status hearing in Texas

2011Sch. at Houston v. Than , 901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995) (citing Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 603 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 2700–01 (1972)).

2011Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 2700–01 (1972)).

2011It is undisputed that the trial court did not conduct a status hearing within sixty days of the temporary order, an initial permanency hearing within 180 days of the temporary order, or subsequent permanency hearings within 120 days of the most recent permanency hearings. [52] As we stated in T.T.F. , In a slightly different context, this court held in In re E.D.L. , 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied), that although family code section 262.201(a) requires a trial court to conduct a full adversary hearing within fourteen days of the date a governmental entity takes pos

2011It is undisputed that the trial court did not conduct a status hearing within sixty days of the temporary order, an initial permanency hearing within 180 days of the temporary order, or subsequent permanency hearings within 120 days of the most recent permanency hearings.52 As we stated in T.T.F., In a slightly different context, this court held in In re E.D.L., 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied), that although family code section 262.201(a) requires a trial court to conduct a full adversary hearing within fourteen days of the date a governmental entity takes possessi

2006See Farley v. M M Cattle Co. , 529 S.W.2d at 758 (in vitiating the common law doctrine of assumed risk, the court stated that the current status of the defense when founded upon contract or strict liability remains unaffected).

2006See Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d at 758 (in vitiating the common law doctrine of assumed risk, the court stated that the current status of the defense when founded upon contract or strict liability remains unaffected).

2015Moreover, a “respondent’s suspension cannot be revoked at the status hearing without prior notice that revocation will be sought, affording the respondent an opportunity to prepare a defense to the specific complaints.” In re Zandi, 270 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) ( per curiam, supp’l op. on reh’g).

2010See id. “[W]hen a person appears at a status hearing set by the court in a contempt or commitment order as a condition of suspension of his sentence for failure to pay child support, without notice of any assertion that suspension will be revoked, the court cannot revoke suspension without notice and a second hearing.” Id. at 78 (supp. op. on reh’g).

2013The trial court continued the trial setting and ordered the parties to appear for a status hearing on July 20, 2009, at which time a trial date would be set. 40 We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions to determine whether the court abused its discretion and whether its choice of sanctions was “just.” See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 2004) (noting sanctions orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(b), which allows trial court to

2013We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions to determine whether the court abused its discretion and whether its choice of sanctions was “just.” See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex.2004) (noting sanctions orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991) (citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(b), which allows trial court to make such orders as are “just” when party fails to comply with proper discovery requests).

2013The trial court continued the trial setting and ordered the parties to appear for a status hearing on July 20, 2009, at which time a trial date would be set. 40 We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions to determine whether the court abused its discretion and whether its choice of sanctions was “just.” See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 2004) (noting sanctions orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(b), which allows trial court to

2013We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions to determine whether the court abused its discretion and whether its choice of sanctions was “just.” See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex.2004) (noting sanctions orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991) (citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215(b), which allows trial court to make such orders as are “just” when party fails to comply with proper discovery requests).

2011See T.T.F. , 331 S.W.3d at 478 .

2011See T.T.F., 331 S.W.3d at 478 .

2006See In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no pet.) (remanding for status hearing); see also Latham v. Department of Family & Protective Servs., 177 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (looking to court of criminal appeals for guidance in dealing with indigent representation in termination cases); Tex. R.

2006See In re T.V. , 8 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.--Waco 1990, no pet.) (remanding for status hearing); see also Latham v. Department of Family & Protective Servs. , 177 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (looking to court of criminal appeals for guidance in dealing with indigent representation in termination cases); Tex. R.

2006See In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no pet.) (remanding for status hearing); see also Latham v. Department of Family & Protective Servs., 177 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (looking to court of criminal appeals for guidance in dealing with indigent representation in termination cases); Tex. R.

2006See In re T.V. , 8 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.--Waco 1990, no pet.) (remanding for status hearing); see also Latham v. Department of Family & Protective Servs. , 177 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (looking to court of criminal appeals for guidance in dealing with indigent representation in termination cases); Tex. R.

2004See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 25 .

2004See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 25 .

2003Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex.1965).

2003Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex.1965).

2025“Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant seeking to challenge counsel’s representation must establish that his counsel’s performance (1) was deficient, and (2) prejudiced his defense.” Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim.

2024The order does not address Mother’s parental rights or the possessory conservatorship of Beth. 5 At a status hearing held in November 2023, before the new trial was granted, the parties explained that there had been “a miscommunication” and that the terms of the agreement were not acceptable to the foster placement. 8 intent.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011).

2024“To discern that intent, we begin with the statute’s words.” Id.

2024App. 2016) (holding that judge who had appeared at a status hearing and signed defendant’s jury-trial waiver as a prosecutor was disqualified from subsequently presiding over defendant’s probation revocation hearing regardless of any actual bias harbored by judge because “the appearance of impropriety [was] palpable”); see also Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (“But to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).

2024App. 2016) (holding that judge who had appeared at a status hearing and signed defendant’s jury-trial waiver as a prosecutor was disqualified from subsequently presiding over defendant’s probation revocation hearing regardless of any actual bias harbored by judge because “the appearance of impropriety [was] palpable”); see also Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (“But to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).

2024As part of Appellant’s family service plan, he was ordered to: • maintaining safe, stable, and appropriate housing free from drugs and other illegal substances; • participate in a psychological evaluation and substance abuse assessment; • attend parenting classes; • submit to random drug and alcohol testing by urinalysis, hair follicle, or oral swab when requested, and “demonstrate sobriety” by testing negative; • attend and complete inpatient rehabilitation if he tests positive after May 16, 2023 , the date of the status hearing; • attend all scheduled visitation with his children; • particip

2024See Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); see also Suarez v. Suarez, No. 13-04-108-CV, 2006 WL 1194960 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 4, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Alfredo’s allegations in his motion for new trial regarding his failure to appear were neither verified nor supported by an affidavit or any other evidence.

2023Three of these four hearings occurred before an attorney was appointed to represent Appellant, and it is unknown from the record whether he was even present. -5- Concurring Opinion 04-22-00651-CV Required Participation in Services “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

2023See In re Blevins, 480 S.W.3d 542, 543 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). 6 more specific tax language elsewhere in the MSA controlled.

2023See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 ; Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n.8; Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585 .

2022See Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (explaining that it is the appellant’s burden to bring forward an appellate record showing reversible error).

2022See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (explaining that, absent a complete record on appeal, a court of appeals must presume the omitted items supported the trial court’s judgment).