Aguilar-Spinelli test in California

2017Defendant claims that, although the United States Supreme Court discarded the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances test in Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ] (Gates), affidavits in support of wiretap authorizations in California must be tested using the Aguilar-Spinelli test because (1) the Wiretap Act was enacted after Proposition 8’s truth-in-evidence provision was added to the California Constitution and (2) the Wiretap Act was passed by at least a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature, thus excepting it from the

2017Defendant claims that, although the United States Supreme Court discarded the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances test in Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ] (Gates), affidavits in support of wiretap authorizations in California must be tested using the Aguilar-Spinelli test because (1) the Wiretap Act was enacted after Proposition 8’s truth-in-evidence provision was added to the California Constitution and (2) the Wiretap Act was passed by at least a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature, thus excepting it from the

1988Citing People v. Schmidt (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 172, 177 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 171 ], which relies on the Aguilar-Spinelli test of probable cause, appellant contends the search warrant affidavit was insufficient for lack of evidence that Smith and Daley were credible or reliable informants.

1988Citing People v. Schmidt (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 172, 177 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 171 ], which relies on the Aguilar-Spinelli test of probable cause, appellant contends the search warrant affidavit was insufficient for lack of evidence that Smith and Daley were credible or reliable informants.

2017(See People v. Love, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 107-108 [applying Gates]; see also In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 896 [Legislature did not intend to abrogate truth-in-evidence provision by reenactment of § 1538.5].).) If the Legislature, when enacting the Wiretap Act, had intended to adopt the Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining probable cause and deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained by wiretap, it could have done so expressly.

2017(See People v. Love, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 107-108 [applying Gates]; see also In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 896 [Legislature did not intend to abrogate truth-in-evidence provision by reenactment of § 1538.5].).) If the Legislature, when enacting the Wiretap Act, had intended to adopt the Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining probable cause and deciding whether to exclude evidence obtained by wiretap, it could have done so expressly.

2017(People v. Superior Court (Ramirez) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 ] [presumption that omission in statute is intentional].) *1009 Finally, the Legislature intended the Wiretap Act to conform to federal law, as reflected in title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ( 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.).

2017(People v. Superior Court (Ramirez) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 ] [presumption that omission in statute is intentional].) *1009 Finally, the Legislature intended the Wiretap Act to conform to federal law, as reflected in title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ( 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.).

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

2017This Aguilar-Spinelli test required that the affidavit in support of the warrant (1) allege the informant’s statement in factual, rather than conclusionary, language and establish the informant’s personal knowledge and (2) contain sufficient underlying factual information reasonably supporting the informant’s credibility and the information’s reliability. ( Aguilar, supra, 378 U.S. 108 ; Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. 410 ; see also People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 397 , 553 P.2d 557 ].) The California Supreme Court used the Aguilar-Spinelli test, as mandated by the binding

2017This Aguilar-Spinelli test required that the affidavit in support of the warrant (1) allege the informant’s statement in factual, rather than conclusionary, language and establish the informant’s personal knowledge and (2) contain sufficient underlying factual information reasonably supporting the informant’s credibility and the information’s reliability. ( Aguilar, supra, 378 U.S. 108 ; Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. 410 ; see also People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 397 , 553 P.2d 557 ].) The California Supreme Court used the Aguilar-Spinelli test, as mandated by the binding

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

2017(See People v. Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 850 .) According to the California Supreme Court, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was “ ‘a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 768, fn. 3 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 755 P.2d 310 ] (Belmontes), overruled on other grounds in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 118 [ 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 ], and People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 ].) In Gates, decided in 1983,

1988Instead, probable cause should be determined based on the totality of circumstances, in a practical commonsense determination whether, given all the circumstances, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant, there is a fair probability of the truth of the information. ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ].) After Proposition 8, evidence which would be admissible under the standard of Illinois v. Gates, supra , is admissible in California. ( People v. Medina (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 11, 16-17 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 216 ].) (2) Under th

1988Instead, probable cause should be determined based on the totality of circumstances, in a practical commonsense determination whether, given all the circumstances, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant, there is a fair probability of the truth of the information. ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ].) After Proposition 8, evidence which would be admissible under the standard of Illinois v. Gates, supra , is admissible in California. ( People v. Medina (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 11, 16-17 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 216 ].) (2) Under th

1988Other ‘indicia of reliability,’ such as . . . corroborative evidence obtained independently may buttress the credibility of an arrestee’s statement.” ( Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 883-884; see People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 337-338 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 455 P.2d 419 ], and cases cited.) Although the magistrate and parties below did not have the benefit of a reading of Campa , reasonably competent counsel at that time would have been familiar with the principles reiterated in this court’s earlier cases which applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

1988Other ‘indicia of reliability,’ such as . . . corroborative evidence obtained independently may buttress the credibility of an arrestee’s statement.” ( Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 883-884; see People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 337-338 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 455 P.2d 419 ], and cases cited.) Although the magistrate and parties below did not have the benefit of a reading of Campa , reasonably competent counsel at that time would have been familiar with the principles reiterated in this court’s earlier cases which applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

1988Other ‘indicia of reliability,’ such as . . . corroborative evidence obtained independently may buttress the credibility of an arrestee’s statement.” ( Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 883-884; see People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 337-338 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 455 P.2d 419 ], and cases cited.) Although the magistrate and parties below did not have the benefit of a reading of Campa , reasonably competent counsel at that time would have been familiar with the principles reiterated in this court’s earlier cases which applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

1988Other ‘indicia of reliability,’ such as . . . corroborative evidence obtained independently may buttress the credibility of an arrestee’s statement.” ( Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 883-884; see People v. Scoma (1969) 71 Cal.2d 332, 337-338 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 455 P.2d 419 ], and cases cited.) Although the magistrate and parties below did not have the benefit of a reading of Campa , reasonably competent counsel at that time would have been familiar with the principles reiterated in this court’s earlier cases which applied the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

1985As explained by Professor La Fave, "in the hearsay-upon-hearsay situation, as where an informant of established reliability tells police what someone else has told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect to each person in the hearsay chain." (La Fave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978) § 3.3, p. 530; see also Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ), supra, 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-473 ; but see In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 679 ]; Peopl

1985As explained by Professor La Fave, "in the hearsay-upon-hearsay situation, as where an informant of established reliability tells police what someone else has told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect to each person in the hearsay chain." (La Fave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978) § 3.3, p. 530; see also Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ), supra, 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-473 ; but see In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 679 ]; Peopl

1985Although Gates abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for determining probable cause, it did not abandon the fundamental rule that if hearsay declarations are used to establish probable cause, the affidavit must provide a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay declarations. ( Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 270 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ]; United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 684 , 85 S.Ct. 741 ]; see also federal cases cited in People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ) (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-475 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 157

1985Although Gates abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for determining probable cause, it did not abandon the fundamental rule that if hearsay declarations are used to establish probable cause, the affidavit must provide a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay declarations. ( Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 270 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ]; United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 684 , 85 S.Ct. 741 ]; see also federal cases cited in People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ) (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-475 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 157

1985Although Gates abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for determining probable cause, it did not abandon the fundamental rule that if hearsay declarations are used to establish probable cause, the affidavit must provide a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay declarations. ( Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 270 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ]; United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 684 , 85 S.Ct. 741 ]; see also federal cases cited in People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ) (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-475 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 157

1985Although Gates abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for determining probable cause, it did not abandon the fundamental rule that if hearsay declarations are used to establish probable cause, the affidavit must provide a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay declarations. ( Jones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 270 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 ]; United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 684 , 85 S.Ct. 741 ]; see also federal cases cited in People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ) (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-475 [ 154 Cal. Rptr. 157

1985As explained by Professor La Fave, "in the hearsay-upon-hearsay situation, as where an informant of established reliability tells police what someone else has told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect to each person in the hearsay chain." (La Fave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978) § 3.3, p. 530; see also Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ), supra, 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-473 ; but see In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 679 ]; Peopl

1985As explained by Professor La Fave, "in the hearsay-upon-hearsay situation, as where an informant of established reliability tells police what someone else has told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect to each person in the hearsay chain." (La Fave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (1978) § 3.3, p. 530; see also Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Bingham ), supra, 91 Cal. App.3d 463, 472-473 ; but see In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 679 ]; Peopl

1983(See, e.g., People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 179-180 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 454 P.2d 681 ].) A. This Informant Did Not Qualify as a “Citizen Informant. ” The officer’s affidavit identifies the source of this information about defendant’s cocaine trafficking as a citizen informant.

1983(See, e.g., People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 179-180 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 454 P.2d 681 ].) A. This Informant Did Not Qualify as a “Citizen Informant. ” The officer’s affidavit identifies the source of this information about defendant’s cocaine trafficking as a citizen informant.

1983(People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 , 50 A.L.R.2d 513 ]; People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 667 P.2d 149 ].) Decisions by our Supreme Court indicate that it has adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli standard to test compliance with the probable cause requirement of article I, section 13.

1983(People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 , 50 A.L.R.2d 513 ]; People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 667 P.2d 149 ].) Decisions by our Supreme Court indicate that it has adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli standard to test compliance with the probable cause requirement of article I, section 13.

1983(People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 422-423, fn. 2 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 439 P.2d 321 ]; Alexander v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 387, 390 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 483 , 508 P.2d 1131 ].) It is not the office of this court to declare that standard abandoned.

1983(People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 422-423, fn. 2 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 439 P.2d 321 ]; Alexander v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 387, 390 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 483 , 508 P.2d 1131 ].) It is not the office of this court to declare that standard abandoned.

1983(People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 422-423, fn. 2 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 439 P.2d 321 ]; Alexander v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 387, 390 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 483 , 508 P.2d 1131 ].) It is not the office of this court to declare that standard abandoned.

1983(People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 422-423, fn. 2 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 439 P.2d 321 ]; Alexander v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 387, 390 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 483 , 508 P.2d 1131 ].) It is not the office of this court to declare that standard abandoned.