failing to advise him that the August 2015 requests for

2019The trial court asked Stinson if he wanted the court to delay the trial until the subpoena challenge could be resolved, and Stinson responded, “Yes, sir.” Thus, even if Person improperly requested a continuance in Stinson’s brief 59 See Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 205-206 (2) (b); Smith, 259 Ga. App. at 739 (3). 60 See Williams, 277 Ga. at 857 (6). 35 absence on August 10, Stinson rendered any error harmless when he requested and obtained a further continuance nine days later.61 Finally, although Stinson contends that Person was ineffective for failing to advise him that the August 2015 requests for

2019The trial court asked Stinson if he wanted the court to delay the trial until the subpoena challenge could be resolved, and Stinson responded, “Yes, sir.” Thus, even if Person improperly requested a continuance in Stinson’s brief 59 See Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 205-206 (2) (b); Smith, 259 Ga. App. at 739 (3). 60 See Williams, 277 Ga. at 857 (6). 35 absence on August 10, Stinson rendered any error harmless when he requested and obtained a further continuance nine days later.61 Finally, although Stinson contends that Person was ineffective for failing to advise him that the August 2015 requests for

2013The trial court also considered the letter written by Hannah from the jail instructing his co-defendant, “don’t take no pleas,” and concluded that Hannah “had no intention of accepting any plea offer and would not plead guilty regardless of any sentencing offer.” 3 Hannah points to a colloquy between the court and prosecutor at a status hearing on October 10, 2011, in which he claims “the State announced that there was no plea offer.” But a review of the relevant transcript shows that the prosecutor, in response to the trial court’s question as to whether an offer had been made, responded, “I

2013The trial court also considered the letter written by Hannah from the jail instructing his co-defendant, “don’t take no pleas,” and concluded that Hannah “had no intention of accepting any plea offer and would not plead guilty regardless of any sentencing offer.” 3 Hannah points to a colloquy between the court and prosecutor at a status hearing on October 10, 2011, in which he claims “the State announced that there was no plea offer.” But a review of the relevant transcript shows that the prosecutor, in response to the trial court’s question as to whether an offer had been made, responded, “I

1983Pate swore that Sprinkler promptly and timely reported the claim made against it by Georgia-Pacific for the collapse of the pump house, and that he reported the claim to Great Southwest; that he had on several *105 occasions discussed the status of this claim with representatives of Great Southwest; that he personally informed Tom Cobb, claims manager for Great Southwest, that Sprinkler was being “greatly pressured” by Georgia-Pacific to restore the pump house and that Great Southwest was “severely jeopardizing” Sprinkler’s business relationship with Georgia-Pacific, a major client; that he pe

1983Pate swore that Sprinkler promptly and timely reported the claim made against it by Georgia-Pacific for the collapse of the pump house, and that he reported the claim to Great Southwest; that he had on several *105 occasions discussed the status of this claim with representatives of Great Southwest; that he personally informed Tom Cobb, claims manager for Great Southwest, that Sprinkler was being “greatly pressured” by Georgia-Pacific to restore the pump house and that Great Southwest was “severely jeopardizing” Sprinkler’s business relationship with Georgia-Pacific, a major client; that he pe

1980Compare, In the Matter of Langley, 246 Ga. 162 ( 269 SE2d 860 ) (1980) (voluntary suspension for wilful abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44, and failure to refund a fee, Standard 23); In the Matter of Bronson, 246 Ga. 136 ( 269 SE2d 27 ) (1980) (public reprimand for wilful abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44, and failure to notify client of dismissal of an action, Standard 4); In the Matter of Cooley, 246 Ga. 137 ( 268 SE2d 927 ) (1980) (voluntary suspension for abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44); In the Matter of Otonicar, 244 Ga. 674 ( 261 SE2d 399 ) (1979) (public rep

1980Compare, In the Matter of Langley, 246 Ga. 162 ( 269 SE2d 860 ) (1980) (voluntary suspension for wilful abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44, and failure to refund a fee, Standard 23); In the Matter of Bronson, 246 Ga. 136 ( 269 SE2d 27 ) (1980) (public reprimand for wilful abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44, and failure to notify client of dismissal of an action, Standard 4); In the Matter of Cooley, 246 Ga. 137 ( 268 SE2d 927 ) (1980) (voluntary suspension for abandonment of a legal matter, Standard 44); In the Matter of Otonicar, 244 Ga. 674 ( 261 SE2d 399 ) (1979) (public rep