86 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacumingreen2 sentences2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). | 38 | 59 |
Spinelli v. United Statesred2 sentences2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). | 14 | 26 |
State v. Moongreen2 sentences2006See Hilliard, 906 S.W.2d at 468 (concluding that a statement in the affidavit that the confidential informant had previously provided information resulting in the arrest and conviction of known drug dealers satisfied the “veracity” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test); Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 339 (stating that “ordinarily, the general credibility of an informant has been -5- shown by his having previously given relevant information to law enforcement which has proven to be reliable”). 2006See Hilliard, 906 S.W.2d at 468 (concluding that a statement in the affidavit that the confidential informant had previously provided information resulting in the arrest and conviction of known drug dealers satisfied the “veracity” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test); Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 339 (stating that “ordinarily, the general credibility of an informant has been -5- shown by his having previously given relevant information to law enforcement which has proven to be reliable”). | 11 | 16 |
State v. Cauleygreen2 sentences1998When probable cause is supplied by an affidavit and the informant is a professional informant drawn from the “criminal milieu,” Tennessee requires the application of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.6 State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 417 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tenn. 1989). 1998When probable cause is supplied by an affidavit and the informant is a professional informant drawn from the “criminal milieu,” Tennessee requires the application of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test.6 State v. Cauley, 863 S.W.2d 411, 417 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tenn. 1989). | 8 | 8 |
Aguilar v. Texasred2 sentences2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 2020The first question at issue is “[w]hether the trial court properly determined that the information as to the credibility and veracity of the C.I. in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was correct.” Previously, this State utilized the two-pronged Aguilar- Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.” Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). | 6 | 23 |
State v. Lowegreen2 sentences2017Case law warns against a hyper-technical application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and this court has previously provided that “[t]he requisite volume or detail of information needed to establish the informant’s credibility is not particularly great.” State v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn. Crim. 2017Case law warns against a hyper-technical application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and this court has previously provided that “[t]he requisite volume or detail of information needed to establish the informant’s credibility is not particularly great.” State v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tenn. Crim. | 5 | 5 |
State v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). 2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Lukegreen2 sentences2013However, our courts have also noted that the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to “citizen informants.” See State v. Luke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Tenn. Crim. 2013However, our courts have also noted that the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to “citizen informants.” See State v. Luke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Tenn. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Valentinegreen2 sentences2013State v. Valentine, 911 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1995). 2013State v. Valentine, 911 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1995). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Smothermangreen2 sentences2020The two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test was required if the hearsay information was being supplied by a criminal informant or a person from a “criminal milieu.” State v. Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. 2006). 2020The two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test was required if the hearsay information was being supplied by a criminal informant or a person from a “criminal milieu.” State v. Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. 2006). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Uptongreen2 sentences2015Jacumin, -6- 778 S.W.2d at 436 (citing Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Mass. 1985)). 2015Jacumin, -6- 778 S.W.2d at 436 (citing Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Mass. 1985)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Ballardgreen2 sentences2008The standard to be employed in reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is “ whether the issuing magistrate had ‘a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d at 662 (quoting State v. Ballard, 836 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1992)). -13- In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989), our supreme court adopted the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining whether an affidavit that relies upon allegations supplied by a criminal informant is sufficient to establish probable cause. 2008The standard to be employed in reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is “ whether the issuing magistrate had ‘a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d at 662 (quoting State v. Ballard, 836 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1992)). -13- In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989), our supreme court adopted the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining whether an affidavit that relies upon allegations supplied by a criminal informant is sufficient to establish probable cause. | 3 | 3 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2023The United States Supreme Court has also discussed that corroboration of innocent details may be enough “for the practical, common- sense judgment called for in making a probable cause determination.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (noting that an anonymous informant correctly informed police that the defendant’s car would be in Florida, that the defendant would fly to Florida in “the next day or so,” and that he would drive the car toward Bloomingdale, Illinois). - 21 - In Tuttle, our supreme court abandoned the Jacumin/Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining the credibility of anonymous or criminal in 2017See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); see also State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (adopting the Aguilar-Spinelli test over the totality of the circumstances approach announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). | 2 | 14 |
State v. Melsongreen2 sentences2011See id. at 356-57 ; see also State v. Luke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 637 (Tenn. Crim. 2011See id. at 356-57 ; see also State v. Luke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 637 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Taysgreen2 sentences2017See Tays, 836 S.W.2d at 600 (applying Aguilar-Spinelli test to the validity of an arrest based on information -6- supplied by a confidential informant). 2015See -7- State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (holding that the Aguilar-Spinelli test is “the standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper under” the Tennessee Constitution); Tays, 836 S.W.2d at 599 - 600 (holding that the Aguilar-Spinelli test is applied to determine the validity of a warrantless arrest). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wurtsgreen2 sentences2005Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli, 303 U.S. at 414-15. 2005Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ; see Spinelli, 303 U.S. at 414-15. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Pullygreen2 sentences1998The Jacumin court held that: while independent police corroboration could make up deficiencies in either prong, each prong represents an independently important consideration that “must be separately considered and satisfied in some way.” 778 S.W.2d at 436 (quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (1985)); see Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31 . 1998The Jacumin court held that: while independent police corroboration could make up deficiencies in either prong, each prong represents an independently important consideration that “must be separately considered and satisfied in some way.” 778 S.W.2d at 436 (quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 , 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (1985)); see Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Henninggreen2 sentences2016The State contended at oral argument that the cooperating individual‟s personal knowledge of the ongoing criminal activity at the target residence, combined with law enforcement‟s “extra step” of sending the cooperating individual into the home to confirm the cooperating individual‟s claim, took the need to establish the informant‟s basis of knowledge and veracity “out of the equation.” However, the State‟s argument disregards State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn. 1989), in which our supreme court espoused the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause wi 2016The State contended at oral argument that the cooperating individual‟s personal knowledge of the ongoing criminal activity at the target residence, combined with law enforcement‟s “extra step” of sending the cooperating individual into the home to confirm the cooperating individual‟s claim, took the need to establish the informant‟s basis of knowledge and veracity “out of the equation.” However, the State‟s argument disregards State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn. 1989), in which our supreme court espoused the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test “as the standard by which probable cause wi | 1 | 8 |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lewis Tuttlegreen2 sentences2025Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 289, 305-08 . 2025Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 289, 305-08 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). 2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2006See Hilliard, 906 S.W.2d at 468 (concluding that a statement in the affidavit that the confidential informant had previously provided information resulting in the arrest and conviction of known drug dealers satisfied the “veracity” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test); Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 339 (stating that “ordinarily, the general credibility of an informant has been -5- shown by his having previously given relevant information to law enforcement which has proven to be reliable”). 2006See Hilliard, 906 S.W.2d at 468 (concluding that a statement in the affidavit that the confidential informant had previously provided information resulting in the arrest and conviction of known drug dealers satisfied the “veracity” prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test); Moon, 841 S.W.2d at 339 (stating that “ordinarily, the general credibility of an informant has been -5- shown by his having previously given relevant information to law enforcement which has proven to be reliable”). | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanninggreen1 sentence2016State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2015See Tays, 836 S.W.2d at 600 (concluding that basis of knowledge prong was satisfied where informant told police officer that he had met with the defendant and learned that the defendant “could supply large amounts of” narcotics, and the defendant arrived in Nashville from the city and on the night “predicted by the informant”); see also State v. Brown, 898 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tenn. Crim. 2015See Tays, 836 S.W.2d at 600 (concluding that basis of knowledge prong was satisfied where informant told police officer that he had met with the defendant and learned that the defendant “could supply large amounts of” narcotics, and the defendant arrived in Nashville from the city and on the night “predicted by the informant”); see also State v. Brown, 898 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Bishopgreen2 sentences2015Bishop, 431 S.W.3d at 38 (Tenn. 2014); see Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290 . 2015Bishop, 431 S.W.3d at 38 (Tenn. 2014); see Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abernathygreen2 sentences2012State v. Abernathy, 159 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tenn.Crim.App.2004). 2012State v. Abernathy, 159 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tenn.Crim.App.2004). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). 2009If the arrest is partly based on information provided by an informant from the criminal milieu, the police must be able to show that the informant: “(1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.” Id. (citing State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tenn. 1997); and Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436 ) (adopting two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test); cf. State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Tenn. 1999)). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Massachusetts v. Uptongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Giordenello v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2014We recognized that magistrates and law enforcement officers making probable cause determinations are “practical people” striving to formulate “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 2014We recognized that magistrates and law enforcement officers making probable cause determinations are “practical people” striving to formulate “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 432 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Day
green
1 sentence2016State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Fred Louis Bell and Charles Lavern Beasley
green
2 sentences2013As stated above, if an informant is from the criminal milieu, “‘[the officers] must be able to demonstrate that the informant (1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. Crim. 2013As stated above, if an informant is from the criminal milieu, “‘[the officers] must be able to demonstrate that the informant (1) has a basis of knowledge and (2) is credible or his information is reliable.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Draper v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Luleff green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Wilke green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Hensley green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.