Aguilar-Spinelli test (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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Aguilar-Spinelli test in District of Columbia

6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Spinelli v. United Statesred
scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1977–1989
2 sentences

1977See Spinelli v. United States, supra at 417-18, 89 S.Ct. 584 . *256 Similarly, the basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis was weak in Galloway .

1977See Spinelli v. United States, supra at 417-18, 89 S.Ct. 584 . *256 Similarly, the basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis was weak in Galloway .

22
Illinois v. Gatesgreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1985–2017
2 sentences

1985Two years ago, however, the Supreme Court discarded the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted a new standard for probable cause, based on the “totality of the circumstances,” in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

1985Two years ago, however, the Supreme Court discarded the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted a new standard for probable cause, based on the “totality of the circumstances,” in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

12
Goldston v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1989 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017The issue is whether the police had a reasonable, particularized suspicion that appellant was the assailant. 11 “Prior to 1983, cases involving informant tips were analyzed under a somewhat rigid and mechanical two-pronged analysis – the Aguilar-Spinelli test.” Goldston v. United States, 562 A.2d 96, 98 (D.C. 1989).4 That test required an adequate showing as to “both the veracity or reliability of the informant and the informant’s ‘basis of knowledge’ for the information.” Id.

2017The issue is whether the police had a reasonable, particularized suspicion that appellant was the assailant. 11 “Prior to 1983, cases involving informant tips were analyzed under a somewhat rigid and mechanical two-pronged analysis – the Aguilar-Spinelli test.” Goldston v. United States, 562 A.2d 96, 98 (D.C. 1989).4 That test required an adequate showing as to “both the veracity or reliability of the informant and the informant’s ‘basis of knowledge’ for the information.” Id.

11
Rushing v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1977 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985See also Rushing v. United States, supra, 381 A.2d at 254-255 .

1985See also Rushing v. United States, supra, 381 A.2d at 254-255 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Aguilar v. Texas red
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

1977Under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, hearsay may be found trustworthy if there is proof regarding (1) the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his *255 information reliable; [1] and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that a crime was being committed. [2] Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509 .

1977Under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, hearsay may be found trustworthy if there is proof regarding (1) the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his *255 information reliable; [1] and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that a crime was being committed. [2] Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509 .

31977–1989
Rutledge v. United States green
dc · 1978
2 sentences

1991Rutledge v. United States, supra, 392 A.2d at 1065 . 7 *282 Here, the informant made two telephone calls.

1991Rutledge v. United States, supra, 392 A.2d at 1065 . 7 *282 Here, the informant made two telephone calls.

11991–1991
Nance v. United States green
dc · 1977
2 sentences

1978Nance v. United States, supra, 377 A.2d at 389 .

1978Nance v. United States, supra, 377 A.2d at 389 .

11978–1978

Where else courts name it

NY 312 (1975–2025) MA 119 (1985–2025) WA 87 (1973–2023) TN 86 (1991–2025) CT 44 (1984–2021) CO 43 (1973–2021) TX 35 (1982–2012) NM 29 (1989–2025) PA 29 (1973–2018) AK 21 (1985–2016) IL 17 (1977–2006) GA 15 (1975–1992) ID 15 (1980–2012) MI 13 (1982–2021) AL 12 (1982–2004) CA 10 (1983–2017) VA 9 (1972–2011) UT 8 (1984–2003) FL 8 (1978–1995) MD 8 (1974–2007) VT 7 (1989–2018) OH 7 (1988–2025) DC 6 (1977–2017) MT 6 (1978–2020) NC 5 (1983–2008) OK 5 (1973–1991) SD 4 (1976–2006) OR 3 (1985–2020) RI 3 (1984–2001) MS 3 (1985–2007) LA 3 (1983–1983) DE 2 (2008–2018) NH 2 (1985–1986) WY 2 (1992–1993) ND 2 (1985–1988) IN 2 (1988–1988) MN 2 (1978–1985) IA 2 (1990–2022) NJ 2 (1987–1991)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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