articulated standard in West Virginia

2016In syllabus point two of State v. Myers, 159 W.Va. 353 , 222 S.E.2d 300 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), this Court articulated the standard applicable to this issue: When a defendant in a criminal case raises the issue of insanity, the test of his responsibility for his act is whether, at the time of the commission of the act, it was the result of a mental disease- or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his act to the requirements of the.law, and it is error

2016In syllabus point two of State v. Myers, 159 W.Va. 353 , 222 S.E.2d 300 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), this Court articulated the standard applicable to this issue: When a defendant in a criminal case raises the issue of insanity, the test of his responsibility for his act is whether, at the time of the commission of the act, it was the result of a mental disease- or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his act to the requirements of the.law, and it is error

2016In syllabus point two of State v. Myers, 159 W.Va. 353 , 222 S.E.2d 300 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), this Court articulated the standard applicable to this issue: When a defendant in a criminal case raises the issue of insanity, the test of his responsibility for his act is whether, at the time of the commission of the act, it was the result of a mental disease- or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his act to the requirements of the.law, and it is error

2016In syllabus point two of State v. Myers, 159 W.Va. 353 , 222 S.E.2d 300 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657 , 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), this Court articulated the standard applicable to this issue: When a defendant in a criminal case raises the issue of insanity, the test of his responsibility for his act is whether, at the time of the commission of the act, it was the result of a mental disease- or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his act to the requirements of the.law, and it is error

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg clarified that not every improper prosecutorial remark will result in reversal of a conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In the present case, the State maintains that examination of the Sugg factors indicates that reversal is not required and that the prosecutor’s arguments, even if deemed improper, did not result in “manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), thi

2005Syllabus point five of Sugg clarified that not every improper prosecutorial remark will result in reversal of a conviction: “A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice.” In the present case, the State maintains that examination of the Sugg factors indicates that reversal is not required and that the prosecutor’s arguments, even if deemed improper, did not result in “manifest injustice.” In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463 , 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), thi

2005In syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) this Court articulated the factors to be examined when analyzing an alleged prejudicial prosecutorial remark, as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecuto-rial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accuse

2005In syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) this Court articulated the factors to be examined when analyzing an alleged prejudicial prosecutorial remark, as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecuto-rial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accuse

2000Vagueness Challenge The Sales additionally contend that the curfew ordinance is unconstitutionally *458 vague [20] because it does not provide adequate notice as to what constitutes an offense and because it contains undefined terms. [21] In the seminal case of State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111 , 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974), this Court articulated the standard applicable when a law is challenged as being unconstitutionally vague.

2000Vagueness Challenge The Sales additionally contend that the curfew ordinance is unconstitutionally *458 vague [20] because it does not provide adequate notice as to what constitutes an offense and because it contains undefined terms. [21] In the seminal case of State v. Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111 , 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974), this Court articulated the standard applicable when a law is challenged as being unconstitutionally vague.

2000In syllabus point one of State v. Tanner, 171 W.Va. 529 , 301 S.E.2d 160 (1982), this Court articulated the test for compulsion, proof of which can be found to excuse the commission of a criminal act: In general, an act that would otherwise be a crime may be excused if it was done under compulsion or duress, because there is then no criminal intent.

2000In syllabus point one of State v. Tanner, 171 W.Va. 529 , 301 S.E.2d 160 (1982), this Court articulated the test for compulsion, proof of which can be found to excuse the commission of a criminal act: In general, an act that would otherwise be a crime may be excused if it was done under compulsion or duress, because there is then no criminal intent.

1999This Court articulated the standard for admission of a prior inconsistent statement in Syllabus point 1 of State v. Blake, *335 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550 (1996).

1999This Court articulated the standard for admission of a prior inconsistent statement in Syllabus point 1 of State v. Blake, *335 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550 (1996).

1999DISCUSSION A. Application of Summary Judgment to a Persinger Cause of Action In syllabus point 4 of Persinger v. Peabody Coal Co., 196 W.Va. 707 , 474 S.E.2d 887 (1996), this Court articulated the standard for pleading and proving a workers' compensation fraud action: In order for a plaintiff employee to prevail on the narrowly construed cause of action by the employee against an employer for fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, the employee must (1) plead his or her claim with particularity, specifically identifying the facts and circumstances th

1999DISCUSSION A. Application of Summary Judgment to a Persinger Cause of Action In syllabus point 4 of Persinger v. Peabody Coal Co., 196 W.Va. 707 , 474 S.E.2d 887 (1996), this Court articulated the standard for pleading and proving a workers' compensation fraud action: In order for a plaintiff employee to prevail on the narrowly construed cause of action by the employee against an employer for fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, the employee must (1) plead his or her claim with particularity, specifically identifying the facts and circumstances th

1998STANDARD OF REVIEW In syllabus point 2 of Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788 ; 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995), this Court articulated its standard of review in lawyer disciplinary matters; A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record made before the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent judg

1998STANDARD OF REVIEW In syllabus point 2 of Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788 ; 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995), this Court articulated its standard of review in lawyer disciplinary matters; A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record made before the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent judg

1998This Court articulated the standard of review on appeal by stating, “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syllabus Point 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588 , 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

1998This Court articulated the standard of review on appeal by stating, “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syllabus Point 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588 , 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

1991This Court articulated the standard of review to test the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial in syllabus point 1 of State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517 , 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978): *239 In a criminal case, a verdict of guilt will not be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, where the state’s evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

1991This Court articulated the standard of review to test the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial in syllabus point 1 of State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517 , 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978): *239 In a criminal case, a verdict of guilt will not be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, where the state’s evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

1979The most articulated standard is the one announced in the Keogh case [United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968)] where the court defined three categories of unconstitutional prosecutorial suppression: (1) Deliberate bad faith suppression for the very purpose of obstructing the defense, or the intentional failure to disclose evidence whose high probative value to the defense could not have escaped the prosecutor’s attention; (2) deliberate refusal to honor a request for evidence which is material to guilt or punishment irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor in refus *

1979Va. at 833 , 197 S.E.2d at 645 ] Cowan also placed a great deal of reliance on our early case of State v. Price, 100 W.

1979The most articulated standard is the one announced in the Keogh case [United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968)] where the court defined three categories of unconstitutional prosecutorial suppression: (1) Deliberate bad faith suppression for the very purpose of obstructing the defense, or the intentional failure to disclose evidence whose high probative value to the defense could not have escaped the prosecutor’s attention; (2) deliberate refusal to honor a request for evidence which is material to guilt or punishment irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor in refus *

1979Va. at 833 , 197 S.E.2d at 645 ] Cowan also placed a great deal of reliance on our early case of State v. Price, 100 W.