status rule in California

1945(Tucker v. City of San Francisco (1931), 111 Cal.App. 720, 726 [296 P. '101]; Jenkins v. National Paint & Varnish Co. (1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 161, 169 [61 P.2d 780]; People v. Kazatsky (1936), 18 Cal.App.2d 105, 110 [ 63 P.2d 299 ], See, also, Robbiano v. Bovet (1933), 218 Cal. 589, 597, 599 [ 24 P.2d 466 ].) We are of the opinion that in this state this quotation from 31 C.J.S. 728 aptly describes the status of the rule we have been discussing: ‘ ... it has been broadly asserted in many decisions that inferences cannot be founded on inferences.

1945(Tucker v. City of San Francisco (1931), 111 Cal.App. 720, 726 [296 P. '101]; Jenkins v. National Paint & Varnish Co. (1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 161, 169 [61 P.2d 780]; People v. Kazatsky (1936), 18 Cal.App.2d 105, 110 [ 63 P.2d 299 ], See, also, Robbiano v. Bovet (1933), 218 Cal. 589, 597, 599 [ 24 P.2d 466 ].) We are of the opinion that in this state this quotation from 31 C.J.S. 728 aptly describes the status of the rule we have been discussing: ‘ ... it has been broadly asserted in many decisions that inferences cannot be founded on inferences.

2017(Conc. & dis. opn., post , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d at 237, 401 P.3d at 72.) Our answer is rooted firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts' obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated Home Builders , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ) and to narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 696, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ). 19 Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the California Constitution, and the status o

2017(Conc. & dis. opn., post , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d at 237, 401 P.3d at 72.) Our answer is rooted firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts' obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated Home Builders , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ) and to narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 696, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ). 19 Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the California Constitution, and the status o

2017(Conc. & dis. opn., post , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d at 237, 401 P.3d at 72.) Our answer is rooted firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts' obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated Home Builders , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ) and to narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 696, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ). 19 Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the California Constitution, and the status o

2017(Conc. & dis. opn., post , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d at 237, 401 P.3d at 72.) Our answer is rooted firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts' obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated Home Builders , supra , 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 ) and to narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 696, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 , 889 P.2d 557 ). 19 Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the California Constitution, and the status o

2016B "A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 (Lynch).) However, " 'the right of self- representation is not absolute.' " (Ibid.) "[A] self-representation motion may be denied if untimely." (Id. at p. 722.) Courts have held requests to waive counsel made on the day of trial, or even days before trial, are untimely. ( Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp.

2016B "A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 (Lynch).) However, " 'the right of self- representation is not absolute.' " (Ibid.) "[A] self-representation motion may be denied if untimely." (Id. at p. 722.) Courts have held requests to waive counsel made on the day of trial, or even days before trial, are untimely. ( Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp.

2016B "A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 (Lynch).) However, " 'the right of self- representation is not absolute.' " (Ibid.) "[A] self-representation motion may be denied if untimely." (Id. at p. 722.) Courts have held requests to waive counsel made on the day of trial, or even days before trial, are untimely. ( Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp.

2016B "A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 (Lynch).) However, " 'the right of self- representation is not absolute.' " (Ibid.) "[A] self-representation motion may be denied if untimely." (Id. at p. 722.) Courts have held requests to waive counsel made on the day of trial, or even days before trial, are untimely. ( Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp.

2013Appeals Bd. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 246, 250-251 (Hinson).) The facts relied on by plaintiffs concerning the company truck, including that there was only one truck and that the arrangement for using it was relatively informal, are insufficient to create a triable issue concerning its availability for use by Patel.

2008(See In re Marriage of Levine (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 585, 589 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ].) I also agree that the timeliness of transcript preparation was not properly before the court in these proceedings.

2008(See In re Marriage of Levine (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 585, 589 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 559 ].) I also agree that the timeliness of transcript preparation was not properly before the court in these proceedings.

2006It embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs’ access to evidence.” (Matchett v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 629 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 317 ], fns. omitted.) In 1982, the Legislature enacted section 1157.6 5 which extended the same discovery exemption provided by section 1157 to quality assurance committees “having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of mental health care rendered in county operated and contracted mental health facilities . . . .” The Legislature found that the “ ‘implementation of quality assurance has been

2006It embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs’ access to evidence.” (Matchett v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 629 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 317 ], fns. omitted.) In 1982, the Legislature enacted section 1157.6 5 which extended the same discovery exemption provided by section 1157 to quality assurance committees “having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of mental health care rendered in county operated and contracted mental health facilities . . . .” The Legislature found that the “ ‘implementation of quality assurance has been

2005(Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896, 901 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ].) The claimant is charged with knowledge of the six-month period and is obligated to inquire as to the status of the claim if he or she has not received a written rejection notice within a reasonable time after the County’s time to act or reject the claim has passed.

2005(Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896, 901 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 341 ].) The claimant is charged with knowledge of the six-month period and is obligated to inquire as to the status of the claim if he or she has not received a written rejection notice within a reasonable time after the County’s time to act or reject the claim has passed.

2003Cir. 1995) 315 U.S. App. D.C. 111 [ 70 F.3d 1323, 1328-1330 ] (Walls) [one who agrees to commit a murder for hire deserves the sentence for that crime, even if he initially offered only to beat the victim up]; United States v. Sanchez (11th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (Sanchez) [Eleventh Circuit has rejected sentencing entrapment as a viable defense]; Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d at p. 963, fn. 5 [Tenth Circuit finds the analogy to entrapment at the sentencing phase is misplaced, for once a defendant crosses the reasonably bright line between innocence and guilt, his criminal inclination has been

2003(See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 (Raven) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1145 , 1154 (Jones) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 294 , 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a s

2003Cir. 1995) 315 U.S. App. D.C. 111 [ 70 F.3d 1323, 1328-1330 ] (Walls) [one who agrees to commit a murder for hire deserves the sentence for that crime, even if he initially offered only to beat the victim up]; United States v. Sanchez (11th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (Sanchez) [Eleventh Circuit has rejected sentencing entrapment as a viable defense]; Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d at p. 963, fn. 5 [Tenth Circuit finds the analogy to entrapment at the sentencing phase is misplaced, for once a defendant crosses the reasonably bright line between innocence and guilt, his criminal inclination has been

2003(See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 (Raven) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1145 , 1154 (Jones) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 294 , 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a s

2003(See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 (Raven) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1145 , 1154 (Jones) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 294 , 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a s

2003(See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 (Raven) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1145 , 1154 (Jones) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 294 , 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a s

2003(See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir. 1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 (Raven) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1145 , 1154 (Jones) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 294 , 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a s

1995Courts have rejected the use of contempt proceedings and other devices to evade the requirements of section 111. (1 Cal. Juvenile Court Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar Supp. 1994) § 11.41 A, pp. 211-213; e.g., In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 ]; In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) Of course, the juvenile here was already a delinquent, and there is no prohibited “bootstrapping” from section 601 to section 602 in charging him with an additional crime.

1995Courts have rejected the use of contempt proceedings and other devices to evade the requirements of section 111. (1 Cal. Juvenile Court Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar Supp. 1994) § 11.41 A, pp. 211-213; e.g., In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 ]; In re Geronimo M. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 573, 587-588 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 532 ].) Of course, the juvenile here was already a delinquent, and there is no prohibited “bootstrapping” from section 601 to section 602 in charging him with an additional crime.

1988The rule in one form was articulated in People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 800 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 557 P.2d 995 ], as follows: “The [trial] court purported to pronounce judgment in a manner which would have augmented defendant’s sentence pursuant to [Penal Code] section 3024, subdivision (c). [Fn. omitted.] The court’s reliance on defendant’s prior conviction for the dual purpose of augmenting sentence and providing an essential element of the charged offense, however, runs afoul of the established rule that when a prior conviction constitutes an element of criminal conduct which otherw

1988The rule in one form was articulated in People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 800 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 557 P.2d 995 ], as follows: “The [trial] court purported to pronounce judgment in a manner which would have augmented defendant’s sentence pursuant to [Penal Code] section 3024, subdivision (c). [Fn. omitted.] The court’s reliance on defendant’s prior conviction for the dual purpose of augmenting sentence and providing an essential element of the charged offense, however, runs afoul of the established rule that when a prior conviction constitutes an element of criminal conduct which otherw

1988(People v. Loera (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 60 ].) On the substantive point, we must evaluate the present status of a rule prohibiting the dual use of certain facts in the imposition of sentence.

1988(People v. Loera (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 992, 998 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 60 ].) On the substantive point, we must evaluate the present status of a rule prohibiting the dual use of certain facts in the imposition of sentence.