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9 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tamburino v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000Applying the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test, see id. at 823-24 , 241 S.E.2d at 764 , the Supreme Court upheld the affidavit, holding it provided “a sufficient basis for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Id. at 826 , 241 S.E.2d at 765 . 2000Applying the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test, see id. at 823-24 , 241 S.E.2d at 764 , the Supreme Court upheld the affidavit, holding it provided “a sufficient basis for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Id. at 826 , 241 S.E.2d at 765 . | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Ventrescagreen2 sentences1977Since the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to information obtained from eyewitnesses, and since facts and information related by other officers to the officer-affiant are considered reliable and credible, United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 111 ; United States v. Welebir, 498 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1974), we hold that each of the affidavits contained a sufficient showing of probable cause, the probability of criminal activity, to authorize the issuance of a search warrant and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered in searches conducted under the warr 1977Since the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to information obtained from eyewitnesses, and since facts and information related by other officers to the officer-affiant are considered reliable and credible, United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 111 ; United States v. Welebir, 498 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1974), we hold that each of the affidavits contained a sufficient showing of probable cause, the probability of criminal activity, to authorize the issuance of a search warrant and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered in searches conducted under the warr | 1 | 2 |
Robinson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . 2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000See also United States v. Liang, 538 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 190-92 , 278 S.E.2d 849, 851-52 (1981) (applying more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test). 2000See also United States v. Liang, 538 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 190-92 , 278 S.E.2d 849, 851-52 (1981) (applying more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Malchus George Lainggreen1 sentence2000See also United States v. Liang, 538 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 190-92 , 278 S.E.2d 849, 851-52 (1981) (applying more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test). | 1 | 1 |
Draper v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, 1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, | 1 | 1 |
Ker v. Californiagreen2 sentences1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, 1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, 1991LaFave Search and Seizure §3.3, at 73 n.26 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). 2 The credibility or reliability of an informant or informer can be established in any number of ways: for example, by showing that (1) the informer has previously given reliable information, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35-36 (1963); or (2) the informer previously has worked with the police and has made controlled buys or worked in narcotic surveillance or other law enforcement efforts, Tamburino v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 821 , *188 825, 241 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1978); or (3) the informer or tipster is a concerned citizen informer, | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1972The affidavit contains no statement of the underlying circumstances upon which the informant based his conclusion that “the premises to be searched are being unlawfully used by the occupants thereof for the illegal possession and distribution of controlled drugs . . . .” See Hooper v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 49, 51-52 , 181 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1971). 1972The affidavit contains no statement of the underlying circumstances upon which the informant based his conclusion that “the premises to be searched are being unlawfully used by the occupants thereof for the illegal possession and distribution of controlled drugs . . . .” See Hooper v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 49, 51-52 , 181 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2011While the majority is certainly correct that most courts, including those of the Commonwealth, no longer apply the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test in analyzing whether the police have probable cause based on a confidential informant’s tip, the two factors of the reliability or veracity of the informant AND the basis of the informant’s knowledge of impending criminal activity are still relevant factors that must be considered in any constitutional analysis under the totality-of-the-circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 2011While the majority is certainly correct that most courts, including those of the Commonwealth, no longer apply the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test in analyzing whether the police have probable cause based on a confidential informant’s tip, the two factors of the reliability or veracity of the informant AND the basis of the informant’s knowledge of impending criminal activity are still relevant factors that must be considered in any constitutional analysis under the totality-of-the-circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). | 4 | 1991–2011 |
Askew v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . 2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Russell v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . 2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McGuire v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . 2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Byrd v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . 2011“When a confidential informant provides the basis for probable cause, there are two considerations that are particularly relevant to our analysis: (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge.” Byrd, 50 Va.App. at 551 , 651 S.E.2d at 419 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2328 ); see also Robinson, 53 Va.App. at 738-40 , 675 S.E.2d at 209-11 ; Askew, 38 Va.App. at 723 , 568 S.E.2d at 406 ; Russell, 33 Va.App. at 610-11 , 535 S.E.2d at 702 ; McGuire, 31 Va.App. at 595-96 , 525 S.E.2d at 48 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Boyd v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1998"The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the rigid two-step analysis known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test is no longer required when deciding whether information provided by an informer establishes probable cause; rather, courts should utilize the more 'fluid' totality-of-the-circumstances approach." Id. at 186, 402 S.E.2d at 919 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32 ). 1998"The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the rigid two-step analysis known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test is no longer required when deciding whether information provided by an informer establishes probable cause; rather, courts should utilize the more 'fluid' totality-of-the-circumstances approach." Id. at 186, 402 S.E.2d at 919 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Haberman
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 131-33 , 390 A.2d at 281-82 . 1997Id. at 131-33 , 390 A.2d at 281-82 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences1978A determination whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant should be “based upon a *1023 common-sense reading of the entire affidavit.” Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 415 ; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 1978A determination whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant should be “based upon a *1023 common-sense reading of the entire affidavit.” Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 415 ; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Andrew J. Welebir
green
2 sentences1977Since the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to information obtained from eyewitnesses, and since facts and information related by other officers to the officer-affiant are considered reliable and credible, United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 111 ; United States v. Welebir, 498 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1974), we hold that each of the affidavits contained a sufficient showing of probable cause, the probability of criminal activity, to authorize the issuance of a search warrant and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered in searches conducted under the warr 1977Since the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply to information obtained from eyewitnesses, and since facts and information related by other officers to the officer-affiant are considered reliable and credible, United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 111 ; United States v. Welebir, 498 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1974), we hold that each of the affidavits contained a sufficient showing of probable cause, the probability of criminal activity, to authorize the issuance of a search warrant and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered in searches conducted under the warr | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.