status exception in Alabama

2009The Kirkland case, supra [ 233 Ala. 404 , 171 So. at 736 ], recognized such a status to be an exception to the general rule where it was observed: “'The complaint does not charge that defendant manufactured or sacked this flour; nor that the poison found its way into the flour while in defendant’s possession; nor that anything on the sack, nor the source from which it came, gave notiee to the retailer, or put him on inquiry touching its fitness for human consumption.

2009The Kirkland case, supra [ 233 Ala. 404 , 171 So. at 736 ], recognized such a status to be an exception to the general rule where it was observed: “'The complaint does not charge that defendant manufactured or sacked this flour; nor that the poison found its way into the flour while in defendant’s possession; nor that anything on the sack, nor the source from which it came, gave notiee to the retailer, or put him on inquiry touching its fitness for human consumption.

2010The Court of Civil Appeals recently summarized the current status of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Alabama: "In 2003, our Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's decision *245 in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), regarding the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2010The Court of Civil Appeals recently summarized the current status of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Alabama: "In 2003, our Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's decision *245 in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 , 121 S.Ct. 1808 , 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), regarding the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

2009For aught appearing, this was an ordinary sack of flour, put up by reliable millers, to be sold by the retailer intact, for the convenience of both merchant and customer.’ “And again: “Tn the absence of some averment disclosing that the poison found its way into the sack of flour here involved while under the control of the retailer, or some fact charging him with lack of care in selecting and selling that particular flour, the complaint was subject to demurrer.’ ” Bradford, 268 Ala. at 219-20 , 105 So.2d at 827-28 .

2009For aught appearing, this was an ordinary sack of flour, put up by reliable millers, to be sold by the retailer intact, for the convenience of both merchant and customer.’ “And again: “Tn the absence of some averment disclosing that the poison found its way into the sack of flour here involved while under the control of the retailer, or some fact charging him with lack of care in selecting and selling that particular flour, the complaint was subject to demurrer.’ ” Bradford, 268 Ala. at 219-20 , 105 So.2d at 827-28 .

2005Second, such proceedings are `analogous to [a] court's termination of the marriage relationship between a husband and wife,' In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d at 319 , and the Supreme Court has determined that the status exception applies to divorce proceedings, see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Traynor, supra, at 660-61); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35 .

2005Second, such proceedings are `analogous to [a] court's termination of the marriage relationship between a husband and wife,' In re Interest of M.L.K., 768 P.2d at 319 , and the Supreme Court has determined that the status exception applies to divorce proceedings, see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208 n. 30, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (citing Traynor, supra, at 660-61); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35 .

2005Explaining its reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The United States Supreme Court has explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where that defendant has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2005Explaining its reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The United States Supreme Court has explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where that defendant has `certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2005"The Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of the status exception in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

2005"The Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of the status exception in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

2005W.A., 63 P.3d 607 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court held that the status exception to the minimum-contacts requirement applied to a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.

2005App.1999), our research reveals only two cases that have declined to extend the status exception to parental termination proceedings: In re Doe, 83 Hawai`i 367, 926 P.2d 1290, 1299 (1996), and In re Vernon R.V., 128 N.M. 242 , 991 P.2d 986, 988 ([N.M.Ct.App.1999])." 63 P.3d at 613-15 .

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people 'to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White , 169

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people 'to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White , 169

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people 'to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White , 169

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people `to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White, 169

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people 'to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White , 169

1996Furthermore, society has an interest, which this state has elevated to the status of a privilege in the case of a patient and psychiatrist or psychologist and which a general rule of confidentiality will further, in encouraging people to seek counseling in times of emotional distress and encouraging those people `to make full disclosure to a physician [or other mental health professional] in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from [access to] a doctor's [or other mental health professional's records].' State v. White, 169

1935That was the status and defense in Wells v. Sheerer, supra. We think it supports the ruling as originally made by the court, and not that which sustained the motion for a new trial.

1914Gordon to the Bank of Hayneville, so as to subject the status to the doctrine of Lamkin v. Lovell, 176 Ala. 331 , 58 South. 258 , based upon the finding of fact in that- instance that Harris was the merely agreed conduit through which, by previous understanding, the mortgage, conveying the wife’s property, passed to Knight, Yancey & Co., the husband’s creditor by previously and then existing obligation as for the husband’s indebtedness to the company.