status hearing in District of Columbia

2007At a status hearing held on October 3, 2002, the trial judge asked Veney’s counsel, in open court and in Veney’s presence, whether “they had made any effort [to get] independent [DNA] testing[.]” *457 Appellant’s case had been joined with Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922 (D.C.2007), in February 2002 for purposes of Frye litigation, 11 which lasted until February 2003.

2007At a status hearing held on October 3, 2002, the trial judge asked Veney’s counsel, in open court and in Veney’s presence, whether “they had made any effort [to get] independent [DNA] testing[.]” Appellant’s case had been joined with Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922 (D.C.2007), in February 2002 for purposes of Frye litigation, 11 which lasted until February 2003.

2023In its order, the trial court found that Ms. Tesema’s “counsel’s questions were relevant and sought the discovery of nonprivileged information relating to [Ms. Wendemu’s] affirmative defenses.” The court explained that questions seeking “legal conclusion[s] are not appropriate but questions seeking to elicit the factual basis for positions that may be taken during the trial are appropriate.” The court denied the sanctions without prejudice because the motion lacked “an accounting of its request for attorneys’ fees in conjunction with the Laffey Matrix” and a “description of the tasks undertake

2023In its order, the trial court found that Ms. Tesema’s “counsel’s questions were relevant and sought the discovery of nonprivileged information relating to [Ms. Wendemu’s] affirmative defenses.” The court explained that questions seeking “legal conclusion[s] are not appropriate but questions seeking to elicit the factual basis for positions that may be taken during the trial are appropriate.” The court denied the sanctions without prejudice because the motion lacked “an accounting of its request for attorneys’ fees in conjunction with the Laffey Matrix” and a “description of the tasks undertake

2013Id. at 1241 .

2013In response to the letter, appellant filed a motion for the trial court to grant a mistrial, or in the alternative, allow an investigation and hold an evidentiary hearing in response to Juror 237’s allegation that several fellow jurors felt that “all ‘blacks’ are guilty regardless.” The judge denied both requests on the record, emphasizing that as established by Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974 (D.C.1979), post-verdict challenges by jurors are generally not permitted.

2007On appeal, Jackson claims that the trial court’s admission of certified copies of the docket entries and the Notice to Return to Court contained in the District of Columbia Superior Court records violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 We conclude that these items did not constitute “testimonial” statements within the purview of the Confrontation Clause, and accordingly we affirm.

2007On appeal, Jackson claims that the trial court’s admission of certified copies of the docket entries and the Notice to Return to Court contained in the District of Columbia Superior Court records violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 We conclude that these items did not constitute “testimonial” statements within the purview of the Confrontation Clause, and accordingly we affirm.

2006Id.

2006Id.

1997In Johnson, supra, appellant's counsel failed to appear at a status hearing because of "an error in his own office”: a praecipe regarding the status conference had been received but was misfiled. 640 A.2d at 709 . 5 .

1997The government argues that under Patton v. United States, 326 A.2d 818 (D.C.1974), fear of coming to court is not a legal defense to failure to appear in court and thus is irrelevant to the BRA charge.

1997Because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal standard to the issue before us, we could theoretically limit our mandate to a remand with directions to exercise her discretion in conformity with the correct standard, as specified in Reid, supra, and as directed in Johnson, supra. We decline to do so, however, because we discern nothing in the record warranting the drastic remedy of dismissal, even without prejudice.

1997Nor is there any indication in the record that the trial court determined, in July 1993, that Mr. Pan-ici’s failure to appear was an act of “willful and deliberate delay” and that appellees were “prejudiced by [Mr. Panici’s] delay.” Id.

1995In Babcock v. Maple Leaf, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 428 (E.D.Tenn.1976), the court contemplated whether the federal government should be joined in an action, and decided to first invite the government to join, before ruling on the government’s status as a rule 19 party: In the instant case it would appear that the interests of all parties, including the interests of judicial economy, would be best served by a joinder of the Government. ...

1995In Babcock v. Maple Leaf, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 428 (E.D.Tenn.1976), the court contemplated whether the federal government should be joined in an action, and decided to first invite the government to join, before ruling on the government's status as a rule 19 party: *1225 In the instant case it would appear that the interests of all parties, including the interests of judicial economy, would be best served by a joinder of the Government....

1981Nor does appellant challenge that delay as violative of his due process rights. [28] A delay of more than one year suffices to establish a prima facie speedy trial claim, see, e. g., Branch v. United States, D.C.App., 372 A.2d 998 (1977). [29] Although both sides cite September 10, 1973 as the date that appellant's first trial commenced, the docket entries indicate it was only a status hearing that was held on that date, followed by various pretrial motions which were disposed of on September 19 and 20.